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Abstract 
This thesis explores the variety of ways in which scientific views of genetic testing 
are portrayed in the realm of popular culture. As a case study, I have used the 
identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer which occurred in New 
Zealand in 1998, and was the result of a partnership between the affected whanau and 
scientists from the University of Otago. Both the empirical and theoretical findings of 
this project have shown how physical processes, such as cancer, are constructed 
beyond biology, and how such accounts are not neutral or transparent. Rather, they 
are positioned to represent certain values and ideas, and this is even more evident 
when those affected are Maori. 
However, considering textual representations of the gene and cancer has revealed the 
importance of taking into account the fact that these 'things' are also physical and 
material. I consider the implications of this and consider the ways in which the 
whanau health workers negotiate the fetishism apparent in biomedicine. Despite its 
misgivings, biomedicine has immense benefits, some of which the whanau have 
manipulated and appropriated for their own good, although they do so on their own 
terms. Despite the many complexities involved in this case study, this is a positive and 
hopeful story where those involved in the stomach cancer gene project have emerged 
with improved solutions. 
i 
Acknowledgements 
There have been many people who have helped me somewhere along the way in the 
research and writing of this thesis. First of all, however, it must be mentioned that this 
project, in its present form, would not have been possible without the participation of 
those who were interested and kind enough to talk to me about their experiences of 
working in the partnership which led to the identification of the gene for hereditary 
stomach cancer. It was a privilege to hear your remarkable stories, and in return, I 
hope this thesis can contribute something positive to the way you think about all that's 
happened in this partnership. 
Dr Ruth Fitzgerald has also been pivotal in the undertaking of this thesis. As my 
supervisor and an academic in the real sense of the word, she has worked above and 
beyond the call of duty and lost a lot of sleep along the way. Her ability to articulate 
what I couldn't and her encouraging and kind words were great motivators, as were 
her words of wisdom not only about the processes involved in such a project, but also 
about life generally. 
Dr Parry Guilford's role as facilitator of many aspects of this project must also be 
acknowledged. Thanks for being accessible, and taking the time to answer all my 
queries when you were under absolutely no obligation to do so. Thanks also to 
Associate Professor Mike Legge for answering my questions and providing me with 
'Baby' literature on genetics and cancer. I am grateful also to Jenny Rankine for 
sharing her work and thoughts on the same case study. 
Equally important to this project has been the peer support I have received from 
others in the same boat. A big thank you to the following people: Susanna for her 
invaluable advice and crash course on undertaking fieldwork; Stephanie for listening 
to my gripes and being sympathetic; Anar for being able to translate biochemistry into 
everyday language, and for checking the drafts and clarifying points that were lost in 
translation; Buzz for the computer tips and moral support; and Phil for his research 
assistance. Last but not least, thanks to Rohan for being a human spell-check and 







Chapter One: Introduction 
Background to the Case Study 
Fetishism and Corporealization: Organizing Threads 
Overview of the Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter Two: Defining Technoscience and Popular Culture 
Technoscience Versus The Orthodox View of Science 
Eurocentrism and the Construction of Science 
Race and Gender 
Is Science Multicultural? 
Anthropologists and the Construction of Science 
Defining the Notion of Technoscience 
The World of Popular Culture 
A Consideration of the Public Understanding of Science 
Re-defining the role and importance of the 'Public' 
Public Ambivalence 
Chapter Three: The Construction of Technoscience and 
Biomedicine in Popular Culture 
Assessing Popular Culture Accounts of the Identification of the Gene 
for Hereditary Stomach Cancer 
The Case Study in Context 
The Notion of Whiteness 
Resistance to Labelling 
Tradition and Modernity 
Moral Qualities of Technoscience and Biomedicine 
Metaphors in Technoscience, Biomedicine and Popular Culture 
The Cultural Construction of Cancer and the Body 
Metaphor As Strategy 
Cultural Constructions of the Gene 
Gene Fetishism: Separation of the 'Natural' and Cultural 



































Chapter Four: Medical Intervention 73 
The Conundrum 74 
The Implications of Genetic Testing 75 
Taussig and Biomedical Fetishism 78 
An Embodied Approach 80 
The Phenomenon of Fetishism in the Realm of Biomedicine 81 
The Medical Encounter and Medical Practice 85 
Illness Narratives 87 
Public Health and Surveillance 93 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Narratives 94 
Negotiating and Negating Fetishism 99 
Chapter Five: Personal Accounts 101 
The Social Reality of (Techno)Science 102 
The Construction of the Gene 113 
The Notion of Embodied Suffering 117 
The Realm of Popular Culture: Media, Metaphors and the 'Public' 121 




Table 1: Key examples from Media Accounts illustrating the theme Notion of 
Whiteness 67 
Table 2: Key examples illustrating the theme Tradition and Modernity 68 
Table 3: Key examples illustrating the theme Resistance to Labelling 68 
Table 4: Key examples illustrating the theme The Moral Qualities of Science and 
Biomedicine 69 
Table 5: Key examples of how the Body, Disease and Genetics are portrayed in my 
~~s m 
Table 6: Key Examples of statements with connotations of War and Violence in my 
analysis 71 





'the term gene signifies a node of durable action where many actors, human and 
nonhuman, meet' (Haraway 1997: 142). 
In the past twenty years or so, there has been a plethora of research projects in the 
area of human genetics, not only in scientific literature, but in the mass media as well 
(Finkler 2000: 1). My initial interest in examining how genetic testing is portrayed in 
popular culture stemmed from an awareness of the increasing volume of literature and 
information about genetics that has appeared in these realms. Anthropologist Kaja 
Finkler (2000: 1) notes that the mass media portray 'discoveries' in genetics as an 
incredible new frontier, and that such reports present the new trend toward the 
geneticization of existence as an amazing innovation in scientific achievement. As I 
came to realise subsequently in this project, the increasing focus and emphasis on the 
fundamental importance of genetics, notions of the gene and its representation in 
biomedical and scientific discourse as well as popular culture, has far-reaching 
implications for how we come to understand and experience these realms. 
Anthropologist Paul Rabinow (1992) focuses on the new genetics as a practice of life, 
believing it to be a potent site for the emergence of new knowledges and powers 
(1992: 236). He argues that the new genetics will be a primary force for influencing 
the shaping of society and life because 'it will be embedded throughout 
the social fabric at the microlevel by medical practices and a variety of other 
discourses' (ibid.: 241). This, he claims, will occur through strategies of medical 
intervention such as prevention and surveillance as the new genetics becomes an 
increasingly prevalent and formidable force in our everyday lives, requiring us to be 
aware of genetic risk and what this could mean (ibid.: 242-243). The focus of my 
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research thus highlights the complexities of the microlevel of this 'social fabric' by 
examining the manner in which the worlds of science and popular culture interact and 
intersect with each other to inform and influence accounts of genetics research. 
Background to the Case Study 
A central part of examining the variety of ways in which genetic testing is portrayed 
in popular culture included considering how it is described by the accounts of 
scientists and other researchers working in this area. In order to effectively elucidate 
this, I have used as a case study the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach 
cancer which occurred in New Zealand in 1998. A central focus of this thesis 
concentrates on the varied popular culture accounts of this groundbreaking work. 
The project to investigate high rates of gastric cancer in one particular whanau was 
initiated in 1994 by the affected whanau (Rankine and McCreanor in press: 10). 
While the majority of the whanau strongly suspected it was hereditary (members as 
young as 14 were affected)1, a small minority of members believed in a historical 
notion that it was a curse placed upon them for selling a hill to be quarried fifty years 
ago. This notion was grossly exaggerated in media accounts and the fact that the 
overwhelmingly majority of whanau members believed it to be hereditary was down 
played. In 1995 the whanau approached the Health Research Council for information 
about the availability of genetics research teams to investigate the high rates of gastric 
cancer. They chose to initiate a partnership with researchers from the Cancer Genetics 
Laboratory at the University of Otago in Dunedin (Rankine and McCreanor in press: 
10). In 1998 these geneticists found that this particular form of gastric cancer was 
caused by a variation in one particular gene.2 The finding was a world first and thus 
highly publicised both here and overseas. 
Essentially, my project consisted of two phases. In the first phase I undertook an 
analysis of the popular culture accounts of the finding of the defective gene (including 
1Rankine and McCreanor note that 'Their experience is unusual as gastric cancer usually occurs in 
reople over retirement age' (in press: 10). 
While it is a variation in one particular gene (E-cadherin) that is the cause of stomach cancer, media 
accounts and this thesis refer to it as a gene that causes hereditary stomach cancer for the sake of 
simplicity. 
Tania Campbell 2 
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newspapers, magazines, internet, radio, and television accounts). I also considered 
accounts of the work that appeared in children's literature and scientific literature. 
Popular culture is an important medium for understanding the importance of genetic 
testing in contemporary Western society because popular representation is 
significantly more transparent and accessible than scientific discourse. Sociologists 
Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee (1995) note that popular culture is a way of 
accessing the social concerns and popular understandings of the gene that are 
influencing contemporary concepts, both in science and molecular genetics, as well as 
culture generally (1995: 10). My analysis follows in a similar vein to these authors 
who argue that it is not the contrast between scientific and popular culture that is 
interesting, but rather, it is the intersection (1995: 4). The concept of popular culture is 
discussed in more depth further in this section in the overview of chapter two. 
The second phase of my research involved interviewing key researchers who were 
intimately involved in the stomach cancer research project. I interviewed three 
scientists who were involved in the 'scientific' research that led to the identification of 
the gene, and two members of the whanau research team who also played a pivotal 
role in undertaking research, notably genealogical research and collecting tissue 
samples for testing. 3 I then embarked on analysing both the similarities and the points 
of contradiction between the worldviews of these people. This highlighted a myriad of 
complexities apparent in the labour undertaken by them, and I will discuss this in 
more detail in the overview of chapter five, which considers the personal accounts of 
those involved in undertaking the research in the partnership. Throughout this thesis, 
my stance is against the colonialist notion that objects of study are voiceless and, as 
stated by Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999: 61) ' ... do not contribute to research or 
science'. As considered in chapters three, four and five, this case study proves this 
claim false. 
In terms of methodology, this project is characterised by inductive analysis, whereby 
'analysis is built up from the ground rather than imposed from above' (Brewer 2000: 
3 All of those interviewed about their experience of the partnership ( except for one scientist who resides 
overseas) are still involved in the partnership in some capacity. The scientists still undertake diagnostic 
testing and the whanau health researchers still collect samples for testing, and have moved into 
counselling and advocacy roles as well. 
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151). This kind of analysis requires that the early stages of research be embedded in 
the data so that the points of interest emerge from the data itself. The advantage of this 
is that theory emerges from practice, allowing for connections and explanations to 
emerge that are related to and grounded in the social world they describe (ibid.: 151-
152). Part of this empirical research also involved undertaking participant 
observation. This is beneficial in that it allows one to observe how people understand 
and experience acts of daily life (Burawoy 1991: 2); and sociologist Danny Jorgensen 
(1989: 15) notes that it provides 'direct experiential and observational access to the 
insiders' world of meaning'. Other methods I have used in researching this project 
include discourse analysis and interviewing, which are discussed further in this 
chapter. 
The fieldwork component of this research however, was undertaken in a very short 
time, as I spent only two days in one research location, and visited the scientists on 
several occasions, although usually for no longer than an hour. This brings to mind 
comments put forth by anthropologists Akbar Ahmed and Cris Shore who have 
argued that social anthropology, as it currently exists, is at risk of becoming both 
marginalised and redundant unless it adapts to the ever-changing world which poses a 
threat to its theories, methods and practices (Ahmed and Shore 1995: 15). This entails 
re-evaluating its usual objects of study and developing novel areas and methods of 
enquiry that are 'commensurate with the new subjects and social forces that are 
emerging in the contemporary world' (Ahmed and Shore 1995: 15-16). More 
specifically, they note that time is one problematic area for anthropology's relevance 
in the contemporary world. They argue that given the same time and resources as the 
anthropologist, a competent journalist could produce the same quality of analysis that 
an anthropologist could, except the journalist could do it more cheaply, faster and in a 
way that is accessible to a much wider audience (Ahmed and Shore 1995: 23). 
In conjunction, these authors argue that anthropology is unable to deal with current 
affairs, due (in part) to its traditions of lengthy fieldwork (often undertaken alone) and 
the very slow process of producing results. They note that until recently, students 
would take from five to ten years to complete their doctorate. Thus, it can take up to 
ten years before the results of ethnographic studies are printed, and by this time, one 
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would expect the findings to have lost their relevance and immediacy, not to mention 
their interest to the public (Ahmed and Shore 1995: 25). Therefore, the short spell of 
~immersion I experienced is more similar to a journalist than an anthropologist. 
However, unlike a journalist, I have looked deeper by spending many months 
considering the significance of my research results and consulting large quantities of 
literature and theories to help elucidate my findings, rather than coming up with a 
relatively short report that took a few days to write. While this does not bring me any 
closer to the 'truth', I think the benefits of such an approach are that I have developed 
a deeper understanding and awareness of the complexities involved in the ways in 
which scientific views of genetic testing are portrayed in the realm of popular culture, 
and this is one advantage of a scholarly anthropological approach. Moreover, an 
assertion made by anthropologist Marilyn Strathem is useful here. She states that: 
'Scientific practice now faces new pressures to take social contexts into account' 
(Strathem 2002: xiv). As a large part of this project has entailed the examination of 
scientific practice, anthropology is better equipped than journalism to identify and 
illuminate these contexts in order produce a more substantial analysis - bringing an 
outsider's rather than an insider's view of the process of media production. 
The ethnographic research I undertook is multi-sited, and the strategies of this 
methodology include following connections, associations and relationships embedded 
in the complex webs of interactions of particular research sites in order to come to 
grips with the myriad of cultural logics that are multiply produced (Marcus 1995: 97). 
Anthropologist George Marcus, a key figure in refining this type of ethnography, 
states that: 
Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or 
juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of 
literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or 
connection among sites that in fact defines the argument of the ethnography 
(1995: 105). 
With this in mind, I have followed connections between Pacific Edge Biotechnology, 
in Dunedin and the other location of my research, the Kimihauora Health Centre in 
MountMaunganui. 
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After obtaining ethical approval from the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee, I undertook participant observation and in-depth interviews in these sites 
with the key researchers involved in the partnership in order to compare and contrast 
their often different views and untangle some of the complexities involved in this 
particular case study. Multi-sited ethnography thus helps to define complex and 
surprising elements of research (Marcus 1998: 13-14). Considering the connections 
and relationships among these two sites and the people involved in each allows for an 
organic approach, one in which an argument emerges through the ethnography 
providing its own contexts of significance (Marcus 1998: 14). In addition, popular 
culture, particularly the media, can be considered another element in this multi-sited 
study as it represents a literal and figurative space where an array of cultural logics are 
both produced and presented (ibid.). 
Fetishism and Corporealization: Organizing Threads 
A further point to note in this discussion is that this project as a whole is underpinned 
by the notion of fetishism, a concept which, according to anthropologist Alf Homborg 
(2001: 474), has been shrouded in ambiguity. This concept has appeared as a tool of 
analysis in several fields, including the anthropology of religion, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis (ibid.). More recently, it has been applied in science and technology 
studies, notably by Donna Haraway (1997) who is an important theorist in relation to 
this thesis. Two broad notions of fetishism useful here are those propounded by Karl 
Marx (1981 [1867]) and, more recently, the anthropologist Michael Taussig (1980, 
1992) who both take fetishism to refer generally to social relations between people 
that take on the form of relations between things (Homborg 2001: 484). The idea of 
fetishism emerged towards the end of my data collection and analysis as a way of 
organising the information and highlighting interesting points of analysis, and I would 
like to spend a little time discussing the concept further because of its centrality to my 
argument. 
Marx defined commodity fetishism as 'the objective appearance of the social 
characteristics of labour' (1981: 176), and this is useful to feminist and scientist 
Donna Haraway' s (1997) notion of corporeal fetishism (which she also terms gene 
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fetishism). This notion is about 'mistaking heterogeneous relationality for a fixed, 
seemingly objective thing' (1997: 142) - it is about the ways in which relations and 
practices get mistaken for things-in-themselves as they are taken for granted as both 
natural and objective. Building on the work of Marx, Haraway broadens his ideas to 
include nonhuman actors in acts of fetishism, allowing this concept to be more 
appropriately applied to the realm of technoscience4 which includes neutral scientific 
objects. 
In accordance, Haraway argues that fetishism is primarily about denial where a fixed 
object obscures the relations and labour of human and nonhuman actors, and these 
things are (mistakenly) understood as the generators of v_alue (1997: 135). In a similar 
vein, Taussig (1980: 9) argued that exposing fetishism means realising that the social 
relations symbolised in objects are themselves warped and self-concealing constructs. 
He states that: 'Definite social relationships are reduced to the magical matrix of 
things' (ibid. 1980: 31-32). For Haraway, the notion of corporealization is central to 
breaking open this 'matrix', as discussed below. 
Haraway also draws on the work of Hungarian Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs 
(1971), who has been pivotal in theorising and illuminating the dynamics of fetishism. 
The Marxist problem of fetishism comes from ideas expressed in an essay Lukacs 
wrote in 1922 whereby he argued that the concept of objectivity held by capitalist 
culture was an illusion promoted by capitalist relations of production. He accused 
Marxist critics of thoughtlessly taking on this concept of objectivity, and by doing so, 
they were upholding a fundamental element of the very social dynamic they sought to 
challenge (Taussig 1992: 83). Lukacs said of the kind of reification embedded in 
fetishism that: 
Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and 
thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly 
rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: 
the relation between people (1971: 83). 
4 This term refers to the notion of modern science as it is entwined with technological advances 
(Rabinow 1992: 236), and it is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Haraway's (1997) notion of 'corporealization', which is defined as: ' ... the 
interactions of humans and nonhumans in the distributed, heterogeneous work 
processes of technoscience' (1997: 141-142), exposes the 'phantom objectivity' 
apparent in technoscience. Haraway goes on to state that 'the term gene signifies a 
node of durable action where many actors, human and nonhuman, meet' (1997: 142), 
and this notion is thus crucial in revealing the objectivity involved in the stomach 
cancer gene, which has become a thing-in-itself.5 
I would also, at this point, like to express some reservations, however, about the idea 
of fetishism - for example, it does not significantly allow for the physical aspects of 
suffering, which result from, in part at least, 'the thing' or 'the gene', which fetishism 
argues is a category in itself. Thus, we cannot put the notion of 'Cancer' wholly in 
inverted commas as it is also material; but in chapter three, however, I have attempted 
to look beyond its materiality to consider the semiotic and metaphorical portrayals of 
cancer. As for so many aspects of being in this physical world, metaphor and 
materiality are intimately entwined6 and co-constructed. 
Overview of the Subsequent Chapters 
Haraway (1997) argues that belief in an objective and universal notion of science 
encourages the flourishing of fetishism within the realm of technoscience (1997: 137-
138). A key strategy in exposing corporeal fetishism through corporealization is a , 
critique of orthodox notions of science in contemporary Western society. Chapter two 
thus considers the socially constructed nature of science and how its apparent 
autonomous and bounded nature can be questioned, revealing science as both a 
culture and practice. I also consider popular culture here, as science and popular 
culture both construct the stomach cancer gene. By taking into account various 
definitions of popular culture and considering the complexities posed by the notion of 
the public understanding of science, I illustrate how popular culture is an important 
site for expressing the culture and practice of science. 
5 Similarly, Hornborg (2001: 490) notes that metaphorically, the stone in the soup (or in this particular 
context, the gene) can be understood as the prototypical fetish as it moves our attention from the wider 
context in which it is situated to its imaginary centre. 
6 See E. Grosz (1994) for a discussion of the intermeshing qualities of social construction and 
materiality in relation to the human body. 
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In addition, the notion of popular culture is an important site as it is a crucial source of 
mainstream guidance and information. Nelkin and Lindee (1995) note that the 
narratives from mediums of popular culture are usually familiar and recognisable, 
conforming to social expectations, both shaping them and resonating with everyday 
beliefs and practices (1995: 12). Thus, popular culture is more accessible than 
scientific discourse, thereby providing a means of access to science, genetics, and 
culture generally (ibid.: 10); and this has implications for how genetic testing is 
represented in both popular culture and scientific discourse, and the meanings that 
emanate from these. However, popular culture is not always transparent, and this 
highlights the importance of popular culture as a site of anthropological inquiry. In 
questioning the boundaries that apparently exist between the realms of science, 
popular culture and the public understanding of science, I reveal these categories as 
both complex and fluid as they are mutually constitutive constructions. 
Having exposed the constructed nature of these domains, I then move in chapter three 
to a discussion of representations of technoscience and biomedicine in contemporary 
popular culture, arguing that popular culture accounts of cancer are neither neutral nor 
transparent. Foucault (1972) argued that discourses wield power and control over their 
subjects by appearing as both natural and objective, and stemming from this, I have 
undertaken discourse analysis, which is a useful tool for exposing biases and revealing 
how ideologies become naturalised within text. Chapter three thus reveals the 
ideological constructions embedded in the popular culture accounts of the 'discovery' 
of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer. 
I then consider prominent metaphors of the body, disease, and cancer that exist in 
technoscience, biomedicine and popular culture which reveal that masculine and 
militaristic thinking dominates the construction of these metaphors. I also examine the 
broader cultural meanings of the gene and consider the implications of the most 
pervasive metaphors of the gene that exist in contemporary popular culture and 
technoscience. Generally, the gene is represented in popular culture and scientific 
discourse as a reductive entity. One exception to this, however, is the Maori view of 
the gene which differs from that held by mainstream Pakeha society generally. 
Tania Campbell 9 
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However, within this Maori view are an array of heterogeneous viewpoints that make 
essentialising the meaning of gene in Maori culture inappropriate. 7 
Drawing on popular culture for this anthropological project illustrates how 
anthropology can work in accordance with cultural studies which broadly concerns, as 
noted by anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1991: 196), 'the relationship between the 
word and the world'. Understanding these terms in their broadest sense, so that the 
relationship becomes one between forms of textualised expression (word) and the 
organization and relations of cultural reproduction (world) (ibid.), is useful in an 
anthropological sense as it helps to capture some of the complexity involved in the 
production of cultural logics (Marcus 1995: 97). Using popular culture as a site of 
inquiry allows for the exposure of how representations are constructed, and in tum, 
allows for the questioning of these representations (Appadurai 1991: 208). 
In accordance, cultural theorist Paul Willis (1997) has argued for the marriage of 
anthropology and cultural studies to form what he terms TIES (theoretically informed 
ethnographic study) because he believes each of these disciplines reflects the others' 
weaknesses (1997: 183). Willis criticises the emphasis placed on the importance in 
anthropology of having done fieldwork in order to be considered an anthropologist, as 
those in cultural studies have similar lines of inquiry, but do not go into the 'field' 
(Willis 1997: 186). However, he also critiques cultural studies for its lack of 
ethnography, asserting that it has become excessively theoretical, and this has 
'removed it from the engagement from which it originally drew' (Willis 1997: 188). 
This thesis draws from both disciplines and the ethnography I have undertaken is 
theoretically informed, as analysis is drawn from both my ethnographic data and 
theoretical literature. 
Moving on from an exploration of the ways in which the symbolic, semiotic and 
textual representations of the body, disease, and the gene in popular culture as well as 
scientific and biomedical discourse are culturally constructed, chapter four considers 
7 One publication stated: 'Many Maori fear that genetic technology could change whakapapa and for 
that reason they might oppose it. But there are also Maori families who have sought help from genetic 
testing services' (Independent Biotechnology Advisory Council 2002: 4). 
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the complexities of medical intervention. Here I take into account the fact that the 
body is also material, physical and corporeal, and considering these aspects of the 
body requires a discussion of the notion of embodied suffering, which renders both 
dichotomous portrayals of the body and contemporary biomedical practice 
problematic. Here I ask (rhetorically) why the whanau wanted to find the gene and 
why are they content with genetic testing and surveillance? These questions bring 
forth many contradictions and complexities, such as a group of indigenous people 
who embrace genetic testing, workers who criticise many aspects of biomedical 
practice, yet uncritically take on some interventions offered by this, while ensuring 
that their beliefs are protected. 
Significantly, the sort of biopiracy critiques of the new genetics from indigenous 
viewpoints put forth by Vandana Shiva (2000) and Mae Won Ho (1999) are not the 
case here. 8 In considering these notions, I draw upon a range of literature, as well as 
my own musings, to elucidate the complexities involved in contemporary biomedical 
intervention. In addition, uncritical portrayals of medical intervention from within the 
institution itself are questioned in this chapter through such notions as a post-colonial 
understanding of medicine, which the whanau can be understood as engaging in. 
In chapter five, I consider the personal accounts of those involved in the partnership 
which led to the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer.9 This 
analysis stems from my interviews with three scientists and two whanau researchers 
who were intimately involved in this project. The interviews were unstructured as I 
used open-ended questions, allowing the participants to interpret the question and 
provide as much or as little information as they wanted. This type of interviewing 
ensures that the content has a degree of depth and 'attempts to understand the 
complex behaviour of members of society without imposing any a priori 
categorization that may limit the field of inquiry' (Fontana and Frey 2000: 653). My 
questions centred primarily on themes that emerged from the discourse analysis, as I 
was interested in the effects of discourses on the key researchers and the complexities 
8 In New Zealand, novelist Patricia Grace (1998) has written on this topic, communicating one widely 
held view of this issue among Maori in her novel Baby No-eyes. 
9 At the request of the Ethics Committee, I have used pseudonyms for the interview participants in 
order to protect their identity. 
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that resulted from this. Although several similarities emerged from the interviews, (for 
example, all of the people I interviewed found the partnership an enriching 
experience), there were many interesting differences which emerged, especially in 
relation to the ways in which science and medicine are practised in contemporary 
New Zealand society. These similarities and differences serve to highlight the 
complexities involved in such a partnership. 
Before exploring such themes further, it is useful at this point to consider 
anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod's (1991) discourse on the self and other in order to 
situate myself in relation to my 'objects of study'. She argues that the notion of 
'culture' in anthropological discourse functions to 'enforce separations that inevitably 
carry a sense of hierarchy' (1991: 137-138), thereby suggesting that anthropologists 
should write against culture (ibid.). Abu-Lughod puts forward two ways in which the 
notion of culture enforces separation between the anthropologist and their objects of 
study: through making these people seem 'other', and focusing on the notion of 
'culture' (1991: 139). This is because the divide in anthropology between self and 
other rests on the notion of culture, or as Abu-Lughod states, 'Culture is the essential 
tool for making other' (1991: 143). Moreover, anthropological discourse renders such 
difference self-evident. It is thus apparent that ethnographic representations are 
'truths' that are both partial and positioned (1991: 142-143).10 
It is therefore necessary to position myself in relation to these people. Although I do 
have iwi affiliations - several older members of my extended family are members of 
Ngai Tahu and are involved and upstanding members of the Maori community - I was 
brought up as a Pakeha and consider this to be my primary ethnic label. In relation to 
the scientists, my exposure to the life sciences at tertiary level has been minimal and I 
do not consider myself a 'scientist'. With this in mind, I do not wish to accentuate 
differences between self/other by casting those I have interviewed into the role of 
'other', or fall into the trap of simplifying the notion of culture to essentialize 
difference. Rather, I am aware of the complexities involved in representation and 
10 Abu-Lughod also writes about doing ethnographies of the particular (for example Veiled Sentiments 
[1986]) which stop people being homogenised into a meaningless group in which they lack identity. 
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recognise that categories based on notions of culture, self and other are both unstable 
and fluid. 
The point of considering the personal accounts of the labour undertaken in the 
partnership in chapter five then is to take into account a range of opinions, thoughts, 
feelings and motives of those I interviewed. I considered their responses in light of 
anthropologist Emily Martin's (1996: 102) analogy of science as a citadel situated in 
the city of knowledge production through which we all move. This is a useful analogy 
for highlighting the complexities of the social reality of technoscience, and I consider 
how these people move through this bustling centre by comparing and contrasting 
their views on several themes, including the orthodox notion of science, technoscience 
and the construction of the gene, embodied suffering, and science and biomedicine in 
the realm of popular culture. These themes also elucidate the complexities of different 
cultural worldviews and highlight the notion of science as a cultural construct. For 
instance, one of the most important findings to emerge from the data was the fact that 
one scientist is Maori, but leaves his 'Maoriness' at the door of the laboratory, while 
another, who is Pakeha, is very careful of tissue and blood samples that contain DNA. 
I also found that the whanau favour genetic testing, and my research thus shows the 
enormous complexity of the topic and how important it is to do these ethnographies of 
the particular. 
Finally, in chapter six, I conclude the discussion by noting that medical intervention is 
not passively accepted as the whanau researchers take measures to authorise its 
intervention. Unusually, this process has found itself entangled with people who are 
not so much grateful as dynamic as the active recipients of this intervention have their 
own understandings and ways of undertaking research. This signals that there is scope 
within science to change and adapt by recognising cultural worth and the need to 
labour in order to accept each other. In relation to this particular case study, this 
required a degree of compromise, especially on the part of the scientists. This project 
has also shown how anthropology can work in conjunction with cultural studies as it 
takes into account both the word and the world as the constructions I have exposed 
differ from the 'reality' they seek to portray. 




Defining Technoscience and Popular 
Culture 
'Science is culture' (Haraway 1991: 230). 
The purpose of this chapter is to indicate, by using the notions of technoscience and 
popular culture, how both these realms construct scientific views of genetic testing. I 
consider the socially constructed nature of science and how its apparently autonomous 
and bounded nature can be questioned, revealing science as both a culture and a 
practice. In this sense, the term technoscience is a more appropriate way to conceive 
of science as it exposes and gives consideration to the social, cultural, economic and 
political elements apparent in science. Popular culture is also an important site for 
accessing representations of scientific views of genetic testing as science and popular 
culture both construct the gene. In considering popular culture in relation to the public 
understanding of science, this chapter serves to question the boundaries between 
science, popular culture and the 'public', revealing these constructions as complex, 
heterogeneous and fluid categories. Thus, neither popular culture nor technoscience 
are more or less privileged as settings of understanding science as both of these fields 
are part of the realm of knowledge production, signalling that science and society are 
mutually constitutive. 
Technoscience versus the Orthodox View of Science 
Throughout European and European-American history, the notion of science has been 
critiqued both internally by philosophers of science such as Karl Popper (1959), Paul 
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Feyerabend (1975) and Thomas Kuhn (1996), and externally, by sociologists, 
anthropologists and feminists, for example, Laura Nader (1996), Donna Haraway 
(1997), and Sandra Harding (1998). While critiques of science have most frequently 
occurred, as feminist philosopher Sandra Harding (1998: viii) notes from within the 
discipline of the philosophy of science, in recent history there have been several 
prominent (external) theorists of science who, coming from feminist and post-colonial 
stand points, have considered the concept of science in unique and different ways. 
Considering their perspectives allows for a critical survey of the orthodox view of 
science. 
However, before proceeding to a consideration of the critiques of science posed by 
these theorists, it is necessary to consider of what it is exactly that the orthodox view 
of science is frequently and popularly thought to consist. Harding (1998: 2) notes that 
a core assumption embedded in the orthodox view of science is that the success of 
modern science is due to its internal features. 11 This internalist epistemology, as 
Harding (1998: 2) refers to it, remains the prevailing theory of scientific knowledge. 
In the same vein, anthropologist Laura Nader (1996) critiques the notion of orthodox 
science, which she argues refers to a body of knowledge that is apparently 
distinguishable from other epistemologies by certain methods of validation. She goes 
on to assert that in Western society, science is characterised by such features as an 
institutionalised setting, as well as a set of problems and questions governed by 
ordered rationality (Nader 1996: 1). Scientific knowledge is therefore knowledge that 
is considered universal, quantifiable, empirical and predictive (Robinson and Groves 
1999: 147). This premise, however, is rendered problematic by the notion of 
technoscience, as considered later in the discussion. 
In addition, Nader (1996) criticises the orthodox view of science by illustrating that 
the borders of science are not fixed and definitive but rather, are fluid and contentious: 
contrary to what some scientists believe, science is not a 'revealed truth' (ibid.: 1-2). 
Nader therefore questions the view of Western science as an autonomous activity, 
11 Harding (1998: viii) lists these as: 
Experimental method or scientific method more generally, science's standards for maximising 
objectivity and rationality, the use of mathematics to express nature's laws, the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities in nature. 
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removed and distinct from social, political and economic contexts (1996: 3). 
Understood in this way, she notes that science is a kind of systematized knowledge 
that is both idealised and privileged and much of its perceived nature is taken for 
granted, especially its apparent bounded and independent character, as well as its 
homogeneity. 
For example, through proposing that there were four norms of behaviour which 
characterised 'good' science (communitarianism, universalism, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism) American sociologist Robert Merton (1973) sought to 
demonstrate that 'pure' science was free from political, ideological or economic 
interests and therefore separate from these contexts. Using these norms, Merton 
argued that science was separate from society (Fitzgerald and Dew in press: 1-2). 12 
Merton's (1973) arguments, however, have been undercut by subsequent social 
scientists, who, in observing the impact of social influences upon science have 
concluded that his 'norms' are more the exception than the rule. This is because, as 
noted by Fitzgerald and Dew, 'Scientists do not operate in a world that is separate 
from society. In fact, the personal and the political permeate all scientific activity' (in 
press: 2). 
Several elements of what Merton expressed sociologically were also being expressed 
by Karl Popper philosophically. Popper rejected the orthodox view of scientific 
method, and in his seminal work, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934), Popper 
proposed a falsificationist13 philosophy of science. Here he criticised the inductivist14 
view that experience can show scientific hypotheses to be highly probable, if not true. 
12 Merton can be considered as part of the Essentialist School of thought on science. According to 
Gieryn (1995: 393), Essentialists 'argue for the possibility and analytic desirability of identifying 
unique, necessary, and invariant qualities that set science apart from other cultural practices and 
products'. Merton's (1973: 270) essentialist leanings are most blatantly expressed in his notion of 
universalism, in which he states that: 
The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to depend on the 
personal or social attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class and 
personal qualities are as such irrelevant. 
13 Popper (1972: 16) defined the premise of falsifiability in terms of: 'whenever we propose a solution 
to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it'. 
14 Inductive reasoning entails moving from premises about objects that have been examined to 
conclusions about objects that have not been examined. This form of reasoning is considered less 
reliable than deductive reasoning (if the premise is true, then the conclusion must also be true) in 
scientific inquiry because inductive reasoning can begin with a true premise and end with a false 
conclusion (Okasha 2002: 19-20). 
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Popper argued that scientific hypotheses are tantamount to broad guesses which 
experience can disprove, but not justify. Popper thus believed that falsification theory 
was a logical way of conceptualising scientific procedure, and that scientific theories 
would always be provisional (Andersson 1994: 1). 
Popper, like Merton, also believed that science had an essential nature, arguing that 
his method was a certain way of distinguishing between science and 'pseudo-science'. 
This premise is problematic in that it neglects that science is a heterogeneous activity 
that is comprised of many different disciplines, practices, and theories (Okasha 2002: 
16). In terms of observation, what one 'sees' is inevitably influenced by cultural 
conditioning. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe our perceptions 
objectively. Moreover, in attempting to demonstrate that their theories are true, 
scientists have to undertake inductive reasoning. Popper's weakness here is that he 
does not acknowledge that induction is a constant and solid element of scientific 
inquiry (ibid.: 23). 
While certain elements of Popper's theories 15 have been criticised, they are interesting 
in one sense with regard to the power of science as they set out the certainty that 
science can never know all the answers as all scientific theories are open to criticism. 
His claim that 'Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor 
is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality' (Popper 1972: 278) 
is therefore closer to the notion of technoscience and useful for critiquing the 
orthodox view of science. Thus, apparent in Popper's work is his belief that no 
scientific theory could ever be relied upon to be the whole truth, therefore slipping 
into relativism, which is briefly considered in the following discussion. This 
15 Further Elements of Popper's (1972) theory resonate with Merton's (1973) notion of universalism as 
Popper argued that 'Scientific theories are universal statements' (1972: 59). This is compounded by his 
ideas that science had an essential nature that could be applied universally, and that science could be 
distinguished from pseudo-science. In addition, Merton's notion of organised scepticism, which 
involves withholding judgement 'about any research claims until sufficient evidence is available to 
assess those claims' (Fitzgerald and Dew in press: 1), resonates with Popper's notion of falsification. In 
terms of Merton's (1973) notion of disinterestedness, this norm 'stipulated that one's self-interested 
behaviour was not to conflict with the goal of science' (Fitzgerald and Dew in press: 2). This is echoed 
in the theory of Popper, whose notion of objectivity is used 'to indicate that scientific knowledge 
should be justifiable, independently of anybody's whim: a justification is "objective" if in principle it 
can be tested and understood by anybody' (Popper 1972: 44). 
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sentiment was echoed (albeit more radically) in the work of one of his pupils, Paul 
Feyerabend. 
That Popper mentored philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend is evident in 
Feyerabend's early work, although he did begin to align himself more with Kuhn later 
in his career. In what is his most important work, Against Method (1975), Feyerabend 
argued that 'Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is 
more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its laws-and-order 
alternatives' (1975: 17). Thus, the central theme of this book was the non-existence of 
scientific method, 16 and while this view is extreme, it is useful for questioning the 
privileged place of science in society. 
Several strands of Feyerabend's thinking resonate with my conceptualisation of 
technoscience, especially his critiques of the premise that the notion of science can be 
governed by a fixed set of methodological rules, and that scientific knowledge is not 
superior to other forms of knowledge. It can therefore be argued that the notion of 
theoretical anarchism is closer to the idea of technoscience than the laws-and-order of 
science. In addition, it has also been noted by the philosopher Bala (2001a online) that 
Feyerabend took seriously the idea of multicultural traditions of science by critically 
examining the hegemony of modem science. He believed that the status of modem 
science was due to the belief that there is only one scientific method (ibid.). 
In accordance, Feyerabend noted that scientific 'facts' are not essentially facts 
because as they enter our knowledge, we are viewing them in a certain way, meaning 
that they are essentially ideational. This resonates with the premise put forward by the 
Frankfurt School which argued that the way we experience the world is essentially 
conditioned, and this is discussed later in the chapter in relation to popular culture. 
Feyerabend stated that: 
This being the case, the history of science will be as complex, chaotic, full of 
mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in tum will 
16 Here, Feyerabend concluded by suggesting that science was an ongoing myth. Radically, he 
suggested that science should be separated from the modern democratic state, like religion (Preston 
1997: 7). 
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be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as are the minds of 
those who invented them (Feyerabend 1975: 19). 
This resonates with a comment made by sociologist of science and technology Bruno 
Latour ( 1987) in relation to technoscience, as he stated that the journey through this 
culture should not be full of 'microbes, radioactive substances, fuel cells and drugs, 
but of wicked generals, devious multinationals, eager consumers, exploited women, 
hungry kids and distorted ideologies' (Latour 1987: 175), highlighting the social, 
cultural, political and economic aspects of the practice and culture of technoscience. 17 
The most prominent philosopher of science was Thomas Kuhn, whose treatment of 
modem sciences as: 'historical, sociological, cultural, and political phenomena, ones 
no different in many respects from other social institutions, their cultures, and 
practices' revolutionised the way science was perceived, especially in the field of 
science studies (Harding 1998: 1). Harding (ibid.: 24) notes that his 1962 work, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions is credited with spurring the origins of the northern 
science and technology studies by illustrating a different pattern to the growth of 
knowledge than had previously been detected by the intellectual histories. 
In this compelling work, Kuhn challenged Popper's progressivist view of science. 
Like Popper, Kuhn critiqued the inductivist view of science, but unlike Popper, he did 
so by illustrating that science does not evolve cumulatively; rather, scientific 
revolutions overthrow established scientific theories (Andersson 1994: 2-3). He 
considered the history of science, especially in relation to the ways in which 
communities of scientists practise their branch of science, and consequently, he 
conceded that particular theories or paradigms18 are taken for granted as the right and 
thus only way to consider the world (Robinson and Groves 1999: 152). He believed 
17 However, it should also be mentioned that Feyerabend's extreme assertions that theories are 
incommensurable and therefore pluralist (Robinson and Groves 1999: 154) were also applied to socio-
political matters, such as his denouncing of Western imperialism, and this led to his labelling as a 
cultural relativist. In relation to science, he concluded that objectively, it was not dissimilar to 
astrology, voodoo and alternative medicine (Preston 1997: 5-6). This highlights the foundations of 
science (such as biology) as ideological systems, rather than fact. 
18 Kuhn (1996) defines his notion of paradigms as 'universally recognised scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners' (Kuhn 1996: x), and 
he contends that 'each scientific revolution alters the historical perspective of the community that 
experiences it' (ibid.: xi). Kuhn thus argued that paradigms change and shift throughout history because 
they take into account new information rather than what is considered the 'truth'. 
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that science progresses through sudden (revolutionary) change, rather than by a 
process of methodical evolutionism (ibid.: 152-3). Kuhn also argued that scientific 
disciplines are disunited as they are composed of many overlapping disciplines 
(Sharrock and Read 2002: 13-14). These aspects of Kuhn's arguments thus question 
some of the many ideological strands of orthodox science that understand science as 
an isolated practice and a progressive and linear enterprise which moves towards the 
'truth'. This notion is discussed in relation to technoscience further on in this chapter. 
The notion of the paradigm is pivotal to Kuhn's work, and is important for critiquing 
the orthodox view of science as he conceptualised this as more than a theory: it is an 
entire scientific view - 'a constellation of shared assumptions, beliefs, and values that 
unite a scientific community and allow normal science to take place' (Okasha 2002: 
81). This premise led Kuhn to question the notion of objective truth, becoming 
suspicious of the conventional notion that there was a fixed set of facts about the 
world that were independent of any particular paradigm. He was also against 
objectivity as he believed that perception is significantly influenced by 'outside' or 
'background' beliefs (ibid.: 84). 
Applying Kuhn's premises more specifically, cultural theorist Barker (2000: 231-232) 
illuminates what Kuhn conceived of as the provisional nature of science. Barker 
speaks of this in relation to the notion of biology as a cultural classification system. In 
relation to biochemistry and genetics, he notes that this area of science is constructed 
by a particular kind of vocabulary used as a means for the achievement of certain 
purposes and gains. A Kuhnian perspective reveals that the arguments and theories 
put forward by these sciences should be understood as the outcome of agreed 
procedures. 19 This highlights the provisional nature of science and the construction of 
consensus . 
Despite Kuhn's successes in questioning the way we conceptualise science, his work 
can be critiqued on several fronts. Notably, it has a strong Eurocentric bias, as he 
ignores the history of science and technology of non-Western cultures by prioritizing 
19 For instance, Barker (2000: 231-232) states that: 'These procedures have enabled us to produce 
levels of predictability which have underpinned a consensus or solidarity amongst the scientific 
community leading them to call particular statements true'. 
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and universalising Western science (Bajaj n.d. cited in Bala 2001b online). This is 
exemplified by the following statement: 
But only the civilizations that descend from Hellenic Greece have possessed 
more than the most rudimentary science. The bulk of scientific knowledge is a 
product of Europe in the last four centuries. No other place and time has 
supported the very special communities from which scientific productivity 
comes (Kuhn 1996: 168) . 
Before proceeding to a discussion of role of Eurocentrism in the construction of 
science, it should be mentioned that like Popper and Feyerabend, Kuhn's relativist 
alternative to the traditional view of science was highly problematic for both scientists 
and social scientists. Paralleling these philosophers, his work encouraged the presence 
of cultural relativism in both the humanities and social sciences (Okasha 2002: 94). 
There has been a trend towards cultural relativism20 by some philosophers and how 
this promotes indigenous categories of science, something anthropologists applaud. 
However, relativism is problematic, especially with respect to the moral aspects of 
science in its orthodox view - a point well apprehended by scientists in the critique of 
scientific understandings of the world. Anthropologists are weary of cultural 
relativism because it can leave us with no grounds to question the moral enterprise of 
a group of people, and this is also a negative situation in science as many moral 
quandaries arise in its practice and purpose. 
Eurocentrism and the Construction of Science 
Considering the Eurocentric basis of orthodox science, however, highlights how it is, 
and has been in the past, ideologically influenced and constructed. This is also helpful 
for highlighting the ways in which scientific views of genetic testing might be 
constructed by technoscience (as considered in the following chapter). Haraway 
argues that while demarcations between the inside and outside of science, or between 
the perceived positive and negative accounts of technoscience are important, the lines 
do not need to appear as if they were created by heroes shrouded in myth (Haraway 
1997: 67). (As, to some extent, was the case in the scientific construction of such 
20 For detailed discussions of the complexities of cultural relativism from an anthropological 
perspective, see Schultz and Lavenda (1995), and Monaghan and Just (2000). 
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Eurocentric notions as the Scientific Revolution, Orientalism, and race and gender, 
which I will now discuss). 
Historian of science Steven Shapin (1996) critiques the orthodox view of science by 
arguing that the Scientific Revolution21 was more a construction over time than an 
isolated, pivotal event. He believes, instead, that this term was constructed as a 
conceptual revolution, a reordering of the way in which we think about and 
understand nature (1996: 2). Moreover, he observes that the phrase 'the Scientific 
Revolution' was not coined until the twentieth century, becoming a book title as late 
as 1954.22 Likewise, the idea of 'the Scientific Revolution' no longer rests easy with 
other historians as many reject the notion that there was any one united cultural entity 
called 'science' in the seventeenth century - thus, there could not be a 'scientific' 
revolution without a coherent entity of science (ibid.: 3).23 This highlights how 
science is constructed and portrayed as more unified and monolithic than it actually is. 
Another reason to think more carefully about the origins of science, as known by the 
West, is that there is no general agreement about the apparent causes of modem 
science. This is implicated by the fact that the search for explanations, and the types 
of accounts on which progressive Western science theorists settle, more often than not 
remain fixed to Eurocentric dichotomies (Harding 2001: 196). What did exist, 
however, was a 'diverse array of cultural practices aimed at understanding, explaining 
and controlling the natural world, each with different characteristics and each 
experiencing different modes of change' (Shapin 1996: 3). 
I will now discuss these notions in relation to the fact that science is constructed in 
ways that is both gendered and raced, and that these categories are constructions in 
themselves as Western science has played a crucial role in creating the 'Other'. I will 
21 This term refers to a period of time between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth century when, 
traditional scholars argue, a series of scientific developments changed what people knew about the 
natural world and the ways in which they learnt this knowledge (Shapin 1996: 1). 
22 This book was by A. Rupert Hall (Shapin 1996: 2). 
23 Similarly, Nader (1996) notes that it was not until the late 1700s that a distinction was made between 
theoretical and practical knowledge, and it was not until 1850 that the idea that scientific knowledge 
equated to technological power and domination over nature became widespread among both experts 
and lay persons (Nader 1996: 3). 
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also make more explicitly the arguments that suggest the notion of science is best 
understood as a multicultural phenomenon. 
Harding (1998) has argued that a sense of highly-valued rationality has played a key 
role in maintaining a series of Eurocentric contrasts, which may or may not have been 
intended. According to her, the self-image of the West depends on contrasts, notably 
between the rational and irrational, between civilization and the savage, the 
progressive and the backward, dynamic and static societies, developed and 
undeveloped, the historical and the natural. Through such contrasts, Harding suggests 
that the European Self has created its Other, thereby justifying its exploitation of 
various cultures and peoples (Harding 2001: 194). Integral to this project has been the 
raced and gendered institution of science, and the dichotomous thinking that has 
become entrenched and normalised within it: masculine, feminine; white, black; 
expert, layperson; science, non-science, etc. 
One outstanding contrast created by the West is that of the Orient, and in looking at 
literary critic Edward Said's (1995) discussion of Orientalism it is possible to 
understand how European culture both managed and produced the geographical 
location of the Orient in many veritable ways, including politically, sociologically, 
militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and perhaps most profoundly, imaginatively, 
during the post-Enlightenment period (Said 1995: 3).24 Specifically, one of the main 
ways in which the West constructed the Orient was through scientific racism, which I 
will now discuss. 
Race and Gender 
Science has been used to construct notions of race and gender in ways that make these 
categories seem natural and 'god-given'. Revealing these categories as constructs 
illustrates, in tum, the constructed nature of science and how it is influenced by socio-
cultural factors. What Said's pivotal analysis of orientalising discourse shows is that 
as the West went about constructing the Orient as the 'other', it used scientific 
24 In elucidating the work of Said, Cultural theorist Chris Barker (2000: 210-211) states that the Orient 
is not an inert fact, but a discursive construction which helped to favourably define the West in relation 
to its perceived 'backward' Other. 
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ideologies and tools to do so. One of the main ways in which this was done was 
through the construction of binaries such as race (white, non-white). Thus, the Orient 
was constructed (unfavourably) in stark contrast to Europe, as backward, unequal, and 
inferior. The scientific basis of this stemmed from the notion of the biological bases of 
racial inequality (Said 1995: 206).25 
Haraway argues that like sex and nature, race was insidiously constructed as an object 
of knowledge, especially by the fields of biology, physical anthropology and 
medicine. This continued from the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth 
century, when these same institutions worked vigorously to disown and dismantle the 
fruits of their labour. Consequently, states Haraway: 'All too predictably, the new 
universals, like the suburbs and laboratories, were all too white' (Haraway 1997: 
217).26 
Another central criticism of science is that it is, or at least was, an overwhelmingly 
masculine gendered discipline. As both a scientist and a scholar of feminism, Evelyn 
Fox Keller (2001) is well placed to question the gendered aspect of science as she has 
come to understand the popular association of science, objectivity and masculinity as 
a claim about the social world, rather than the natural ( or biological) world. For her, 
such a realisation refers to a collective consciousness shaped by beliefs which come 
into existence through language. Thus, thinking about science as a social and cultural 
construct requires recognition of the social nature of the enterprise known as 'science' 
(ibid. 2001: 61). 
Is Science Multicultural? 
Having critiqued the orthodox view of science throughout this chapter, to reveal 
science as a practice and a culture, and questioned its construction as a Eurocentric 
enterprise, it becomes evident that science does not transcend culture - rather, science 
25 Said (1995: 206) states that: 
To these ideas was added second-order Darwinism, which seemed to accentuate the 
"scientific" validity of the division of races into advanced and backward, or European-Aryan 
and Oriental-African. Thus the whole question of imperialism ... carried forward the binary 
typology of advanced and backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies (ibid.). 
26 Harding (2001: 190) highlights an important dynamic in relation to this point, stating that: 'whoever 
gets to name natural and social realities gets to control how they will be organized', reinforcing that the 
construction of science rests on foundations, albeit more so in the past, that are white and male. 
Tania Campbell 24 
> 
> .. 
Chapter Two Defining Technoscience and Popular Culture 
is entangled within culture, rendering science as both a practice and a culture. Harding 
(2001: 189) emphasises this point by arguing against the widespread belief that the 
success of science and its universal validity is due to the assumption that sciences 
transcend culture. While this premise has been challenged by considerations of race, 
gender and nature, another central challenge to this assumption are multicultural 
perspectives, which are useful and necessary tools in re-thinking science (ibid.). 
Harding's key point is that modem science does, in fact, have non-Western origins. 
Modem sciences have borrowed from other cultures, although these 'borrowings' 
have been significantly more important and fundamental than conventional histories 
will admit. Modem science, then, owes much of its foundations to the 'complex' 
cultures of Asia, such as India and China and the Islamic world, as well as from the 
'simpler' cultures of Africa and the pre-Columbian Americas (ibid. 2001: 191).27 
Thus, embedded within Western science is an attitude which asserts that this 
enterprise is unrelated to sciences of other civilizations and is superior because their 
sciences only existed in the past. Harding criticises this view by noting that Egyptian 
mystical philosophies and pre-modem European alchemical traditions were more 
important to the development of sciences in Europe than the conventional view 
(which portrays these elements as irrational and only marginally useful) will admit 
(Harding 2001: 191-192).28 Modem science can therefore be considered multi-cultural 
in the sense that it has incorporated components of the knowledge traditions of a 
myriad of non-European cultures (ibid.: 192). (I will return to discuss the implications 
of science as a multicultural enterprise in relation to the case study of the gene for 
hereditary stomach cancer in the concluding remarks of chapter six). 
Anthropologists and the Construction of Science 
Along with philosophers of science and sociologists, anthropologists have also played 
a pivotal role in exposing and critiquing the orthodox view of science and its 
construction. Anthropologist Emily Martin (1996) discusses the contributions of 
anthropologists and anthropology to the study of science and culture. For example, 
27 This is also expressed by Nader (1996: 1), who observes that contemporary Western science is set 
apart from sciences of other civilizations, such as those of China, India and Islam, among others. 
2 Mathematical developments which originated in India and scientific instrumentation such as 
gunpowder that were developed in China provide other examples. 
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she highlights the important work of Sharon Traweek (1988 cited in Martin 1996: 
100) on exposing the culture inherent in physics and how this world is constructed 
and given different meanings by Japanese and American physicists. Martin also 
mentions the pivotal work of Rayna Rapp (1988 cited in Martin 1996: 101) and 
Deborah Heath (1993 cited in Martin 1996: 101-102) who brought to our attention the 
presence of the varied yet powerful collectives who surround scientific practices, of 
which non-scientists are one such group (as considered further in this chapter). 
Through Rapp's ethnographic account of looking at the role of genetic counsellors 
and Heath's ethnography of the boundaries between a genetics laboratory and people 
with Marf an Syndrome, these scholars have shown that these aforementioned groups 
are not only present, but that they interact with the domain of science in significant 
ways. This has implications for the public understanding of science as considered 
further in this chapter. 
Such ethnographic research demonstrates that the borders between knowledge 
production and the public are not fixed and clean. Rather, these domains are entangled 
and porous. The significance of this is noted by Martin (1996: 102) who states that: 
This means the way is opened for a more complex, less flatly antagonistic 
attitude toward science than prevailed among some of us earlier. Scientific 
knowledge is being made by all of us; we all move in and out of the bustling 
city of knowledge production. 
Thus, recent anthropological studies of science have shown that science is not 
produced in a realm that is both isolated and privileged, 'trickling out to inform the 
rest of us about what is "true'"; rather, science is an ongoing process that permeates 
human culture, which, like science, is historically constituted (Martin 1996: 107-108). 
Thus, technoscience and popular culture (as considered further in this discussion) are 
part of this bustling city as these realms both construct the stomach cancer gene, 
which is discussed in more depth in the following chapter. 
The work of physicist and feminist philosopher Karen Barad (2000) highlights why 
both scientists and non-scientists bustle through the city of knowledge production. 
She brings our attention to the practice of technoscience as a site of varied 
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entanglement by putting forward the theoretical framework of agential realism. Using 
this framework, technoscientific practices are fruitful sites in which many 
epistemological, ethical, and other issues are intertwined (ibid. 2000: 225). 
Barad (2000: 236) states that: 'According to agential realism, reality is sedimented out 
of the process of making the world intelligible through certain practices and not 
others'. This notion is important for an understanding of technoscience (as well as 
popular culture) in that it emphasises that scientific constructions (and accounts of 
science in popular culture) are consciously made, rather than residing as pre-given 
facts. (This is exemplified by the discourse analysis I undertook of the popular culture 
accounts of the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer which is 
discussed in chapter three). 
It is apparent, then, that agential realism is more viable than scientific literacy because 
as a theoretical framework, it offers an understanding of the nature of scientific and 
other social practices which acknowledge that both objectivity and agency are 
entwined with issues of responsibility and accountability. Realizing this forces us to 
confront that we are partially responsible for what exists because we have a role in 
shaping it (Barad 2000: 236-237). Barad thus argues that science is not separate from 
society and the making of these two domains is mutually constitutive. This is because 
scientific practices are 'material-discursive intra-actions with intertwined 
epistemological and ontological significance' (ibid.: 246). 
Defining the Notion of Technoscience 
Thus, critiquing the pursuit of scientific knowledge and thinking about science as a 
social and cultural construct requires recognition of the social nature of the enterprise 
known as 'science' (Keller 2001: 61). I argue that using the term technoscience is 
helpful for thinking about science in this way, and my stance stems from the work of 
Haraway (1997: 66) who argues that 'science is cultural practice and practical 
culture' .29 Haraway's insights on technoscience are especially relevant in that she is 
trained in molecular and developmental biology, but identifies as a historian of 
29 An example to illustrate this premise is Haraway's (1997: 66) recognition of the laboratory as an 
'arrangement and concentration of human and non-human actors, action and results that change 
entities, meanings and lives on a global scale'. 
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science who has 'applied for a visa for an extended stay in the permeable territories of 
anthropology - as a resident alien or a cross-specific hybrid, naturally' (Haraway 
1997: 49). Haraway therefore has the privileged position of understanding both the 
realms of technoscience and anthropology in all their messy configurations. 
The basis of Haraway's definition of technoscience stems from Latour's (1987: 174) 
use of the term. He states that he uses this term to 'describe all the elements tied to the 
scientific contents no matter how dirty, unexpected or foreign they may seem', 
thereby merging the social and the scientific, and he uses the phrase 'science and 
technology' 30 as a sub-set of technoscience (ibid. 1987: 175). 
The notion of technoscience is useful for critiquing the orthodox view of science by 
revealing science as a practice and culture, and is helpful in highlighting the ways in 
which scientific views of genetic testing are constructed, as considered in the 
following chapter. In terms of the meaning of technoscience, Haraway states that she 
means this term to refer to 'the implosion of science and technology into each other in 
the past two hundred years around the world' (Haraway 1997: 50).31 Haraway's 
(1997) notion of technoscience stands somewhat in contrast to the orthodox view of 
science and in relation to fetishism, highlights labour undertaken by the human and 
nonhuman actors entangled in the web of technoscience. However, while Haraway's 
definition of technoscience is important for this thesis as a whole, it is incomplete in 
that she does not consider the personal, embodied experience of being within this 
realm and does not do justice to the notion of suffering. 
Haraway does, however, partly redeem this omission by implicating the notion of 
impartiality, arguing that we cannot remain neutral in the face of meanings and 
30 Anthropologist Bryan Pfaffenberger (1992) brings our attention to the importance of technology to 
social anthropology through the concept of the sociotechnical system. A central feature of the 
sociotechnical system, like the notion of technoscience, is that it 'refuses to deny the sociality of human 
technological activity' (Pfaffenberger 1992: 493). The sociotechnical systems model, then, means that 
each human society is one that is in the process of becoming - one where people are actively engaged 
in technological advancement and the appropriation of artefacts as the means of self-knowledge and of 
'coordinating labour to sustain their lives' (ibid.: 5ll). 
31 More specifically, Haraway (1997: 50) goes on to state that she wants to use this term to: 
... designate dense nodes of human and nonhuman actors that are brought into alliance by the 
material, social, and semiotic technologies through which what will count as nature and as 
matters of fact get constituted for - and by - many millions of people (ibid.). 
Tania Campbell 28 
Chapter Two Defining Technoscience and Popular Culture 
practices of technoscience which affect us physically and emotionally. She notes that 
our perspective and understanding is inevitably partial, stating that: 'We must cast our 
lot with some ways of life on this planet, and not with other ways' (Haraway 1997: 
51 ), suggesting that it is difficult, if not impossible, to be intellectually and 
emotionally omnipresent and therefore complete in our thinking. While aware of her 
pragmatic insight, I do attempt a partial redress of this omission in chapter four where 
I consider the notions of suffering and embodiment which satisfy a personal 
understanding of the effects of technoscience, and also in chapter five where I 
consider personal accounts and perspectives of those who are entangled in the web of 
technoscience. 
The World of Popular Culture 
Having given consideration to the realm and meaning of science when it is understood 
as technoscience, it is important to now consider that of popular culture as both these 
sites construct the stomach cancer gene. Popular culture is also an important part of 
the bustling 'city' of knowledge production, especially in relation to the public 
understanding of science. 
As argued by van Dijck (1998> 11), the boundaries between the worlds of science and 
popular culture are constantly shifting, and thus it cannot be asserted that popular 
portrayals of genetic testing come from 'inside' popular culture, and 'outside' science. 
Another important point to reiterate in relation to popular culture is that popular 
representations matter, and historian of science Jon Tumey (1998: 201) makes the 
point that popular culture, especially the popular media, are as important for 
understanding debates about science as other, more academic records. 
Like Tumey, sociologists Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee (1995: 10) also bring our 
attention to the importance of the popular in science. They assert that popular imagery 
is significantly more transparent than scientific discourse in that it is a means of 
gaining access to the social concerns and popular understandings that are influencing 
concepts in molecular genetics specifically, and the culture at large generally. They 
note that popular culture can take many forms for the consumer, the most common 
including television programmes, films, mass media generally, and in more recent 
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times, the internet. Such vehicles of popular culture, according to Nelkin and Lindee, 
are a crucial source of guidance and information. The narratives from these mediums 
are usually familiar and recognisable, conforming to social expectations, both shaping 
them, and resonating with everyday beliefs and practices (Nelkin and 1995: 12). For 
example, Tumey discusses the myth and presence of Frankenstein32 in the popular 
imagination, emphasising that it is a central and governing myth of modem biology, 
warning of the potential negative consequences of the 'quest' for knowledge (Tumey 
1998: 3). Moreover, this story (written by Mary Shelley and first published in 1818) 
illustrates, according to Tumey, that there are important continuities in cultural 
debates about science from this time to the present (ibid.). 
The definition of popular culture is both broad and problematic. Because this term 
means many different things to a variety of populations, societies, and cultures, there 
is no definitive definition. In order to arrive at several generalisations about what this 
ambiguous term encapsulates, however, it is necessary to briefly overview the 
historical emergence of popular culture. Considering its emergence historically 
reveals that, as argued by cultural theorist, John Storey (2003: xi), popular culture is a 
category that was invented by intellectuals. He notes that since the late eighteenth 
century until the early part of the twentieth century, intellectuals who studied 
nationalism, Romanticism and folklore 'invented' the first notions of popular culture. 
He argues that debates over this time about what defined and constituted this 
phenomenon led to two broad concepts of this term: popular culture was understood 
as a kind of rural folk culture, or as the low brow and banal mass culture of the newly 
emergent industrial working class (ibid. 2003: 1). 
However, these distinctions became increasingly blurred in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries as traditional socio-cultural relations between upper 
(dominant) and lower (subordinate) classes began to alter under the far-reaching 
impact of industrialization, urbanization, and consequently, the emergence of an 
32 The thematic material of the story focuses on Dr Frankenstein's pursuit of the secret of life. The 
monster is created after the doctor spends two years collecting and assembling human remains from 
corpses. When it is brought to life, Dr Frankenstein is at once both exhilarated and horrified by his 
creation (Allan 2002: 179). The monster becomes the physical embodiment of the doctor's pursuit, and 
this, argues Turney (1998: 3), became one of the central myths of modernity - the social consequences 
of the search for knowledge. 
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industrial working class. European and American intellectuals became especially 
interested in the culture of the 'folk', and this culture became an occupation of people 
from a wide variety of social denominations (Storey 2003: 1-2). In addition, the study 
of folk culture also helped to establish the notion of ordinary people as the masses, 
consuming mass culture (Storey 2003: 15). In more recent times, this study of popular 
culture can be related to the emergence of the discipline of cultural studies, which was 
considered in the previous chapter in relation to Willis's (1997) notion of TIES, and I 
briefly address the emergence of cultural studies further in the subsequent discussion. 
There are several tenets that are integral to definitions of popular culture: the popular, 
class, consumption, and the mass media.33 In terms of class, sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu's (1984, 1993) work illuminates how actions in the realm of culture help to 
reproduce and proliferate class inequalities. Generally, he argued that while class rule 
is essentially economic, its appearance is cultural.34 Concerning the mass media, 
sociologist Dominic Strinati (1995: xiii) believes that people's lives in Western 
capitalist societies are increasingly affected by the popular culture offered by the mass 
media. This highlights how the mass media is coming to play a particularly prominent 
role in the notion of popular culture. Strinati (1995: xviii) emphasises that the difficult 
task of defining popular culture is also related to how it is explained theoretically. 
Several of the most common theories of popular culture briefly considered here 
include the notion of popular culture as a dominant ideology, that popular culture is 
actively constructed by its audiences, that it is an ideological struggle between classes, 
and that the popular is political. 
The Frankfurt School, for example, argue that popular culture is mass culture which is 
produced by the culture industry, thereby ensuring the continuity of capitalism 
(Strinati 1995: xviii). The Frankfurt School is thus influenced by Marxism, and 
33 Cultural theorist Peter Brooker (1999: 197) notes that the most common underlying definition of 
popular culture equates the popular (including popular attitudes and tastes) with the products of the 
processes of both mass production and the mass media. 
34 Commenting on this dynamic, Storey (2003: 43) states that 'In this way, the production and 
reproduction of cultural space helps to produce and reproduce social space, social power, and class 
difference'. Another theorist to put forward a compelling idea of popular culture in terms of class is 
Susan Sontag who observed 'the distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture seems less and less 
meaningful' (Sontag 1966: 296, 299, 302). The cultural valorization of music, among other things, was 
representative of this 'new sensibility' (Storey 2003: 63). 
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perceives popular culture as a kind of dominant ideology (ibid.). In addition, this 
School believes that popular culture is inferior (in relation to 'high' culture). They see 
popular culture as commodity-based, inauthentic, and banal. Mass culture is perceived 
this way because it is produced by those with commercial interests and does not 
enrich its consumers (Barker 2000: 44-45). 35 
However, in relation to popular culture, the conservative view of the Frankfurt School 
denies the consumer any agency, as it assumes that textual representations are 
appropriated by audiences in a manner that is passive and unproblematic. This view 
also neglects to consider political issues embedded in popular culture (or, popular 
cultural politics). This position has been convincingly challenged by the arrival of the 
academic discipline of cultural studies which, in contrast, takes popular culture 
seriously. More specifically, this discipline introduced the active audience paradigm 
whereby individuals engage actively and critically with popular culture (Barker 2000: 
44-45). Popular culture is thus appropriated by its audiences, and as prominent 
cultural theorist John Fiske (1989: 8) argues, popular culture is composed by the 
meanings that individuals take from it and make with it as opposed to those apparent 
in texts. Consumers are not passive recipients, but discerning and active makers of 
meaning. Fiske (ibid.: 43) states that: 'There can be no popular dominant culture, for 
popular culture is formed always in relation to, and never as part of, the forces of 
domination' .36 
This point also needs to be considered in relation to critical public understanding of 
science (PUS) studies which demonstrate the ways in which the 'public' and 
'laypeople' do not passively receive information, but actively engage with, and 
35 It should also be mentioned that the Frankfurt School influenced sociological and anthropological 
theory and practice in the early to mid twentieth century, This School used Marxist theory to analyse 
empirical social science research. The approach of this School was characterised by 'critical theory' 
which takes into account that the way one sees the world is conditioned, especially by political and 
other ideological structures of society. This had implications also for anthropology as critical theory is 
self-reflective, taking into account the way in which society shapes perception, recognising the power 
structures inherent in such conditioning (Edgar and Sedgwick 1999: 150-151). 
36 Popular culture can also be considered political especially in light of the concept of hegemony 
(Storey 1993: 13). Storey (ibid.) draws on Gramsci's political concept of hegemony to conceive of 
popular culture as 'a site of struggle between the forces of resistance of subordinate groups in society, 
and the forces of incorporation of dominant groups in society'. Considering a Gramscian view of 
popular culture illuminates the ideological struggle between dominant and subordinate classes and 
cultures. 
Tania Campbell 32 
-'", 
\ 
Chapter Two Defining Technoscience and Popular Culture 
appropriate, information. Brian Wynne (1995: 385), a sociologist of science, asserts 
that this field of research has found a wealth of evidence to indicate that laypeople 
problematise and negotiate their own relationship to 'science'. 
While there is no correct answer to the problem of defining popular culture, some 
ways of doing so are more appropriate than others. For my purposes here, I will 
generally regard popular culture 'as the meanings and practices produced by popular 
audiences at the moment of consumption' (Barker 2000: 47).37 It is fair to conclude 
then, that while the notion of popular culture is difficult to define, it is always 
entwined with ideas of social power, especially in relation to socio-cultural categories 
such as class, race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality (Storey 2003: xii). This is also true 
of technoscience, which is comprised of these constructions and (unlike the orthodox 
model of science) problematises them at every tum. 
A Consideration of the Public Understanding of Science 
If technoscience and popular culture are both present in the city of knowledge 
production, then the public understanding of science is the result of the intersection of 
these two fields. Just as the meanings of science and popular culture can be 
questioned and revealed as constructed, so to can the categories of the public, 
laypersons and scientists, especially in relation to the public understanding of science. 
Tumey (1998: 5), for example, captures the essence of the complexities involved with 
the public understanding of science by noting that whether referring to the past, 
present, or future, we must avoid a simplistic view of this theme. Thus, there is no 
simple entity called 'science', just as there is no single 'public' - these are both 
complex and dynamic categories. Other issues which I will consider in this section are 
the relationship between science, society and the public, public responses to science, 
and how the term 'public' is defined. 
According to Shapin (1990), the past three centuries have witnessed an inversion of 
the power dynamics between science and the public. He argues that the relations 
between these two realms have changed markedly since the seventeenth century. In 
37 This view stands in direct contrast to the traditional question of how the culture industry transforms 
people into commodities that serve its interests in favour of understanding how people turn the 
products of industry into their popular culture, serving their interests (Barker 2000: 47). 
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the past, science (when recognized as a separate activity), was influenced by the 
public and other institutions. Now, however, the scientific community believes itself 
to be more autonomous, controlling its own proceedings as well as stipulating 'the 
nature of proper relations between itself and the public, and even extends its influence 
importantly into the arena of public affairs' (ibid. 1990: 992). This view stands in 
direct contrast to the arguments of Nowotny et al (2001) who suggest that the barriers 
between science and society are dissolving. 
These authors claim science can no longer be considered as an autonomous entity 
cleanly separated from other realms of society, culture, and economy. They argue that 
these categories have increasingly become both heterogeneous and interdependent 
(ibid. 2001: 1-2). They build (as Haraway and I have done) on the work of Latour 
(1987), who argued that science and society are inseparable as they rely on the same 
foundation. However, they note that the relationship between these two domains has 
changed as traditionally, science held an 'external' place in society, which could be 
antagonistic to scientific values and methods. Consequently, scientists understood 
their task as the 'benign reconstitution of society according to "modern" principles 
which they were largely responsible for determining' (Nowotny et al 2001: 2). 
In contemporary society, however, science is now 'internal'. This means that 
scientific research is no longer an authoritative and elite project, but a contribution to 
society as it creates new knowledge and provides degrees of uncertainty and 
instability (ibid.). This resonates with the aforementioned claim of Martin (1996) that 
the walls of the citadel of science are porous and permeable. In accordance, Nowotny 
et al (2001: 260) argue that it is impossible to clearly demarcate between context and 
core, and therefore, the intrusion of the 'social' cannot be viewed as inhibiting 
scientific novelty. Rather context, or the 'social', is a key source of innovation. This 
statement is also true of technoscience whereby the 'social' is embraced as a defining 
feature of this domain. 
Re-defining the role and importance of the 'Public' 
Nowotny et al's (2001) comment about the impossibility of creating clearly defined 
boundaries resonates with the tenets of the public understanding of science. For 
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speech communication specialist, Celeste Condit (2001), the distinctions between the 
categories of scientists and the public are not clear-cut. She argues that the category of 
the public is messier and has more agency than has been suggested by many scholars 
(for example Shapin 1996, and further in this section Garvin 2001). Condit observes 
that in a democratic society, the lay public are influential in terms of the progress of 
science and the use of science-based technologies. For instance, members of the 
public can choose which research projects they support morally and intellectually, but 
most importantly, financially (Condit 2001: 811). She thus embraces a more specific 
and faceted view of the public and what constitutes this entity, if in fact, it can be 
referred to as such. These sentiments are echoed by Irwin and Wynne (1996: 9), who 
state that: 
... the public is portrayed as a homogeneous mass which needs to be rendered 
more receptive to the insights of science. The 'public' exist as an audience for 
science; they are an object rather than a subject. At this stage, we need to 
remember Raymond Williams' observation: 'there are in fact no masses, but 
only ways of seeing people as masses. 
Important to consider in relation to the public understanding of science is the role of 
. the citizen as consumer. A common occurrence, for example, is for geneticists and 
biotechnologists to consult 'lay people' in their role as 'consumers'. While this is 
important, one potential danger is that the power and force of the market in Western 
industrialised society might cause those who are acting as individual consumers to be 
mistaken as the public (Condit 2001: 811). Condit argues, then, that it is important to 
distinguish between these groups, stating that: 'the public is not a group of individuals 
who are pursuing their own private advantages and interests' (ibid.). 
Instead, the public is a collective concept - one that alludes to shared efforts to gain 
benefits that transcend limited personal interests, thus affecting the community at 
large. The nature of the collective concept of the public is also heterogeneous and 
abstract, and because of this, its thoughts are difficult to capture and identify (Condit 
2001: 811). This stands in contrast to the thoughts of both Shapin (1996) and Garvin 
(2001) who, in their discussion of the relationship between scientists and publics, 
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overlook the importance of the fact that the concept of the public is both varied and 
ambiguous. 
Public Ambivalence 
In considering how the citizens of the city of knowledge production perceive science, 
it is important to consider Tumey's (1998: 3) claim that the general public feel 
ambivalent and weary about modem biology. While we celebrate the great 
'discoveries' of recent times in the mass media, he states that 'we fear that the 
triumph will tum sour' (ibid.). Although we are eager to benefit from scientific 
advances, we are also aware of the potential risks of applying this new biotechnology, 
especially its threat to dissolve and blur boundaries and eliminate taken for granted 
categories (ibid.). 
In relation to how the mass media portray the work of geneticists, Tumey (1998: 3) 
notes that they feel their work is portrayed negatively. This is compounded by the fact 
that many scientists feel that, in modem Western societies, there is an anti-science 
movement. Whether this is true or not, it is certain that there is a sense of ambivalence 
surrounding science and technology. This is especially so in the life sciences, and 
although modem biologists have perceived this, they relate it to a general anti-science 
feeling, public ignorance, or media misrepresentation of their work (ibid.: 4). Tumey 
(1998: 5) criticises this rhetorical response to criticism as it dismisses the possibility 
that 'there may be special reasons why an increase in manipulative power in the life 
sciences might provoke public disquiet'. In addition, Barad (2000) notes that the 
notion of agential realism has implications for the public understanding of science as 
she argues that scientific literacy is problematic in that the 'public' 'no longer 
considers scientists to be paragons of social responsibility' (2000: 229). 
In accordance, Tumey (1996) argues that while the public has become more receptive 
to learning science, there is a feeling of public mistrust towards experts, meaning that 
a scientific education of the public will involve more than offering simple scientific 
facts. Scientists thus need to consider the ways in which people are empowered to use 
the scientific information that is offered to them. The onus, then, falls on the scientist 
to explain scientific developments and their implications in ways that a diversity of 
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'publics' can use. This has led Turney to assert that, instead of focusing on the 
public's understanding of science, we need to improve the scientist's understanding of 
the public (Turney 1996: 1087), which would mean redrawing boundaries and 
redefining the categories of public and science. As previously mentioned, similar 
sentiments have been made by Martin (1996: 102) and Barad (2000: 246). 
Moreover, it can be argued that the ways in which the public construct and define 
relevant knowledge differs from scientists. However, environment and health policy 
expert, Theresa Garvin notes that how the public interprets knowledge, just as in the 
science world, is historically and culturally contextual (Garvin 2001: 450). She 
therefore argues that there are two main competing models for interpreting risk 
information: technical and cultural. Lay and expert perceptions contrast because 
laypersons place importance on the cultural models, while experts usually focus on 
the technical (ibid.). One consequence of these differences is that there is a degree of 
conflict because experts believe the ·public to be scientifically illiterate, while the 
public accuse experts of technical elitism and oppression. Although this view is 
simplistic, it is important to acknowledge that the public can evaluate evidence and 
construct knowledge in ways that are fundamentally different from the scientific 
community. For example, the public's access to evidence is derived from sources that 
are both formal and informal. The public gathers evidence from both scientific 
assessments and lay sources, (which can include anything from oral histories to 
personal experience), as well as from the media. Interestingly, Garvin (2001: 450) 
also notes that the public, in some cases, gives more credibility to these lay sources 
than to those of a scientific nature. 
This discussion has thus set out several important tenets in relation to technoscience, 
popular culture, and the public understanding of science. I have considered how the 
orthodox view of science is inferior to the notion of technoscience because it does not 
acknowledge that society and science are mutually constitutive. The notion of 
technoscience, however, takes the social and cultural into account and acknowledges 
that science is not a bounded and homogeneous activity that operates 'outside' of the 
confines of society. This has implications for how information is presented in the 
realm of popular culture as both technoscience and popular culture construct the 
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stomach cancer gene, and how categories are constructed and represented in the 
public understanding of science. In addition, popular culture is a crucial site for 
accessing representations of scientific views of genetic testing as it is no more or less 
privileged as a setting of understanding science - science and popular culture are 
inseparable as they lie on the same foundation: society. The following chapter will 
draw on this theoretical basis to discuss the importance of considering the textual and 
semiotic portrayals of genetic testing, highlighting the various ways in which the 
stomach cancer gene is constructed by biomedicine, technoscience and popular 
culture. 





The Construction of Technoscience 
and Biomedicine in Popular Culture 
'No object, no thing, has being or movement in human society except by the 
significance men [sic] can give it' (Sahlins 1976: 170). 
The previous chapter considered how the worlds of technoscience and popular culture 
are both defined and culturally constructed, and having established that both sites 
exist in the city of knowledge production, I now move on to a discussion of 
representations of technoscience and biomedicine in contemporary popular culture 
using the specific example of the New Zealand media handling of the 'quest' for the 
stomach cancer gene. In doing so, I argue that popular culture accounts of cancer 
particularly (and interventions to restore health generally) are not the neutral, 
transparent reporting of one set of facts they appear to be. Instead, these accounts are 
politicised, culturally constructed and positioned. Moreover, when this cancer is 
experienced by Maori in a New Zealand historical context, even further cultural 
shaping occurs. 
In this chapter then, I 'lay bare' the constructed nature of popular culture accounts of 
the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer and consider the 
consequences of such constructions which have become normalised in contemporary 
New Zealand society. I also place these findings of the constructions of the cancer 
gene against the broader socio-historical accounts of metaphorical ways of 
understanding the body, disease (especially cancer), and genetics, which I will discuss 
in some detail. As I consider in the second half of this chapter, cancer38 is not a 
neutral term in the West in that we understand it in terms of military and masculine 
38 The meaning of this term is considered in Susan's Sontag's (1978) contested work, Illness as 
Metaphor. 
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metaphors, as well as in relation to the genre of science fiction. We do this by 
culturally constructing its meaning beyond biology through storytelling, the use of 
metaphors and myth. I conclude the chapter by considering the implications of the 
current and most pervasive metaphors of the gene existing in contemporary popular 
culture and technoscience and how we understand these in New Zealand. 
Assessing Popular Culture Accounts of the Identification of 
the Gene for Hereditary Stomach Cancer 
Considering how technoscientific and biomedical discourses are represented in 
popular culture is important because, as asserted by Tumey (1998), our perceptions of 
science and technology and their products are partly influenced by the images of the 
work which exist outside of the confines of scientific representations and accounts. 
Bearing this in mind, as part of the empirical research for this thesis I have 
deconstructed media and other popular culture accounts of the identification of the 
gene for hereditary stomach cancer by undertaking discourse analysis. This practice is 
useful for the ways in which it questions assumptions which are taken for granted and 
upsets what has become naturalised and normalised in the fabric of society. Moreover, 
discourse, (along with metaphor and myth) is important to cultural life as a way of 
accepting and resisting meaning. 
In conceptualising discourse theory, Foucault (1972: 27) posed a central question in 
relation to how discourse was able to construct the social world: 'how is it that one 
particular statement appeared rather than another [?]' This consideration has informed 
my approach to this particular topic by highlighting the constructed nature of the 
accounts I looked at. Foucault argued that the stability of forms of continuity and 
syntheses embedded in discourse must be disturbed in order to illustrate that 'they do 
not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of 
which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized' (ibid.: 25). 
French social theorist Ronald Barthes' (1973) notion of 'myths', which are culturally 
constructed despite their appearance as pre-given, universal truths, is also useful in 
highlighting the value of discourse analysis. This is due to the notion that myth 'has 
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the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, making contingency 
appear eternal' (Barthes 1973: 155) More specifically, Barthes' (1973) contentions 
illustrate how, as citizens of New Zealand society, we 'buy into' particular ideas of 
the stomach cancer gene and how we come to make sense of the broader issues 
surrounding this gene in the ways that we do. This is considered in the following 
discussion concerning the outcomes of my own discourse analysis which reveals 
particular myths as the cultural constructions they are.39 Furthermore, undertaking this 
type of analysis reveals which constructions are accepted and resisted, as I will 
illustrate in the following discussion. 
The Case Study in Context 
During the course of this research, I analysed twenty seven popular culture accounts 
focusing on the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer. The purpose 
of this was two-fold: first, I wanted to deconstruct the ideologies behind these 
accounts, noting the ways in which certain portrayals were made to seem natural and 
'normal' by highlighting several prominent themes. Second, I sought to find ways in 
which the body, disease (especially cancer) and genetics are portrayed in popular 
culture, and to illuminate the implications of particular portrayals and constructions. 
The results of this latter inquiry are considered further in this chapter in relation to the 
broader cultural meanings of metaphors. In terms of the themes that emerged from the 
discourse analysis concerning the partnership, I found, as did Rankine and McCreanor 
(in press) in their discourse analysis on the same topic,40 which corroborates my 
research, that the whanau are generally portrayed unfavourably in contrast to the 
scientists. Hence, the themes to emerge from my discourse analysis illustrate that the 
whanau are marked as 'other', and portrayed negatively as 'traditional' in relation to 
the 'modem' scientists. I also found that the ideology of modem science and 
biomedicine is portrayed uncritically, indicating that this is a valued institution in 
New Zealand society. For ease of reference, seven tables are included at the end of 
39 Discourse analysis also reveals how people are positioned in different ways as social subjects 
(Fairclough 1992: 3-4). Discourses, therefore, encode power relations and specify 'what relations are 
riossible and valued in specific institutional contexts' (Schirato and Yell 2000: 103). 
0 Although Rankine and McCreanor (in press) focus on media accounts of the identification of the 
gene for hereditary stomach cancer, I have used accounts that span a wider time frame and accounts 
that exist in popular culture generally, rather than exclusively print media accounts. 
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this chapter: tables one to four show key examples for the accounts of each theme; 
tables five and six show key examples from my analysis of how the body, disease and 
genetics are portrayed, and table seven alphabetically lists the accounts I analysed. 
_Before I commence a detailed discussion of my findings, brief consideration must be 
given to New Zealand's history in order to place the discourse analysis in a historical 
.context.41 It is crucial to the consideration of the emergent themes of my discourse 
analysis to observe that New Zealand experienced colonialism in the nineteenth 
century whereby Maori populations were colonised by European settlers. The signing 
of the Treaty of Waitangi (this country's founding document) had negative 
consequences for Maori as their sovereignty was supplanted by British culture, 
politics and economics. While Maori interpreted the Treaty as confirming and 
enforcing their sovereignty, imperial Britain understood that the Treaty rendered 
Maori sovereignty void, thereby paving the way for the British to take legal control 
and colonise. Although Maori resistance to the negative effects of colonialism has 
been robust, it has been unable to ward off negative impacts in the areas of culture, 
health, education and economics of Maori populations (Orange 1992, Rankine and 
McCreanor in press: 4). Any understandings of contemporary discourses around this 
case study must therefore be aware of the preceding history. 
Before explaining the outcomes of the discourse analysis, several points must also be 
mentioned about the case study which is itself the subject of this analysis. This 
medical research differed from most others of its nature in that the whanau team had 
played a fundamental and active role in the research process. For example, they 
directed the research, compiled their own genealogy and collected tissue samples.42 
However, the whanau's active and involved role in the partnership was underplayed in 
the media accounts, and this led Rankine and McCreanor (in press: 21) to refer to it as 
'Colonial Coverage', which they state: 'functions to reinforce and reproduce the 
41 Schirato and Yell (2000: 17) emphasise that communication practices 'are always informed by and 
produced within cultural contexts'; therefore, considering the wider context of culture in which these 
texts operate is central to the concept of discourse analysis. 
42 More specifically, in partnership with the scientists, the whanau team negotiated: 'an agreement 
involving culturally appropriate management and ownership of tissue samples, a shared patent for the 
genetic test and regular reporting by the genetics team at whanau hui' (Rankine and McCreanor in 
press: 10). 
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subordinate position of Maori and their position of "other" to the norm of modem 
Pakeha society', and this is a finding which my own research supported. 
The Notion of Whiteness 
Central to the notion of discourse theory is the concept of ideology, which becomes 
naturalised in the construction of discourse. O'Sullivan et al (1994: 143) note the 
importance of the concept of ideology in the media because it insists that 'natural' 
meaning does not exist - rather, media accounts are always constructed and socially 
positioned by notions of class, race and gender, among others. 
This argument is significant as it reveals hidden within the texts the notion of 
'marking', whereby Maori are always the marked category, while the category of 
Pakeha is always left unmarked because it is assumed (on racist grounds) that the 
scientists would for the stomach cancer research group, belong to the dominant 
(white) ethnicity. This, however, is not the case as one scientist is in fact Maori, and 
this is discussed in more detail in chapter five. Maori are generally, however, 
relegated to the status of 'other' in the majority of popular culture accounts. For 
instance, in the accounts I analysed, the whanau are always ethnically marked, usually 
by the term 'Maori family' or by the term 'whanau', and in none of the pieces I 
looked at is whiteness marked - there is no mention that the majority of the scientists 
are 'Pakeha', 'white', or 'New Zealand European'. 
This indicates that, because Maori are the marked category within these discourses, it 
is taken for granted that the category which is not marked is assumed to be white, and 
this is a reflection of the way in which society is ethnically constructed. Statements 
like the following appeared in the overwhelming majority of articles I viewed: 
'Scientists at Otago University achieved a world first in identifying the gene E-
cadherin as being responsible for stomach cancer in five generations of a Maori 
family' (The Christchurch Press 27 March 1998: 9). The only exception to the articles 
I analysed is a short item which appeared in Otago Graduate (1998: 17), which does 
not mention that the whanau are Maori. Significantly, even specifically Maori 
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publications have 'Maori' as a marked category.43 However, it should be noted that in 
these contexts, the marking of this category can be a positive attribute, highlighting 
the achievements of Maori. 
Also related to the notion of Whiteness is the ideology of monoculturalism. According 
to Abel (1997: 20), this concept refers to the 
... unwillingness to refer to "Pakeha culture" or to recognise that Pakeha might 
be politically and culturally dominant. Such attitudes position Pakeha 
viewpoints and values as "normal" and "universal" and force Maori into the 
position of "other". 
Another possible reason for the consistent marking of Maori is that, according to 
Abel, most reporters are ill-informed about Maori society and values. Therefore, 'the 
"importance," "relevance" and "significance" of a story is inevitably seen through 
Pakeha eyes' (ibid. 1997: 24).44 
However, the practice of marking 'racial' categories other than white has very real 
consequences in terms of constructing categories of what is considered 'normal' and 
in contrast, 'other'. This notion has been theorised in the discipline of Whiteness 
Studies, and one proponent of this discipline, Richard Dyer (1997: 1), argues that 
because race is only applied to non-white peoples, white people are not racially 
marked. Therefore, while 'other' people are raced, white people are just people. In the 
same vein, sociologist Ashley Doane (2003) notes that because Whiteness is a 
discourse that focuses on the racialised 'other', white becomes a category by default. 
He states that: 'whiteness is defined through boundaries and exclusion, by being "not 
of colour"' (Doane 2003: 8-9). Academic deMello Patterson (1998: 104) argues that 
Whiteness can be defined by several ideological features including capitalistic society 
structure, faith in science and progress, family and societal group structures based on 
43 This is illustrated by the following two examples: 'A unique research collaboration between an 
extended Bay of Plenty Maori whanau and biomedical scientists in Dunedin into an inherited type of 
stomach cancer has just been awarded $931,171 in further funding over three years by the Health 
Research Council' (Kokiri Paetae February 1998: 6); 'A unique research partnership between a Maori 
whanau and University of Otago scientists has identified a world first - a gene for stomach cancer 
susceptibility' (Te Maori 14 April 1998: 3). 
44 Derek Fox, the creator of Mana Maori Media, a specifically Maori media organization, has stated 
that 'Pakeha journalists are generally not aware that in their work they are drawing on their own 
cultural perspective, since they assume it is universal' (Fox 1993: 136 cited in Abel 1997: 24). 
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the ideology of capitalism (individualism, competition) and 'belief in Eurocentric 
cultural, philosophical, and economic superiority'. 
In other words, Whiteness refers to ways of living that were developed from Western 
European colonialism (ibid.), and this resonates with the aforementioned conclusion 
of Rankine and McCreanor (in press: 21), that the media coverage of the identification 
of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer is 'Colonial Coverage' in that 'It weakens 
voices that assert an active and positive role for Maori'. Moreover, the construction of 
the helpful and heroic Pakeha scientists in contrast to the 'problem' Maori whanau 
appears as both natural and unchangeable (ibid.). 
Elaborating on this, Rankine and McCreanor (in press) note that the labour undertaken 
by Maori in the partnership such as their initiative, research, collaboration and 
management were considered incompatible with Pakeha 'commonsense'. They assert 
that this incompatibility was managed by writing Maori out of stories in order to 
restore the expectation that 'it will be Pakeha excellence and competence in 
knowledge creation that solves the problem' (Rankine and McCreanor in press: 18). 
This highlights how, when hereditary stomach cancer is experienced by Maori in a 
New Zealand historical context, even further cultural shaping occurs. 
They also concede that in vanous yet subtle ways, (such as names, institutional 
affiliations, photographs and the absence of cultural markers), the conclusion was 
made that the medical scientists involved were Pakeha. Drawing on the work of 
Barthes (1973) and his notion of 'exnomination', they elucidate this point. This term 
refers to the process of identifying the margins in order to naturalise the centre. 
Barthes cited this as a central way in which dominance (as a social relation) is 
reproduced (Rankine and McCreanor in press: 16). Rankine and McCreanor argue 
that in the media accounts, this notion relegates science and medicine as part of the 
modem (Pakeha) world rather than something belonging to Maori, who are pushed to 
the periphery as outsiders (ibid.). This point is illustrated by the following example: 
'Mr Peters said the project represented a partnership between modem science and 
traditional Maori culture' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
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Unsurprisingly then, apparent in several of the media accounts is a resistance to 
labelling on the part of the whanau in order to counter the subtle ways in which they 
were negatively portrayed as 'sick, passive and subordinate to Pakeha expertise' 
(Rankine and McCreanor in press: 19). The following examples illustrate how the 
whanau were portrayed as such: 'A whanau's cry for help points New Zealand 
scientists to a world first' (Perry 26 March 1998b: Al), and: 
The project involved a research partnership between the university scientists 
and a Bay of Plenty extended Maori family group, which suffers from a high 
rate of aggressive inherited gastric cancer (Gibb 26 March 1998: 1). 
Rankine and McCreanor (in press: 14) note that such statements stigmatise the family 
'portraying the disease as a characteristic of the whanau (and therefore perhaps Maori 
in general), rather than something that happens to some members'. They also note that 
out of the twenty three stories they examined, only three mentioned positive 
characteristics in relation to the whanau (such as bravery, courage and optimism) 
(ibid.). Thus, there is a compounding of the passivity of the cancer victims with the 
smaller degree of agency associated with non-whites. 
In addition, many of the accounts marginalise the central role the whanau played in 
the project by either downplaying their role, or not mentioning it at all, despite the fact 
that their part was of crucial importance, especially in terms of initiating and directing 
the research. Although I found many examples to back this claim, I will mention only 
the most evident: 'A team of seven researchers led by Dr Parry Guilford made 
headlines two years ago when they discovered the gene which leads to inherited 
stomach cancer' (Otago School of Medical Sciences n.d.), and 'Research assistance 
came from a nurse, Maybelle McLeod, from the Kimihauora Health Clinic at Mount 
Maunganui, and other helpers in the area' (Gibb 26 March 1998: 1). In relation to this 
latter example, Rankine and McCreanor assert that 'The term "nurse" in this 
medicalised context is a hierarchical marker of occupation that reinforces the 
subordinate role implied in "research assistance" for Maybelle McLeod' (in press: 
17). These authors also note that the majority of stories they looked at construct the 
scientists as active and competent, while the whanau is positioned as passive, 
Tania Campbell 46 
! •. 
Chapter Three The Construction of Technoscience 
and Biomedicine in Popular Culture 
diseased, and dependent on the scientists. Over half of the stories did not mention the 
fact that the whanau compiled the (very large) whakapapa, or genealogy (ibid.: 13-
14). 
This is particularly disconcerting in that Rankine and McCreanor (in press), after 
consulting a Health Research Council press release, were aware of the agency of the 
whanau in terms of initiating, directing, contributing to and applying the findings of 
the research. Their discursive analysis of the media coverage is therefore revealing in 
that this coverage: 
... elects to tell the story as if Maori were involved as victims of a terrible 
disease rather than innovative participants in developing the understanding of 
and responses to inherited stomach cancer (Rankine and McCreanor in press: 
19). 
These comments resonate with an assertion made by Abel (1997), who noted that 
generally, news values are embedded within organisational constraints and routines to 
'produce ideological effects which disadvantage Maori ideas and values' (1997: 26-
27). 
The most outstanding statement (see Table 3 for others) from the whanau in terms of 
resistance to labelling present in the media came from one involved whanau member, 
who stated that: 'We are future-looking people who do not dwell on the past. We 
faced the problem and didn't just sit down and wait for someone else to take the 
initiative' (Perry 26 March 1998a: A3). Other examples featured in the documentary 
Gene Hunters (video recording 1998), in which the narrator, Janet McIntyre, 
introduced it by emphasising the whanau' s role in initiating and directing the 
project.45 This allows the whanau a degree of agency they were not granted in many 
of the other media accounts, and this portrayal is more accurate in terms of portraying 
the labour undertaken by some whanau members and the medical research team. 
45 McIntyre (Gene Hunters video recording 1998) stated that: 
When NZ scientists discovered the gene that causes stomach cancer earlier this year, the 
international scientific community cheered ... What you didn't hear was how the breakthrough 
came about - how it was triggered by the largest family group in the world afflicted by this 
cancer. That Mt. Maunganui family was determined to find out why they'd been singled out 
by this pitiless disease, and as you will see, there were good reasons for their motivation. 
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Another theme to emerge from the undertaking of my own discursive analysis of 
media accounts of the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer is the 
cultural dichotomy between representations of Maori (traditional) and technoscience 
(modem). The assumption implicit in this is that all Maori people, because they are an 
indigenous population, are averse to modernity, especially in the areas of biomedicine 
and medical science. One consequence of this representation is that it serves to widen 
the perceived gap between modem technoscience and traditional Maori culture such 
as the previously mentioned quote from Mr Peters (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 
2: 11). Comments such as this imply that 'traditional' Maori culture is hostile to, and 
separate from, modem technoscience, which is a misleading and simplistic claim, 
especially considering that 'modem science' is based on its own traditions, as 
considered in the previous chapter in relation to the notion that science is 
multicultural. 
In addition, the notion of the curse is mentioned in many of the accounts, and this has 
several negative consequences for the way in which the whanau is portrayed. In some 
articles, it is implied that there was a firm belief in the curse, and this was the main 
reason for the whanau not requesting a scientific explanation, or that it was widely 
believed as the cause of the disease. Examples of this include: 'A Mt Maunganui 
family is praying that research soon to be extended to other parts of New Zealand will 
help lift a lethal curse that has ravaged its members for generations' (The Dominion 
11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11); 'After losing 25 of its members to stomach cancer in 30 
years, a Maori family put aside traditional superstitions and contacted laboratories 
throughout New Zealand to obtain a scientific explanation' (Senior 1998: 276); 'A 
family cursed? That was the Maori belief for many years, that a maketu had been put 
on the whanau. But this "curse" they would be told in 1997, had a scientific reason' 
(Coddington 2001: 77). These statements also serve to further reinforce the 
construction that the whanau and traditional Maori culture generally, is hostile to 
modem technoscience, thereby enhancing this dichotomy. 
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However, the fact that one whanau member stated that the belief of the curse did not 
come, for the most part, from the whanau highlights how the media exaggerated the 
significance of the curse in order to create a 'good story'. Thus, this member stated 
that this belief was 'mostly promoted by people outside the whanau, that a makutu or 
Maori curse was responsible for the deaths' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
Significantly, all those I interviewed reiterated that the notion of the curse was 
simplified, exaggerated, and overemphasised in the media, becoming a means to make 
'good press' and portray the whanau in a negative light. For instance, the whanau 
health workers whom I interviewed said the curse was a 'misconception', and the 
scientists also noted that they tried to downplay the curse as it was exaggerated and 
taken out of context in order to make the media accounts more interesting to the 
detriment of the whanau. (This will as discussed in more detail in chapter five). 
Moral Qualities of Technoscience and Biomedicine 
Another issue apparent in the accounts I analysed was the unanimously positive 
portrayal of technoscience and biomedicine, especially in relation to the moral 
qualities of these institutions. Before embarking on this discussion, it is important to 
consider a comment made by Kleinman (1995: 23), who notes that: 'There is ... no 
essential medicine. No medicine that is independent of historical context'. This helps 
to locate biomedicine as just one of many health systems, and opens it to criticism. 
Another healing system, for instance, is that of ethnomedicine46 and anthropologist 
Mark Nichter (1992) notes that while this healing system is negatively presumed to be 
complacent and irrational, biomedicine is, in contrast, portrayed as 'logical and self-
correcting through the deployment of standardized, replicable procedures which test 
for the falsification of hypotheses' (ibid.: xii). 
Although biomedicine is generally privileged in Western society and the mainstream 
media, this medical system is deeply flawed in that it takes a disembodied approach to 
illness and healing. However, in consideration of my own findings, sociologist Alan 
46 Ethnomedicine is: 
... the study of how well-being and suffering are experienced bodily as well as socially, the 
multivocality of somatic communication, and processes of healing as they are contextualised 
and directed toward the person, household, community and state, land and cosmos (Nichter 
1992: x). 
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Petersen (2001), in his investigation of how the newsprint media 'frames' stories on 
genetics and medicine in articles appearing in several Australian newspapers in the 
late 1990s, stated that: 'Gene stories were found to be prominent in each of the 
newspapers, and to emphasise the medical benefits of genetic research' (2001: 1255). 
I also found that such positive portrayals of biomedicine were especially apparent in 
the 'human-interest' story.47 Such stories emphasise the personal experience and 
suffering of the individual. One example of this is an article titled 'Errant gene cut 
family members down', subtitled 'Wondering each day who would be next was the 
hardest part', whose lead sentence is: 'Everyday of his adult life, Rangi McLeod felt 
like a soldier going into battle' (Knight and Perry 23-24 May 1998: A3). Such 
portrayals serve to bolster the positive effects of science and medicine as they are seen 
as the sole mechanisms for the alleviation of suffering. 
A further point to note is that in none of the accounts I analysed, is there any mention 
of the negative aspects of monitoring, surveillance and medical intervention generally. 
This is interesting in that the tendency in biomedicine to reduce persons to objects 
through these means is dehumanising (Kleinman 1995: 31). However, this is not 
surprising considering the relatively uncritical relationship between the media and the 
institutions of biomedicine and medical science (as will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter). Biomedicine is therefore privileged and taken for granted as 
the only possible system of healing. Practices such as endoscopy and surveillance 
programmes are hailed as being life saving, or having great preventative power,48 and 
many of the accounts frame monitoring as a privilege. For example: 'Christchurch 
oncologist Bridget Robinson said the discovery was "really exciting". It would allow 
people with familial risk of stomach cancer to be monitored through screening' (The 
Christchurch Press 27 March 1998: 9); this example brings to mind a comment made 
by Rankine and McCreanor (in press: 17) who state that in much of the media 
coverage, the whanau are seen 'only as passive targets of the genetic screening 
programme', and is also exemplified by this statement: 'Dr Guilford said Otago 
47 These particular types of stories are 'a powerful way of both universalising and personalising human 
experience, which is portrayed as beyond the reach of social, political and economic factors' (Karpf 
1988: 101 cited in Petersen 2001: 1259). 
48 References to screening through a simple blood test, monitoring through endoscopy, and/or general 
surveillance are mentioned in 14 of the accounts I analysed. 
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researchers had already developed genetic blood tests which could be used to screen 
members of the three Maori families involved in the study' (Gibb 26 March 1998: 1). 
I will consider the social complexities of this kind of genetic testing in the following 
chapter. 
Another associated pattern to emerge from the texts I analysed was the altruistic 
construction of scientists in relation to the whanau. Notably, the leader of the team of 
geneticists, Dr Guilford, is always portrayed as the person responsible for most of the 
ground-breaking work, and as being solely responsible for saving lives: 'With a one in 
three billion chance of success, gene research scientist, Parry Guilford, has identified 
the mutant gene - saving the lives of thousands of people' (Cancer Gene n.d.). The 
same account also stated that: 'The lives of thousands of people will be saved because 
of the co-operation of Hira's whanau and Parry Guilford's amazing discovery' (ibid.). 
Here there is a notable contrast in which the whanau are noted for their co-operation, 
while Guilford is credited for his 'amazing discovery'. This serves to reinforce other 
media portrayals of the whanau as passive and needy. Moreover, it is apt that in this 
context, it is a scientist who is focused upon as, as previously mentioned, the media 
has a relatively uncritical relationship with the institutions of technoscience and 
biomedicine. 49 
In conjunction, Rankine and McCreanor note that in the articles they studied, the 
scientists are attributed with 'active, controlled, expert actions - the descriptors of the 
scientists' agency and purpose are unequivocal' (in press: 11). Such descriptors 
included: the scientists 'identified' a gene, 'developed a test', 'saved lives 
worldwide', studied the whanau, tackled the cancer, 'monitored', 'patented' and 
'achieved' (ibid.). In contrast, they note that references to the whanau are more 
'mixed', and that the current affairs story (Gene Hunters video recording 1998) was 
the only one that mentioned that the whanau recruited the scientists after 'rigorous 
scrutiny', that they wanted control over the process, that a group of women from the 
49 This observation echoes the work of other scholars who have argued that 'Newspapers rely heavily 
on geneticists' own discourse about their practice and tend to neglect uncertainties in scientific 
knowledge and the social context of science and practice' (Cunningham-Burley, Kerr, and Amos 1998: 
20-22, cited in Petersen 1999: 164). 
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whanau 'footslogged' through cemeteries, constructed a whakapapa, convinced 
members to give DNA samples, and compiled a database (Rankine and McCreanor in 
press: 11). Such contrasts in the portrayals of the same event highlight how popular 
culture accounts of genetic testing generally, and this case specifically, are culturally 
constructed to reflect certain values, emphasising the importance of considering 
discourses. 
Metaphors 1n Technoscience, Biomedicine and Popular 
Culture 
In undertaking discourse analysis I also considered how the body, disease and 
genetics are portrayed in the popular culture accounts of the case study. The findings 
reinforce the fact that representations of these physical entities are culturally shaped 
beyond biology. For example, discourse analysis revealed that it is common to use 
masculine and militaristic metaphors in technoscientific and biomedical discourse, as 
well as popular culture. The rest of this chapter, then, will focus of the role of 
metaphor in these discourses because the use of metaphor is a central way in which 
they are constructed. It is also appropriate to discuss at length the role of metaphor 
here because of the great deal of literature written on this topic. 
My findings parallel those of Flannery (2001: 628) who, coming from a feminist 
standpoint, argues that metaphors used to describe technoscience and its processes are 
overwhelmingly masculine. Petersen (1999: 169) has also asserted that metaphors in 
technoscience are masculine, noting that science is often represented as a quest to find 
the gene. This is reinforced by the common use of hunting and sporting metaphors to 
describe the work of the researchers or the processes of research. Examples that 
illustrate this point are the titles of two accounts of this particular case study: Gene 
Hunters (video recording 1998), and The Gene Seekers (O'Brien 2001).50 These 
examples demonstrate that scientific and biomedical discourse filters through into 
popular culture, which uncritically appropriates and proliferates such constructions. 
This is compounded by the fact that the family involved is indigenous, therefore 
conjuring images and connotations of tribalism, primitivism and depicting a sort of 
50 Refer to Table 5 at the end of this chapter for more examples of this particular theme. 
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hunter-gatherer organisation. Another noteworthy example is the following headline, 
which states that 'Cancer find "like scaling Everest"', followed by a comment by an 
involved professor who stated that: "It was like scaling Everest for the first time" (26 
March 1998a: A3). This comment is masculine in tone in that it resonates with the 
idea of discovery, of conquering nature and the unknown; it also plays on the idea of a 
major discovery in a linear and progressive fashion (i.e. climbing a mountain). It is an 
appropriate metaphor in New Zealand society as it refers to Sir Edmund Hilary's 
victory of 'conquering' Mount Everest (which is generally not understood to be the 
achievement of Tenzing Norgay). 
In terms of war and military imagery (see Table 6) in the accounts I analysed, I will 
mention only the most obvious and notable examples: [Whanau member] "It's similar 
to going to war, not knowing if they were going to die or when a bullet's going to hit 
them. We all felt the same fear" (Knight and Perry 23-24 May 1998: A3). While this 
particular quote was from the affected person, the reporter chose to select and 
emphasise it, placing it at the beginning of the article. This phrase is an obvious 
metaphor of going to war, and is reinforced by the accompanying photo of three 
female members of the McLeod whanau standing, looking into the distance. However, 
this metaphor is interesting in that the person using it is provided with a way of 
articulating what the illness experience is like, a way of communicating both the fear 
of being surrounded by illness and a sense of foreboding as one is fearful and 
uncertain of the future. Therefore, there are positive aspects of using militant 
metaphors in communication about disease. 51 
Other negative examples include: 'A $330,000 marae-based clinic to fight a cancer-
causing gene has opened near Te Maunga' (New Zealand Herald 17 March 2001 
online), and 'Researchers battle family curse' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
It is evident then that cancer is perceived as something to be feared and fought. Both 
51 It is important to bear in mind that the experience of cancer can be like this, and it is not surprising 
that such metaphors are frequently used in relation to this disease. One possible reason for this is that it 
speaks to the overwhelming sense of actual attack that we might feel. Therefore, it is important to point 
out that such views of the body can often have a positive effect on those who are ill. As Arthur Frank 
(1995: 105) states: 'Where life can be given narrative order, chaos is already at bay'. Thus, war 
imagery is a way of giving narrative as well as physical order to life in the face of disease. 
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of these examples illustrate that masculine thinking is entrenched and naturalised in 
contemporary popular culture in relation to technoscientific and biomedical discourse. 
Moreover, such use of language suggests that the audiences of these newspapers are 
familiar with this kind of language, and that not only is it accepted, but also expected. 
One scientist I interviewed was also critical of this language for the way in which it 
negatively portrayed and misconstrued the processes and effects of cancer, and I will 
discuss this later in the thesis. 
In considering representations of the effect of cancer on the whanau, then, it becomes 
apparent that language imbued with references to violence and war are pervasive in 
the media accounts. In conjunction with this, the whanau are portrayed as passive 
victims of this disease. The following phrase illustrates this point: 'The family ... had 
been plagued by stomach cancer' (Perry 26 March 1998b: Al), and the following 
statement goes further by conjuring images of uncontrollable destruction, as is 
sometimes the case with news reports of tornadoes and hurricanes: 'The disease has 
ravaged generations of the McLeod family .. .' (New Zealand Press Association 28 
Oct. 1999 online). The effects of cancer are thus portrayed as having a violent and 
forceful effect on those who have it, both physically and emotionally. 
George Annas (1995: 745), an academic of public health, has noted how medical 
metaphors draw on military images for their substance. He draws on the practice and 
financing of medicine in the United States, asserting that: 'Military thinking 
concentrates on the physical, sees control as central, and encourages the expenditure 
of massive resources to achieve dominance' (ibid.). More specifically, he asserts that 
this thinking encourages viewing the human body as a battlefield, which is perceived 
as appropriate by many male physicians, who, until recently served in the American 
military (ibid.). Despite the fact that the notion of the body as battlefield has come 
under criticism from many critics of scientific and biomedical discourse, this 
metaphor is still apparent in these discourses.52 One key reason for its prevalence is 
52 Scientist Scott Montgomery (1991: 347), for example, concedes that in Western culture, the reigning 
image-system for all diseases is war as the language of militarism represents its users as an occupied 
people. 
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that fact that military metaphors have historically played an important role in 
technoscience and biomedicine, as discussed by Sontag (1978).53 
The Cultural Construction of Cancer and the Body 
It is evident, then, that there is cultural labour involved in the use of metaphor to 
describe science which we often tap into unthinkingly and uncritically. Concerning 
cancer specifically, Sontag (1978: 61) asserts that cancer is the metaphorical barbarian 
within. The dominant metaphors used to describe cancer are drawn from the language 
of warfare, highlighting how cancer is constructed beyond biology in the West, and 
this was the case in my own discourse analysis of the popular culture accounts of the 
identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer. Both physicians and patients, 
argues Sontag, are familiar with such military terminology. So, rather than perceiving 
cancer cells as simply 'multiplying', they are considered 'invasive'. Cancer cells, 
then, are seen to 'colonise' from the original tumour to other sites in the body, and the 
body's 'defences' are not strong enough to destroy a tumour that consists of countless 
destructive cells (ibid. 1978: 64). However, Sontag's work has been criticised for her 
assertion that diseases should be relieved of metaphorical associations. This is 
paradoxical in that she was one of the first critics to argue that disease becomes 
meaningful through using metaphor (Lupton 1994: 57-58). 
In accordance, war imagery is especially prevalent in portrayals of the physical 
dynamics of cancer. Such portrayals connote violence as power dynamics between 
cells victimise the body as the variations and processes of cancer are constructed as 
both invasive and aggressive. The following examples (see Table 6 for others) from 
one article about the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer illustrate 
this point: 'suppress cell invasion', 'the E-cadherin was mutating, leading to 
53 
Sontag (1978) argued that the military metaphor in medicine became both pervasive and popular in 
the 1880s as a result of the identification of bacteria as 'agents of disease' (1978: 65-66), and the 
bacteria was understood to 'invade' and 'infiltrate'. However, she also states that the use of war 
imagery to describe disease, especially cancer, is now strikingly literal and authoritative as medical 
treatment is overwhelmingly described this way (ibid.). Sontag elaborates on the origins of military 
metaphors in technoscience and biomedicine, claiming in a later work that it was when the 'invader' 
was perceived as the rnirco-organism that causes the illness (rather than the illness itself) that medicine 
became particularly effective, resulting in the credibility and precision of military metaphors (ibid. 
1990: 97). 
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extremely aggressive forms of tumour. .. ' (Perry 26 March 1998a: A3). This brings 
our attention to the fact that how we understand cancer is culturally shaped. 
Breast cancer specialist Musa Mayer (1998) argues that common metaphors of cancer 
can contribute to the stigma associated with the disease. For example, when cancer 
treatment fails or is particularly harsh, biomedicine's mechanistic view of the body as 
a fixable machine lead easily to the use of metaphors of war whereby disease becomes 
the invader that must be counter-attacked by biomedical treatments. Mayer concedes 
that 'Warlike imagery plays a role in eliciting fear when cancer is conceived of as an 
invincible enemy, mindlessly mowing down victims in its path' (Mayer 1998 online: 
para. 6). So, the way in which cancer is constructed can have very real consequences 
for those who live with it. 
The use of the term 'mutant' in reference to the defective gene E-cadherin which 
causes familial gastric cancer (see Table 5 for notable examples) also has negative 
connotations and illustrates how, in the West, cancer is constructed beyond biology 
and associated with the genre of science fiction. The use of this term in this context 
ensures that cancer is portrayed as unnatural, out of control and ceaselessly 
threatening. The great majority of articles I studied mentioned that the gene is 
'mutant', for example: 'Seven out of ten people with the mutant gene are expected to 
develop cancer' (New Zealand Herald 17 March 2001 online), 'The Maori family has 
lost at least 30 members in 30 years to gastric cancer because of a mutant gene passed 
on by an ancestor' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). Journalist Jenny Rankine 
has made a crucial point in relation to this case. She stated that: 
In scientific terms, mutation simply means a change, but its lay associations of 
deformity, freakishness and serious innate disease contributed to the media 
construction of the whanau as diseased. This is something scientists don't 
realise, I think, and contributes to problems with media coverage of genetic 
issues more generally (Rankine, J. 2003, Pers. Comm. 14 May). 
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Sontag (1978: 68) also notes that cancer is considered as 'the disease of the Other', 
and in science fiction,54 'mutant' cells are seen as an invasion of 'alien' cells, which 
are considered stronger than normal cells. Thus, the process of cancer has affinities 
with the standard science fiction plot of mutation. This theme is usually expressed 
either by mutants arriving from outer space or by accidental mutations occurring 
among humans. Cancer, then, can be described as a victorious mutation, as mutation 
has become a central image for cancer (Sontag 1978: 68). Thus, it is apparent that one 
prominent way in which we understand cancer in the West is by associating the 
physical process with particular elements of science fiction: the unknown, the 
undesirable and the uncontrollable. 
The body has also been likened to a machine, especially in the field of genetics. I 
found this to be the case, particularly in reference to DNA, as the following statement 
from one article illustrates: 'They plan to reverse the existing mutation using the cells' 
inherent DNA repair machinery' (Senior 1998: 276). This phrase resonates with the 
notion of the body, and its workings as a machine, and portrays processes associated 
with DNA as a kind of industrial factory - it's repairing is seen as automatic, 
immediate, and technical. In addition, Nelkin and Tancredi (1989) have argued that 
the metaphor of body as machine has shaped how diagnostic tests are interpreted, and 
how their results are employed; and while metaphors of the body have changed 
through time and in response to technoscientific and medical developments, they have 
always reinforced the notion of the body as a mechanical system, highlighting how 
the body is culturally shaped.55 
Metaphor As Strategy 
Having established that metaphors which exist in technoscience, biomedicine and 
popular culture are culturally constructed, notably as masculine and militant as well as 
54 Here Sontag (1978: 68) is referring to such science fiction films as Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 
The Incredible Shrinking Man, The Blob, and The Thing. 
55 For example, Nelkin and Tancredi (1989: 15) cite the developments in the area of organ 
transplantation during the 1960s, which projected an image of the body as a set of replaceable parts. 
Earlier, in the 1930s, another metaphor emerged whereby antibiotic medications created the 
representation of the body as a chemical system. They (1989: 15-16) suggest that this metaphor became 
increasingly apparent and pervasive as advances in molecular biology in the 1960s and 1970s, as well 
as the chemical basis of cellular activity became illuminated. 
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in terms of science fiction, I will now briefly consider the strategic use of such 
metaphors in the communication of science in order to further elucidate how 
representations of disease, the gene and the body are culturally constructed. 
Petersen (2001) offers a compelling argument on the strategic role of metaphor in 
newsprint stories about genetics. He states that scientists have 'employed particular 
metaphors and rhetorical strategies to help convey complex ideas to a broad lay public 
and to communicate the excitement and the benefits of their work' (Petersen 2001: 
1257). He concedes that while genetic researchers and the professional journals that 
publish their work strive to promote research as objective and value-free, scientific 
descriptions depend on metaphors and other imagery that circulate in the broader 
culture and also mirror social biases (ibid.). For example, Petersen observes that the 
use of military metaphors help to convey the significance of the research for the 
development and advancement of new preventive techniques, drugs or therapies. In 
articles that use this technique, it is also apparent that researchers appear heroic as 
defenders and guardians of the public's health (ibid.: 1264). 
In addition, as sociologist Deborah Lupton (1994) notes, both the linguistic and visual 
representations of medicine, illness, disease and the body in popular culture as well as 
medical and scientific texts, play a significant role in the construction of lay and 
expert knowledges and experiences of these domains. The metaphors used to describe 
illness, disease and the body are choices which are telling of deeper social feelings of 
both the body politic and the corporeal body (Lupton 1994: 78). It is significant, then, 
that common portrayals and understandings of these phenomena incorporate imagery 
that has connotations of war, violence and control (ibid.). 
It has been argued that the use of metaphor in communication about technoscience is 
always strategic (Nelkin 1987, Bono 1990, Nelkin 1994, Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 
Keller 2002, Brown 2003). Therefore, the use of particular metaphors and not others 
signals that particular values of certain institutions are more prominent than others, 
and in relation to the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer, 
metaphors explaining the notion of whakapapa are at best, sparse. Bearing these 
points in mind, I will now discuss several prominent metaphors of the gene, giving 
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consideration to their broader cultural meanings in the realms of technoscience and 
popular culture. 
Cultural Constructions of the Gene 
By examining some of the most prevalent metaphors of the gene56 to exist in 
contemporary popular culture, I consider how the broader cultural meanings of these 
metaphors offer a limited and partial understanding of the complex socio-cultural 
relations embedded in technoscience. The metaphors discussed here are those of the 
blueprint, the map, and the 'master molecule', and are important to consider for the 
way in which they construct and reify the gene as an entity, at the cost of ignoring 
complex socio-cultural factors. The broader cultural meanings of the gene therefore 
offer a limited and partial understanding of the complex socio-cultural relations 
embedded in technoscience. Contrary to these portrayals is the notion of whakapapa 
which questions the reductive portrayal of the gene in popular culture, and this 
holistic concept is considered further in the following discussion. 
Condit (1999: 205) notes that the end of the twentieth century saw the emergence of 
the blueprint metaphor, which, during the 1990s, became the dominant metaphor for 
genetics. This metaphor was influenced by a refocusing of scientific views and 
possibilities from the individual genes to the 'genome', and consequently, a more 
holistic perspective was adopted when looking at the complex role of DNA in animals 
and cells (ibid.: 20). In this new era, the blueprint metaphor represented a more 
holistic portrayal and was also understood as more materially connected to the 
environment (ibid.). One role of the blueprint metaphor is that it orchestrated the 
different parts of the code into a whole and particular text (Condit 1999: 219). 
However, this portrayal of the gene as a deterministic entity lacks a sense of socio-
cultural context, especially when considering other definitions of the gene, such as 
that put forth by Haraway (1997) in relation to the notion of corporealization, as 
considered further in the discussion. 
56 Considering metaphors of the gene must also necessarily entail considerations of DNA and the 
genome as generally, these are all the same thing. The genome consists solely of DNA, and the genome 
contains genes, which are finite pieces of DNA embedded within the genome (Khan, A. 2004, Pers. 
Comm: 2 March). 
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Another metaphor of importance as to how the gene and genome are constructed in 
the settings of technoscience and popular culture is that of the map. Haraway (1997) 
argues against the standard view put forward by many geneticists, which argues that 
their work is simply an objective representation of reality. She reveals the way in 
which the gene is appropriated and fetishised, noting that for gene fetishists (scientists 
and geneticists) maps and scientific objects generally are simply objective technical 
representations which are entrenched in a process of neutral and objective discovery.57 
Arguing against this view, Haraway draws on the work of Latour (1987) to emphasize 
her point. She focuses on the way in which he emphasises the movement of worlds 
through practices of mapping. Latour concedes that cartography is both a metaphor 
and technology of central importance to technoscience (Latour 1987: 215-257 cited in 
Haraway 1997: 163), and this leads Haraway (1997: 163) to assert that 'Cartography 
is perhaps the chief tool-metaphor of technoscience'. Nelkin (1994) also notes the 
importance of the map as a cultural construction in relation to genetics. She asserts 
that maps represent cultural choices and are, as a form of knowledge, tools of 
persuasion. She states that: 'As a curator put it: "Every map is someone's way of 
getting you to look at the world in his or her way"' (Nelkin 1994: 29). 
Along with the blueprint and map metaphors, the 'master molecule' is another central 
metaphor apparent in popular discourses about genetics. The discourse surrounding 
this particular metaphor has encouraged notions of genetic determinism to flourish, 
especially in the realm of popular culture, as noted by Nelkin and Lindee (1995). 
Even geneticists have critiqued the notion of the 'master molecule'; for instance, 
Richard Lewontin (1992: 48), an internationally renowned geneticist and philosopher 
of science, states that: 'Isolating the gene as the "master molecule" is 
an ... unconscious ideological commitment, one that places brains above brawn, mental 
work as superior to mere physical work, information as higher than action'. 
Haraway (1997) also critiques the idea of the gene as 'master molecule' by offering a 
complex definition of the gene which consciously takes into account its place in 
57 
To illustrate her point, she paraphrases the attitude of denial inherent in corporeal fetishism: 
Scientific maps could not be fetishes, fetishes are only for perverts and primitives. Scientific 
people are committed to clarity; they are not fetishists mired in error. My gene map is a non-
tropic representation of reality, that is, of genes themselves (Haraway 1997: 137). 
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socio-cultural relations. She states that: 'A gene is not a thing, much less a "master 
molecule" or a self-contained code. Instead, the term gene signifies a node of durable 
action where many actors, human and nonhuman, meet' (Haraway 1997: 142). This 
understanding of the gene highlights its multifaceted and heterogeneous nature, as 
well as its embedded position within dynamic social and cultural beliefs and practices. 
Moreover, this understanding of the gene is illustrated throughout this thesis, 
especially in chapter five where I consider the labour undertaken by the key 
researchers involved in the stomach cancer gene project. 
Gene Fetishism: Separation of the 'Natural' and Cultural 
Considering the broader cultural meanings and metaphors of the gene that exist in 
popular culture illustrate how the gene has become fetishised, not only in popular 
culture, but in technoscience as well, highlighting how the gene is culturally shaped. 
Haraway' s notion of corporealization58 exposes the myths and metaphors of the gene 
prevalent in both the practice of genetics and the realm of popular culture, and this 
notion reveals the constructed nature of the gene and frames it less as an object and 
more as a web of action made up of human and nonhuman actors (Haraway 1997: 
142). 
Haraway notes the original site for the construction of the gene is the sphere of 
technoscience, or more specifically, biotechnology. Drawing partially on the work of 
Freud, who argued that 'a fetish is an object or part of the body used in achieving 
libidinal satisfaction' (Haraway 1997: 144),59 Haraway argues that the dynamics of 
gene fetishism obscure the sociotechnical relations among humans, and between 
humans and nonhumans that create two things essential to commodity fetishism: 
objects and value (ibid.: 147). The notion of corporealization thus renders such 
entities as 'natural-technical objects of knowledge and practice' (ibid.: 141-142), 
58 As previously mentioned in chapter one, Haraway (1997: 141-142) defines corporealization as ' ... the 
interactions of humans and nonhumans in the distributed, heterogeneous work processes of 
technoscience'. 
59 In relation to this point, Haraway states that: 
Only half jokingly, I see the molecular biological fetishist to be enthralled by a phallus-
substitute, a mere "penis" called the gene, which defends the cowardly subject from the too 
scary sight of the relentless material-semiotic articulations of biological reality, not to mention 
sight of the wider horizons leading to the real in technoscience (Haraway 1997: 146). 
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highlighting their constructed nature. Considering this point in relation to the stomach 
cancer gene highlights how it has become fetishised in the realms of technoscience, 
biomedicine, and the media. 
Popular culture (especially the media) often mirrors the ideology of gene fetishism in 
that it separates the 'natural' from the cultural by focusing on the gene as a physical 
entity that is both fixed and objective. Petersen (2001) for example, argues that stories 
about genetics in the newsprint media portray the gene as 'all powerful, reinforcing 
the view that nature is separate from culture' (ibid.: 1266). This point becomes 
especially evident when considering that the role of DNA is reified (as the 'blueprint' 
of life, among other things), at the cost of ignoring socio-cultural factors. This has 
significant ramifications not only for how we understand genetics and the gene, but 
how we perceive technoscience generally. For instance, the stomach cancer gene has 
become a thing-in-itself: as noted in the Introduction of this thesis, the familial gastric 
cancer is not caused by a 'mutated' gene, but rather, a variation in one particular gene. 
Standing in contrast to the way in which many metaphors of the gene separate the 
'natural' from the cultural are some Maori views of the gene, especially the notion of 
whakapapa. Interestingly, the Maori notion of whakapapa was not considered in most 
of the popular culture accounts of the identification of the gene for hereditary 
stomach, highlighting how discourses are produced to represent certain values and 
views and not others. 
Before discussing the significance of this term in relation to genetics, it is important to 
place this term in the cultural context of Maori belief, although it should be mentioned 
here that not all Maori adhere to this worldview, and opinion of how this worldview 
should be adapted by Maori in contemporary New Zealand society also differs.60 
Ethnologist Percy Smith (1913 cited in Mead 1998: 23) translated teachings of Maori 
religion, cosmology and history, which made the Maori worldview of creation 
accessible to a New Zealand European (or Pakeha) audience. From this translation, it 
60 For example, the South Island iwi of Ngai Tahu has been particularly opposed to technologies that 
interfere with genetics, such as genetic engineering and modification. One member of this iwi, scholar 
Tim Rochford, has argued (in an article entitled 'D.N.A.: Do Not Alter') that DNA, because it is the 
physical manifestation of whakapapa, should be regarded as tapu, or sacred, and therefore should not 
be interfered with (Rochford 2000: 12). 
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is understood that the Earth grew out of waters, and this Earth became Papatuanuku 
(earth mother) who became the wife of Ranginui (sky father). The next creation was 
minor vegetation, then trees were created to clothe the earth. Reptiles and insects 
came next, followed by animals and birds, and the creation of the moon, sun and stars. 
Finally, the first woman and her daughter were created 'from whom mankind in the 
world sprung' (ibid.). Thus, every living being is descended from Papatuanuku and 
Ranginui (Mead 1998: 23). 
Stemming from this are the numerous ways in which Maori describe the human 
genome. For instance, the term Iratangata (the life force of mortals) describes the 
genome, while the notion of whakapapa is used to refer to what is contained in the 
genome (Independent Biotechnology Advisory Council 2002: 4). This latter notion is 
fundamental to the Maori view of genetics because it is the physical and spiritual 
embodiment of their genealogy. The notion of whakapapa entails the following 
elements: 
Spiritually, it includes notions of orderliness, sequence, evolution and progress 
which are 'embodied in sequence of creation stories, traditions, genealogical 
succession and tribal histories which trace the lineage of human beings and the 
development of culture and human institutions (ibid.). 
Academic Bevan Tipene-Matua (2000) notes that while the English equivalent of the 
term whakapapa is genealogy, the notion of whakapapa differs from its English 
counterpart in that the traditional Maori worldview holds that everything has a 
whakapapa. This notion explains the relationship between people and other living 
entities, and it is the interference with these relationships that causes concern among 
many Maori (Tipene-Matua 2000: 100). Similarly, Aroha Mead (1995), who has 
written widely on issues concerning Maori and the environment, notes that the notion 
of whakapapa differs from the Western tradition of separating the physical from the 
metaphysical, such as isolating the (physical) human gene from any broader 
(metaphysical) identity. In contrast, Maori culture promotes the notion that the human 
genome is the physical embodiment of both the metaphysical and generational 
whakapapa. Mead goes on to assert that whakapapa is not something that can be 
owned. It is inherited from previous generations, and the individual contributes to this 
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and then passes it on to future generations. Mead (cited in Dixon et al 1995: 34) 
therefore asserts that the human gene is both collective and cultural property. 
Although the concept of whakapapa has been considered as a template for knowledge, 
especially in the way the notion of reality is understood as a continuous, unfolding of 
generative processes, it is seen as being incompatible with most of modem science. 
However, as Roberts and Wills (1998) argue, the Maori worldview harbours the 
potential of 'a more sustainable relationship between humanity and the world that 
science studies' (ibid. 1998: 43). They argue that the assimilation into science 
(especially biology) of notions such as whakapapa and mauri (life principle) would 
make it impossible to separate issues of science and ethics (ibid.).61 
Collectively, these views of the gene break open the fetishism apparent in the 
previously mentioned metaphors as the notion of whakapapa is a more holistic way of 
describing the human genome - one that stands in stark contrast to conventional 
(Pakeha) notions. Such Maori views of the gene, especially the spiritual and 
metaphysical aspects of this definition, make conventional notions of the gene and 
genome problematic by exposing the fetishism apparent in these more reductionist 
and physical notions. However, it is important to bear in mind at this point that neither 
Maori nor Pakeha are monolithic entities, and these views are shared by some 
members of each group, but not all. 
Quilting and Ecology: More Appropriate Metaphors 
It is evident, then, that metaphors employed in contemporary scientific and 
biomedical discourse and portrayed in popular culture are culturally constructed. The 
metaphors of disease and the body are often reductive, but there are some benefits to 
such portrayals. While the use of masculine and militant metaphors and imagery to 
describe scientific inquiry and the body and disease, create a reductive and rigid 
understanding of these complex areas, understanding disease in military terms can be 
61 
Roberts and Wills (1998: 43) state that: 
The continuity of relationships and processes that constitute whakapapa carry intrinsic 
obligations, manifest not only in tribal society as mores of kinship but in the responsibilities of 
humans to all other living and non-living descendents of Papatuanuku (Roberts and Wills 
1998: 43). 
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helpful to the sufferer as they attempt to regain control over their body and their life. 
However, due to the many negative aspects of such portrayals, less aggressive and 
more holistic views of science and medicine have also been theorised. 
Flannery (2001: 628), for instance, suggests that a feminist view of technoscience 
calls for the introduction of new metaphors that are less aggressive and alienating. She 
argues that the quilting metaphor 'may assist in the reconstruction of scientific inquiry 
to be more inclusive, responsive and human' (ibid.: 642). She notes that most of the 
metaphors in technoscience have masculine connotations, such as hunting, discovery, 
penetrating, control over nature, and conquering the unknown. This is damaging she 
argues, because these ways of acquiring scientific knowledge 'miss the nuances of 
context, the subtleties that become apparent through intimate conversation rather than 
through conquest' (ibid.: 630-631). Flannery concludes that feminist approaches to 
science emphasise a more holistic view of this enterprise, taking into account the 
complexity of nature and exploring the relationships and processes of this domain 
(ibid.: 639). In addition, Annas (1995: 746) has also opted for a more holistic way of 
thinking about metaphors in medicine and proposes an alternative to military thinking 
through the metaphor of ecology, which has connotations of integrity, balance, 
diversity, sustainability and renewal. 
Sontag (1990) has vociferously argued that the prominence of the military metaphor is 
perilous, and is eager for its demise. This is due to its effects on the social body as she 
argues that it justifies authoritarian rule and compounds the view that state-sponsored 
repression is necessary. She also notes that military thinking about the body is 
dangerous in that 'It overmobilizes, it overdescribes, and it powerfully contributes to 
the excommunicating and stigmatising of the ill' (Sontag 1990: 182).62 
62 
However, Sontag has been critiqued for this position; for example, Levin (1999: 107) believes that 
because of her focus on the physical causes of cancer, the hegemony of Cartesian dualism is reinstated. 
Consequently, disease becomes known to us as solely physical through reductive analyses, of which 
subjective meanings are absent (ibid.). Levin also argues that Sontag's reading of cancer does not allow 
for critical self-reflection as her view seems to claim that cancer is nothing more than a material disease 
(ibid.). 
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This chapter has illustrated how portrayals of the body, genetics and disease 
(specifically cancer) are culturally constructed in technoscientific and biomedical 
discourse, as well as in popular culture. This was also the case for the New Zealand 
accounts of the stomach cancer gene research, and examining these accounts 
highlighted how they are culturally shaped and politicised to represent material in a 
particular way that is to the detriment of the whanau. While this signals that 
discourses matter, it also brings to our attention the tension between considering not 
only the importance of textual and semiotic representations of cancer and the body, 
and the meanings that emanate from these, but also the material aspects of the body 
and disease. This, then, is the subject of the following chapter in relation to the 
whanau's experience of medical intervention. 
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Table 1 Key examples from Media Accounts illustrating the theme Notion of Whiteness 
The Notion of Whiteness 
'A unique research collaboration between an extended Bay of Plenty Maori whanau and Biomedical 
Scientists in Dunedin into an inherited type of stomach cancer has just been awarded $931,171 in 
further funding over three years by the Health Research Council' (Kokiri Paetae 1998: 6). 
'This project was driven by a western Bay of Plenty Maori family with a history of gastric cancer 
stretching back eighty years' (Morning Report 26/3/98). 
'The Maori family has lost at least 30 members in 30 years to gastric cancer because of a mutant gene 
passed on by an ancestor' (The Dominion ll Dec. 1997: 11). 
'The research project was initiated in 1994 by a Bay of Plenty Maori family affected by a high rate of 
an aggressive inherited gastric cancer' (The Dominion 26 March 1998: 7). 
'The disease has ravaged generations of the McLeod family and led to a unique, Government-funded 
collaboration between the whanau and Otago University scientists to find out why' (NZPA 28 Oct. 
1999 online). 
'Scientists at Otago University achieved a world first in identifying the gene E-cadherin as being 
responsible for stomach cancer in five generations of a Maori family' (The Christchurch Press 27 
March 1998: 9). 
'Lives are being saved around the world, thanks to a team of New Zealand doctors who discovered a 
mutant gene causing stomach cancer in one Maori family' (New Zealand Herald 31 Dec. 1998: A13). 
'The project was instigated by a Maori family of Mt Maunganui who had lost 25 members to the cancer 
over 25 years' (New Zealand Herald 27 March 1998: A16). 
'And while much fanfare greeted the study's findings, the Maori family which made the discovery 
possible is staying quietly in the background - at its own request' (Sunday Star Times 5 April 1998: 
10). 
'Otago University researchers Dr Parry Guilford and Professor Toney Reeve announced in March 
they'd discovered the gene mutation after a two-year study involving 121 members of the Maori 
family' (Sunday Star Times 24 Oct. 1999: 9). 
'After losing 25 of its members to stomach cancer in 30 years, a Maori family put aside traditional 
belief superstitions and contacted laboratories throughout New Zealand to obtain a scientific 
explanation' (Senior 1998: 276). 
'A unique research partnership between a Maori whanau and University of Otago scientists has 
identified a world first' (Te Maori 1998: 3). 
'New Zealand scientists have identified a genetic mutation which makes people prone to stomach 
cancer. The discovery happened as a result of action by a Maori whanau from the Bay of Plenty' 
(Rankine 1999: 35). 
'The team of doctors who discovered a mutant gene causing stomach cancer in one Maori family have 
confirmed their findings with a similar breakthrough among sufferers overseas' (McEneaney 1998: 
A6). 
'A whanau's cry for help points New Zealand scientists to a world first' (Perry 1998: Al). 
'Gene isolated with help of Maori family' (Perry 1998: A3). 
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Table 2 Key examples illustrating the theme Tradition and Modernity 
Tradition and Modernity 
'Mr Peters said the project represented a partnership between modern science and traditional Maori 
culture' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
'Waiariki MP Mita Ririnui congratulated the whanau for opening their doors to scientists to enable 
research to being on the disease. Kimi Hauora Trust chairman Petera Ririnui thanked doctors and 
scientists for showing sensitivity to Maori culture during their nvolvement' (New Zealand Herald 17 
March 2001 online). 
'A family cursed? That was the Maori belief for many years, that a maketu had been put on the 
whanau. But this "curse", they would be told in 1997, had a scientific reason' (Coddington 2001: 77). 
'At their Bay of Plenty marae, atop a hill overlooking glorious Papamoa beach and the vast sweep of 
the Pacific Ocean, a whanau coming to terms with the fact that traditional culture can accommodate 
genetic modification was jut what the good doctor needed' (Coddington 2001: 80). 
'John Fraser was the second family member after Rangi McLeod to undergo a gastrectomy. The 
success of his operation - a life saved - has vindicated the actions of those whanau who trusted 
scientific technology, often upsetting others in their family who opposed genetic research' (Coddington 
2001: 80). 
'After losing 25 of its members to stomach cancer in 30 years, a Maori family put aside traditional 
superstitions and contacted laboratories throughout New Zealand to obtain a scientific explanation' 
(Senior 1998: 276). 
"'Many people from the family started out with quite a high level of suspicion about genetics but they 
are equal partners in this project and most are now very well educated in the science and the ethical 
issues involved"' (Senior 1998: 276). 
"'In Maori culture, body parts represent the embodiment of the family tree and so are sacred. The 
family's requests were easy to accommodate: we stored all their body samples and DNA in a specially 
designated area; we agreed never to send samples or DNA overseas; and we promised complete 
confidentiality," explains Guilford' (Senior 1998: 276). 
Table 3 Key examples illustrating the theme Resistance to Labelling 
Resistance to Labellin2 
'Ms McLeod said there had been barriers to the project, including "a belief, mostly promoted by people 
outside the whanau, that a makutu or Maori curse was responsible for the deaths'" (The Dominion 11 
Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
"'[Maybelle McLeod] We are future-looking people who do not dwell on the past. We faced the 
problem and didn't just sit down and wait for someone else to take the initiative"' (Perry 1998: A3). 
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Table 4 Key examples illustrating the theme The Moral Qualities of Science and Biomedicine 
The Moral Qualities of Science and Biomedicine 
'Today, family spokeswoman and researcher Maybelle McLeod confirmed that screening since then 
had uncovered 32 carriers of the mutated gene, and that they would now be monitored for the first signs 
of stomach cancer. She said the figures were "disturbing" and confirmation of the gene "frightening" 
for the individuals identified. But it was also exciting to be able to tell people one way or the other and 
arrange for monitoring aimed at early detection of any cancers that developed' (NZPA 28 Oct. 1999 
online). 
'The project will now focus on screening people who have the defective gene, and scientists hope other 
families, who have a high rate of stomach cancer will also come forward' (Morning Report 26 March 
1998). 
'Now the family could be blood-tested for the gene and if they tested positive then close monitoring, 
including annual endoscopies, meant the disease could be detected before it became terminal' 
(Coddington 2001: 80). 
'"We have now screened 55 people in the whanau and have identified some family members who have 
the mutant gene. They will now be regularly monitored for warning signs and in 90 per cent of cases 
we think we can prevent them getting the stomach cancer"' (New Zealand Herald 31 Dec. 1998: AI3). 
'Sometimes the excitement in a scientist's eyes is easy to share. Yesterday was one of those times. The 
scientist, eyes wide with triumph in the photograph on our front page, was Dr Parry Guilford of the 
genetics laboratory of Otago University. He and his colleagues had isolated a gene that, when mutated, 
causes cancer of the stomach. The discovery opens a door that could save many thousands of people 
every year and, who knows, could lead to that elusive cure' (New Zealand Herald 27 March 1998: 
A16). 
'With the knowledge so gained, the researchers can identify the cancer gene with a simple blood test 
and people found to harbour it can be monitored and treated if necessary, in good time' (New Zealand 
Herald 27 March 1998: A16). 
'The scientists also developed a simple blood test which identifies the gene and so far 80 family 
members have been tested. Those with the gene have 70% risk of getting stomach cancer. Guilford said 
those with the mutation had been enrolled on a clinical surveillance programme to watch their 
conditions. [Guilford] "That will ensure we pick up any tumour development. The sooner we catch it, 
the better chance we have of successful treatment"' (Alexander 24 Oct. 1999: 9). 
'In the short term, family members are being offered clinical surveillance every six months. If the 
cancer is caught early, before it spreads to other tissues, the prognosis is better. The next step is to look 
at ways to delay the onset of cancer in mutation carriers' (Senior 1998: 276). 
'Identification of the gene enables the cancer to be detected early, and greatly improves treatment 
options' (Te Maori 1998: 3). 
'People with the gene are having six-monthly surveillance endoscopies at Tauranga Hospital. Early this 
year these people also started to attend regular clinics at the marae for other tests. This monitoring 
enables the cancer to be detected early, and greatly improves treatment options and the survival rate of 
whanau members' (Rankine 1999: 37). 
'The whanau are now being individually screened to identify who is at risk, using a simple blood test 
researchers developed ... The project manager, nurse Maybelle McLeod, said whanau members were 
now desperate to be screened because the fear of the "unknown killer" had been removed' (McEneaney 
5 Nov. 1998: A6). 
'The lives of thousands of people will be saved because of the co-operation of Hira's whanau and Parry 
Guilford's amazing discovery' (nzoom.com n.d. online). 
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Table 5 Key examples of how the Body, Disease and Genetics are portrayed in my analysis 
How the Body, Disease and Genetics are Portrayed in my analysis 
Gene Hunters (video recording 1998). 
The Gene Seekers (O'Brien 2001). 
'Guilford hopes to identify what triggers gastric cancer in humans' (Coddington 2001: 81). 
'Seven out of ten people with the mutant gene are expected to develop cancer' (New Zealand Herald 
17 March 2001 online). 
'They have identified genetic mutations in the E-cadherin gene in the 16th human chromosome, which 
predisposes some people to develop stomach cancer' (The Evening Post 26 March 1998 Ed. 3: 2). 
'Their project involved a unique research partnership between the university scientists and a Bay of 
Plenty whanau, which has a high rate of aggressive, inherited cancer' (The Evening Post 26 March 
1998 Ed. 3: 2). 
'New Zealand scientists have identified a genetic mutation which makes people prone to stomach 
cancer' (Rankine 1999: 35). 
'They had expected the gene hunt to take five years but it took only 18 months' (Rankine 1999: 36). 
'The Bay of Plenty whanau, which is affected by a high rate of an aggressive inherited gastric cancer, 
initiated the research project in 1994' (Te Maori 14 April 1998: 3). 
'They plan to reverse the existing mutation using the cells' inherent DNA repair machinery' (Senior 
1998: 276). 
'Thirty-two members of a Mt Maunganui family have been diagnosed with the gene mutation which 
causes stomach cancer, a disease which has already killed at least 25 of their relatives' (Alexander 24 
October 1999: 9). 
'By comparing each person's DNA, they identified a single gene, named E-cadherin, mutating, leading 
to aggressive forms of tumours' (Alexander 24 October 1999: 9). 
'The research project was initiated in 1994 by a Bay of Plenty Maori family affected by a high rate of 
an aggressive inherited gastric cancer' (The Dominion 26 March 1998: 7). 
'"This suggested there could be an environmental trigger setting it off among the McLeods, such as a 
bacteria or something specific in their diet," said Dr Guilford, of the university's genetics laboratory' 
(New Zealand Herald 31 Dec. 1998: A13). 
'The project manager, nurse Maybelle McLeod, said that for the whanau the fear of the unknown killer 
had now been removed' (New Zealand Herald 3 l Dec. 1998: A13). 
'The Maori family has lost at least 30 members in 30 years to gastric cancer because of a mutant gene 
passed on by an ancestor' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
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Table 6 Key examples of statements with connotations of War and Violence in my analysis 
Examples War and Violence in mv analysis 
'By comparing the DNA of each relative they identified a single gene, E-cadherin, which is important 
to a process called cell adhesion and structure and is thought to suppress cell invasion' (Perry 26 March 
1998a: A3). 
'E-cadherin is a protein which helps cells stick together and is also thought to stop cancer cells 
invading healthy tissue' (Rankine 1999: 36). 
'The mutations, which can be inherited, inactivate the gene, which is important in cell adhesion and 
structure and is thought to suppress cancerous cell invasion' (Gibb 26 March 1998: 1). 
'The breakthrough came after a Maori family approached the scientists to help to tackle the disease 
which had claimed 25 of their loved ones in 30 years' (Perry 26 March 1998a: 1). 
"It means we can put these people on a monitoring programme and tackle the cancer before it gets a 
hold" (Perry 26 March 1998a: 1). 
'The flow-on effect of a company commercialising research like Guilford's discovery of the gastric 
cancer gene could be hugely beneficial in New Zealand's fight against cancer' (Coddington 2001: 81). 
'The disease has ravaged generations of the McLeod family and led to a unique, Government-funded 
collaboration between the whanau and Otago scientists to find out why' (NZPA 28 Oct. 1999 online). 
'Every day of his adult life, Rangi McLeod has felt like a soldier going into battle ... "It's similar to 
going to war, not knowing if they were going to die or when a bullet's going to hit them. We all felt the 
same fear"' (Perry 26 March 1998a: A3). 
'A $330,000 marae-based clinic to fight a cancer-causing gene has opened near Te Maunga' (New 
Zealand Herald 17 March 2001 online). 
'Researchers battle family curse' (The Dominion 11 Dec. 1997 Ed. 2: 11). 
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Table 7 Alphabetical List of Accounts Analysed 
Source Date Title of Account 
Kokiri Paetae February 1998 Whanau and scientists work together on 
ground-breaking cancer research project 
Molecular Medicine 1998 Maori family initiates successful search 
Today for stomach cancer gene 
National Radio 26 March 1998 Morning Report 
New Zealand Herald 26 March 1998 Cancer find 'like scaling Everest' 
New Zealand Herald 26 March 1998 Gene research leads to cancer 
breakthrough 
New Zealand Herald 27 March 1998 Profits from Science 
j New Zealand Herald 23-24 May 1998 Errant gene cut family members down ,, 
New Zealand Herald 5 November 1998 Foreign cases confirm cancer finding ' 
New Zealand Herald 31 December 1998 Cancer-Gene Link A Saviour Abroad 
New Zealand Herald 17 March 2001 Clinic targeting stomach cancer gene 
opens 
New Zealand Press Association 28 October 1999 32 Members of Whanau Identified With 
Cancer Gene 
New Zealand Science Teacher 1999 Partnership acts on inherited stomach 
cancer 
j' North and South December 2001 The Big C: What do we really know? 
I Nzoom.com n.d. Cancer Gene 
ll 
Otago Daily Times 26 March 1998 Cancer Breakthrough 
\ , Otago Graduate 1998 Otago scientists have identified a gene 
i linked to stomach cancer 
Ota go School of Medical n.d. Otago dominates research into inherited 
Sciences stomach cancer 
Sunday Star Times 5 April 1998 Cancer Families Come Forward After 
Discovery 
j Sunday Star Times 24 October 1999 Cancer Gene Afflicts 57 Relatives 
Te Maori 1998 Maori whanau key major cancer research 
discovery 
, i 
The Christchurch Press 27 March 1998 Cancer Gene 'Excites' Doctors 
The Dominion 11 December 1997, Ed. Researchers battle family 'curse' 
2 
The Dominion 26 March 1998 Stomach Cancer-Causing Gene 
Identified 
The Evening Post 26 March 1998 Ed. 3 Stomach cancer breakthrough for Otago 
Scientists 
The Evening Post 11 August 2001 Cornering Cancer Calls for Cold, Hard 
Cash 
The Gene Seekers 2001 The Gene Seekers 
"t 
60 Minutes 24 May 1998 Gene Hunters (video recording) 





Janet: Yeah, well we agree that that's how they describe it, but when they talk 
to us, or any of our people, they have to put it in lay people's terms. They have 
to be down to earth, telling them exactly, none of that medical rubbish. If 
you've got cancer, then that's what you've got. It's not "carcinoma something 
something" (field notes 7/10/03). 
Allison: Straight up the guts (ibid.). 
The previous chapter explored the symbolic, semiotic and textual constructions of the 
body, disease, and the gene in popular culture as well as in scientific and biomedical 
discourse, particularly in relation to media accounts of the identification of the E-
cadherin stomach cancer gene. This revealed that these representations are culturally 
constructed as their meanings have significance beyond the boundaries of biology. 
However, such analysis into the state of the body and disease in these realms is 
incomplete as the fact that the body is also material and corporeal must be 
acknowledged. 
The opening statements of this chapter made by the whanau health workers I 
interviewed deserve consideration in that they set the scene for the following 
discussion on the complexities of medical intervention in relation to this specific ~ase. 
Their words illustrate that the health workers resist the fetishism apparent in 
biomedicine by emphasising the importance of communication that makes sense to 
lay people, without all the trappings of jargon and other symptoms of the fetishism 
evident in biomedical discourse. The holistic and straightforward approach of the 
whanau health workers lessens the degree of fetishism as it emphasises the social 
aspect of the medical encounter. It can thus be argued that their weariness and 
mistrust of some health professionals previously stems from the tendency in 
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biomedicine to fetishise the patient through objectifying the disease in a very 
particular and disembodied way at the cost of obscuring the important social relations 
and meanings of that disease. The interviews I undertook with these health workers 
indicate a strong interest from them to avoid such concealment in the practice of 
science and medicine. 
It should also be stated that at this point, what I am talking about are my own 
musings, and there is a risk in this of abstracting the corporeal aspects of suffering 
from the health workers' accounts. I therefore do not purport to be speaking for the 
whanau in considering the importance of the material body. Through my involvement 
with them and the scientists, as well as the literature I have consulted, I consider how 
I can make sense of the complexities of my research as well as highlight not only the 
presence of fetishism in biomedicine, but the ways in which it is perhaps negotiated 
by the whanau health workers. 
The Conundrum 
The whanau are happy with the health centre which was erected specifically for their 
use, and they are satisfied with the surveillance programmes in place to screen for 
those who have the defective gene and those who have, or are at risk of developing 
cancer. It struck me that while they were focused on people, they quickly appropriated 
medical science and its negative aspects, such as its tendency to reduce people to 
objects and its invasive nature, especially surveillance. While it may appear that the 
whanau are appropriating biomedicine somewhat uncritically, this is not the case as 
they do criticise and challenge the way practitioners of this institution go about their 
work, as discussed in the following chapter. This indicates that they have manipulated 
biomedicine for what they want, which questions some social science critiques of 
biomedical practices. This leads to a conundrum, therefore, in how they have 
presented what they have done, especially in terms of critiquing the way in which 
practitioners of biomedicine relate to and communicate with people. 
It is also important to bear in mind that people suffer and search for meaning of their 
afflictions, indicating that socio-cultural notions of illness and disease are other 
crucial factors to consider in the experience and construction of disease. However, the 
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tendency in biomedicine to treat bodies as simply physical is limited in that it ignores 
the notion of suffering which is experienced not only physically, but also, and perhaps 
more profoundly, emotionally and socially. Michael Taussig argues (1992) such 
suffering is disguised in biomedicine as this ideology objectifies the body and focuses 
on the physical and material aspects of suffering at the cost of fetishising the social 
relations embedded in biomedical practice. 
Bearing these implications in mind, then, the rhetorical question I pose in this chapter 
is: why did the whanau want to find the gene? This leads us to other questions such as 
why were they so active in their quest, and why do they want genetic testing and 
surveillance? The answers to these questions may seem obvious - in short, they are 
helping to save lives and alleviate physical suffering. However, when considering the 
complexities surrounding the corporeal body and the embodied self, many issues arise 
which problematise conventional notions of the body, suffering, and the taken for 
granted altruistic nature of the social relations embedded in contemporary 
biomedicine. 
The Implications of Genetic Testing 
In order to explore the complexities of medical intervention and how the whanau 
negotiate these, brief consideration must be given to the premises of genetic testing 
and why the whanau sought this procedure. I will also consider other physical 
procedures involved in alleviation of hereditary stomach cancer, such as endoscopy 
and gastrectomy. Genetic testing procedures allow scientists to examine genetic 
information contained inside an individual's cells in order to determine if that person 
has, or is at risk of developing, a particular disease or could pass a disease to his or 
her offspring (Nordenson 1999: 1274). In this particular case, it is hereditary stomach 
cancer (or familial gastric cancer), which is a disease where the cells that form the 
inner lining of the stomach become abnormal and divide uncontrollably, forming a 
tumour (Niendorf 2002: 1097-1098). 
Predictive (presymptomatic) genetic testing is used on individuals known to be 'at 
risk' for a genetic disease because other members of their family are affected. The key 
advantage of this type of testing is that the effects of the disorder can be better 
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managed if identified early. In relation to hereditary stomach cancer, the introduction 
of treatment in response to early detection improves the individual's chance of 
survival (Clarke 2001: 134). A blood or tissue sample from the individual at risk is 
necessary for the genetic test in the context of detecting cancer, and if the individual 
tests positive for the defective gene, molecular probes are used to identify defections 
in certain genes that have been associated with particular cancers (Cherath 1999: 571). 
Of those who test positive for the defective E-cadherin gene, not all will develop 
cancer, although they could be at greater risk of developing cancer compared to an 
individual who does not posses the defective gene (Niendorf 2002: 1102).63 
Those who test positive for the defective gene will undergo surveillance whereby the 
use of an endoscope shows whether or not the carrier has developed tumours. 
Presently, endoscope is the most effective and commonly used detection tool 
available for stomach cancer, allowing a diagnosis in about 95% of cases. In this 
procedure, the endoscope, which is a thin optical instrument containing a minute 
camera and light, is put down the throat, allowing the oesophagus, stomach, and upper 
small intestine to be viewed. If there are any suspicious areas visible, a biopsy is 
taken. The tissue from these samples is then examined, indicating whether or not it is 
cancerous (Niendorf 2002: 1102).64 
Those who do have stomach cancer can opt for gastrectomy (the only cure for 
stomach cancer), which is the surgical removal of all or some of the stomach, 
depending on the severity of the cancer. Most commonly, however, this operation is 
performed to remove a malignant tumour. After gastrectomy, the digestive tract is 
reconstructed in order for it to function, and while there are several different surgical 
techniques, the surgeon generally attaches any remaining parts of the stomach to the 
small intestine (Helwick 1999: 1247). While endoscopy and gastrectomy are 
undertaken at a hospital, the whanau have their own health centre which was erected 
specifically for the purposes of dealing with issues relating to the testing, prevention 
63 Seventy percent of those who test positive for this defective gene will develop stomach cancer in 
their lifetime; currently, there are investigations into why thirty percent of those who carry this gene do 
not develop stomach cancer (Kirnihauora Health Centre 2003 online). 
64 While it is a straightforward process, it is laborious, as after the procedure (which takes 
approximately thirty minutes), the patient is expected to stay in hospital for up to four hours to allow 
the sedative to wear off (New Zealand Consumer Health Information 2001 online). 
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and treatment of stomach cancer. The clinic is ideally positioned on the top of a hill at 
the whanau's pa where it sits next to their marae and is surrounded by an avocado 
orchard and a plant nursery. It was designed by several members of the whanau, and 
its structure mimics that of a marae. The first floor has consultation rooms, a 
reception, and a staff room, and the second floor is a boardroom where their trust 
meets to discuss issues to do with the clinic, such as finance. 
More specifically, the centre has several varied purposes, which include the collection 
of samples for genetic testing (which are then sent to the Cancer Genetics Lab at the 
University of Otago for testing), and the offering of genetic counselling and advocacy 
to those who have tested positive for the gene. In addition, the roles of the staff 
include driving those undergoing gastrectomy to the hospital in Auckland where it is 
performed and comforting them before and after the surgery, as well as sorting out 
financial aid for patients who are unable to work or support their families. One 
possible reason why the whanau are content with the testing is because they have a 
large degree of control over the procedures and can thus do things on their own terms, 
in their own way (albeit within reason). 
As discussed in more depth in the following chapter, the manner of the whanau health 
workers I spoke to was relaxed and informal - they have little time for tedious 
bureaucracy and incomprehensible medical jargon. They are straight-talkers who 
emphasise a more holistic and personal connection with the patient than one would 
generally expect from a strictly biomedical context. In order to consider the contrasts 
and implications from these different approaches, it is necessary to point out that 
while I am speaking theoretically, they are not. This is because they are living through 
the reality of the implications of hereditary stomach cancer, while I am merely 
theorizing the complexities of this. 
The dilemma I will now discuss concerns the implications of biomedical intervention. 
While biomedicine works to alleviate physical suffering by naming and controlling 
(and often curing) disease, it does little to acknowledge the embodied experience of 
suffering. The following discussion highlights both the positive and negative aspects 
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of biomedicine and considers the role of fetishism in this practice. In doing so, I am 
pursuing my own interests, not those of the whanau health workers. 
Taussig and Biomedical Fetishism 
Although I will consider in depth the implications of medical intervention and the 
material body further in the discussion, I begin with the work of Taussig (1992) who 
has revealed the ways in which biomedicine fetishises social relations as disease. He 
highlights that in biomedicine, the emphasis is on the body and disease and the 'how' 
of disease, while biomedical practitioners cannot offer insight to the social and moral 
meaning (the 'why') of the disease. This is somewhat ironic in that the 'how' of 
disease and disease itself, is socially constructed. His central thesis is that the physical 
body is fetishised at the cost of obscuring or disguising the social nature of the 
medical encounter. Taussig states that: 
... things such as the signs and symptoms of disease, as much as the 
technology of healing, are not "things-in-themselves", are not only biological 
and physical, but are also signs of social relations disguised as natural things, 
concealing their roots in human reciprocity (1992: 83). 
This premise brings our attention to both the positive and negative aspects of 
biomedicine as discussed by Taussig. In relation to fetishism, he builds on the 
aforementioned work of Lukacs (1971)65 and is concerned with the 'phantom-
objectivity of disease and its treatment in our society' (Taussig 1992: 84). Taussig 
observes that we mystify human relations embodied in symptoms, signs and therapy 
which are consequently denied, thereby reproduce a political ideology masked as a 
science of 'real things' - what he terms 'biological and physical thinghood' (ibid.). 
Therefore, the objectivity embedded in biomedicine is culturally constructed, and I 
will consider this premise in relation to my experiences with the whanau health 
workers and scientists throughout this chapter. 
65 Lukacs said of the kind of reification embedded in fetishism that: 
Its basis is .. .is that a relation between 'people takes on the character of a thing and thus 
acquires a 'phantom objectivity,' an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people 
(1971: 83). 
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Taussig (1992: 84) applies these abstract concepts to the material aspects of sickness. 
He notes that conceptions of the body are fluid and dynamic, changing over time and 
through cultures. This is echoed by feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz (1994: x) who 
also contends that bodies are the products and effects of the social constitution of 
nature. Historical, social and cultural demands produce 'the body as a body of a 
determinate type' (ibid.). In contemporary times of modem capitalist culture, the body 
is considered dualistically: as a thing and a being, or a body and a 'soul' (Taussig 
1992: 84). This is especially the case in scientific and medical discourse where the 
body is considered as a dichotomy of mind and body. This separation of the mind 
from the body is attributed to French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes 
who, in the seventeenth century, argued that the mind and body worked not in unison, 
but separately. 
The historical construction of Cartesian dualism has been widely criticised in the 
social sciences and humanities for the way it disembodies the corporeal body. For 
example, Grosz (1994: 7) states that: 'To reduce either the mind to the body or the 
body to the mind is to leave their interaction unexplained, explained away, 
impossible.' Another feminist theorist, Young (1997), expresses a similar view. She 
notes that in the realm of biomedicine, the body is inscribed into a discourse of 
objectivity: the self is ignored as the material body becomes the focus of biomedical 
attention. This disjunction is the core of biomedical discourse: the separation of the 
mind from the body. Thus, although one experiences one's self as embodied, in the 
realm of biomedicine, the body becomes an object of scrutiny at the cost of the 
embodied self (Young 1997: 1). I will consider this premise in relation to the 
complexities of medical intervention in relation to the case study further in the 
discussion. 
Revisions to the mind/body dichotomy have been made by Grosz (1994: 7) who 
argues against the notion of dualism which, she notes, 'is responsible for the modem 
forms of elevation of consciousness (a specifically modem version of the notion of 
soul, introduced by Descartes) above corporeality'. Cartesian dualism separates the 
body and mind, and Grosz argues that to reduce either component to the other renders 
their interaction both unexplained and unexplainable (ibid.). However, this is 
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somewhat paradoxical in that Cartesian dualism in medicine and science is attributed 
as elevating the body over the mind. It was this privileging of the body over the mind 
that allowed biology to pursue the extremely materialist thinking that is characteristic 
of biomedicine (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1998: 201). Scheper-Hughes and Lock 
(ibid.) go on to state that Cartesian dualism 'caused the mind (or soul) to recede to the 
background of clinical theory and practice for the next three hundred years'. 
An Embodied Approach 
Grosz (1994: x) brings our attention to the way in which the body in the natural 
sciences has been, and continues to be, colonized through the powerful discursive 
practices of these disciplines, especially the discourses of biology and medicine. 
Likewise, Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1998: 209) argue that: 
A singular premise guiding Western science and clinical medicine (and one, 
we hasten to add, that is responsible for its awesome efficacy) is its 
commitment to a fundamental opposition between spirit and matter, mind and 
body, and (underlying this) real and unreal. 
As I will consider throughout this chapter, the whanau health workers mitigate the 
degree of fetishism in biomedicine, and one reason for this is the Maori belief in 
whakapapa, as discussed in the previous chapter. This worldview lessens the degree to 
which the mind and body can be separated as its metaphysical elements link the body 
to a wider metaphysical identity. Maori culture promotes the notion that the human 
genome is the physical embodiment of both the metaphysical and generational 
whakapapa (Mead cited in Dixon et al 1995: 34). The way in which the whanau health 
workers demanded that their tissue be stored separately and not used for any other 
purposes other than testing highlights how they are mindful of the mind/body split in 
biomedicine, and how, under normal circumstances, their tissue would have been 
treated as a physical entity, separate from the wider context in which the whanau's 
beliefs locate it. (This point is discussed in more depth in the following chapter). 
Furthermore, Grosz (1994: x) maintains that bodies are the products and effects of the 
social constitution of nature, and as previously mentioned, historical, social and 
cultural demands produce and shape the body in a certain way. This points to her 
assertion that bodies are embodied as she argues against the body as dichotomous -
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that is, in terms of the physical, material body on one hand, and its many cultural and 
historical representations on the other. Rather, she claims that such 'representations 
and cultural inscriptions quite literally constitute bodies and help to produce them as 
such' (ibid.). 
Grosz (1994) uses the model of the Mobius strip as a suitable way of 
(re)conceptualising the relationship between the mind and body. This model illustrates 
the merging and inversion of the mind and body whereby one side becomes another. 
This model is thus a useful way of questioning and rethinking the relations between 
the exterior (corporeal) and interior (psychical) of a person by illustrating 'the torsion 
of the one into the other, the passage, vector, or uncontrollable drift of the inside into 
the outside and the outside into the inside' (Grosz 1994: xii). Using this model, Grosz 
warns that fresh analysis of the body must avoid dichotomous views of the person 
whereby the subject is divided into the apparently mutually exclusive categories of 
mind and body. She believes that we must create understandings of what she terms 
embodied subjectivity, and psychical corporeality (ibid.: 21-22). Materialism therefore 
needs to be conceptualised as more than corporeality as this has implications for how 
we conceive of the body in terms of embodiment and the notion of suffering. It also 
highlights that while the body is textual and semiotic, it is also corporeal and material, 
and all of these components of the body have interrelated consequences for both the 
experience of suffering and the notion of embodiment, especially in the context of 
biomedical discourse. The model of the Mobius strip thus acts as an antidote to the 
argument put forth by Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1998: 211) who state that: 
Ironically, the conscious attempts to temper the materialism and the 
reductionism of biomedical science often end up inadvertently recreating the 
mind/body opposition in a new form. 
However, their point that categories of illness and disease have both been claimed by 
physicians for the medical domain, and consequently, that illness has become 
medicalised (ibid.) is a valid one. 
The Phenomenon of Fetishism in the Realm of Biomedicine 
Having considered how Cartesian dualism is responsible for the objectification of the 
body in biomedicine and consequently, its disembodied approach, I now consider 
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more specifically the phenomenon of fetishism in the realm of biomedicine, of which 
this dualism is a part. I will illustrate throughout the following sections how, in my 
own opinion, the whanau negotiate this. Taussig, (1992: 86) notes that such physical 
entities as bodily organs are considered mere things in biomedicine, even though there 
is a personal need to understand the social significance and meaning of dis-ease. Thus, 
as argued by Taussig, the master paradigm of biomedicine in modem capitalist culture 
dichotomizes mind from matter, morality from physical determinism 'and "things" 
from the social context and human meaning in which they inhere' (ibid.: 90). Herein 
lies the fetishised nature of the body in biomedicine - it is removed from any sort of 
social context, thereby disguising the constructed nature of biomedicine itself. 
This element of Taussig's argument parallels the thought of Haraway (1997: 67) 
concerning technoscience. As discussed in chapter two, technoscience renders science 
as a culture and a practice, and attempts to maintain boundaries become a more 
visible, overt practice as the labour of the human and nonhuman actors who partake in 
its constitution is exposed. Medical innovations (such as genetic testing) are one 
strong area for the operation of technoscience, and the labour involved in constructing 
not only its boundaries, but also the way in which it objectifies people as they, and the 
social relations between them, become represented as things. 
Because modem science (including biomedicine) focuses on the physical aspects of 
disease, this discourse is unable to adequately explain the human significance of 
physical effects. However, one central advantage of biomedicine is that it can, in 
many cases, explain the 'how' of disease, and such naming is extremely powerful 
(Finkler 2000: 194). The ability to name and understand the physicality of disease can 
have a profoundly positive impact in relation to the alleviation of not only physical, 
but emotional and social suffering as well. In relation to the identification of the gene 
for hereditary stomach cancer, the naming of disease, and the understanding of its 
'how' has been an immense psychological and emotional comfort, not to mention life-
saving. One whanau health worker I interviewed stated that the whanau were 'Elated' 
at the finding and naming of the physical cause of the illness (field notes 7 /10/03). 
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Where biomedicine subsequently fails, however, is in its ability (or lack thereof) to 
explain the social significance of disease and acknowledge the embodied aspect of 
suffering. Because biomedicine focuses on the corporeal body and disease at the cost 
of ignoring the embodied self, it does not consider an embodied approach to disease. 
This is noted by Kleinman (1995: 31) who argues that the experience of suffering is 
given little consideration in biomedicine because of biomedicine's insistence on 
materialistic dichotomies, such as body/mind. The nature of biomedicine therefore 
encourages the practitioner to construct disease as both the object of study and 
treatment. This leaves little, if no room for the patient's experience of suffering. 
This sentiment is reiterated by Cassell's (1991) notion of suffering which helps to 
illuminate the effects suffering has on people, and emphasises that suffering is not 
confined to physical symptoms. He states that: 'Suffering must inevitably involve the 
person - bodies do not suffer, persons suffer' (Cassell 1991: vii). This notion of 
suffering is therefore important to consider in relation to this particular case study in 
that the whanau are more emotionally involved and invested in the project because 
they are directly affected by the incidences of illness among their people and have a 
close, 'hands on' relationship with those (physically and emotionally) affected. 
In accordance, Cassell (1991: 23) states that: 'The promise of scientific medicine is 
that the knowledge does the work'. This premise is echoed in biomedical practice, as 
the emotional labour and social suffering involved in illness and disease is usually not 
considered. Stemming from Cassell' s observation, I would argue that in scientific 
medicine, the knowledge does some of the work. For instance, the scientists and 
doctors involved in the partnership with the whanau health workers undoubtedly 
played a pivotal role in identifying the 'how' of the disease, but in terms of managing 
the illness, the whanau health workers have also had an important role in restoring 
health by undertaking many varied and additional roles related to specifically 
relieving suffering, as considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
Cassell (1991: 33) goes on to argue that understanding of the role of the person in 
human illness requires one to disregard mind/body dualism. He asserts that as long as 
the mind-body dichotomy is prevalent in biomedical discourse, suffering will continue 
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to be either subjective (and not considered as residing within the boundaries of 
biomedicine), or it will be associated as solely physical. This has several negative 
effects: it depersonalises the patient and ironically, is a source of suffering itself 
(Cassell 1991: 34). The mind/body dichotomy thus needs to be discarded before 
personal suffering can be understood in the domain of biomedicine. 
Significantly, the whanau health workers believe that the medical professionals 
involved understand the degree of suffering (both physical and emotional) that comes 
with this disease. Although the scientists and other biomedical professionals involved 
in the project care about the patients, it seems that the whanau health workers are the 
ones who deal with them beyond the physical side. As Cassell argues, suffering goes 
beyond the physical side of illness, occurring when there is a sense of imminent 
destruction of the person, and which continues until this threat passes, or until the 
person is restored to a sense of wholeness. 66 
He concedes that there are two other ways in which integrity to the person is restored: 
through assigning meaning to the condition, which reduces the suffering associated 
with it, and transcendence, which places the person in a larger psychological 
landscape (Cassell 1991: 45). Assigning meaning to the condition in order to restore 
the integrity of the person is, however, difficult in the discourse of biomedicine, 
which, as noted by Taussig (1992: 85), does not cater to answering the 'why' of 
disease. It could be argued, though, that the naming of disease is a way of assigning 
meaning to it. 
Generally, however, the mind/body dichotomy, and subsequently, biomedicine's 
focus on the body and the 'how' of disease exacerbates the suffering of individuals. In 
order to overcome this, the mind/body divide must be rethought so that the body is 
less fetishised in biomedicine, thereby making room for considerations of dimensions 
of the disease/illness experience that are not only, or more than, physical. Grosz's 
(1994) previously mentioned model of the Mobius strip is one way to counter this 
66 
Cassell (1991: 40) states that: 
People can suffer from what they have lost of themselves in relation to the world of objects, 
events, and relationships. Such suffering occurs because our intactness as persons, our 
coherence and integrity, come not only from intactness of the body but from the wholeness of 
the web of relationships with self and others. 
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fetishism, and more concretely, the efforts of the whanau health workers to attend to 
the emotional needs of those suffering is another way in which fetishism in 
biomedicine is negated. 
The Medical Encounter and Medical Practice 
Another negative aspect of biomedicine is the fetishised nature of the medical 
encounter. In relation to medical altruism, Taussig argues that in modern clinical 
practice and medical culture the function of medical altruism is camouflaged, stating 
that 'This issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence' 
(Taussig 1992: 87). For instance, he notes that the function of the relationship 
between the doctor and the patient, which is to restore and restructure the 
understandings of the patient and return them to society (firmly placing them within 
the 'epistemological and ontological groundwork from which the society's basic 
ideological premises arise') is disguised or obscured as the social nature of the 
medical encounter is not immediately or blatantly obvious (ibid.: 86). Taussig argues 
that this is because in our society, consultation and healing occurs in settings that are 
both privatised and individualistic, and both the moral and metaphysical elements of 
disease a11d healing are obscured and concealed by the employment of the natural 
science model (ibid.: 87), a point made by the whanau health workers in the opening 
quotations. Moreover, the interviews which I carved out with these people indicate a 
strong interest to avoid such concealment in the practicing of science and medicine. 
For instance, they have a more forthright and overt way of communicating, as well as 
a more holistic and personal approach to consultation than is generally found in the 
biomedical context, and this will be discussed later in chapter five. 
Concerning the constructed nature of disease, Taussig asserts that these manifestations 
are like symbols which the diagnostician sees, and interprets in a way that has been 
conditioned by perception, which is socially determined (Taussig 1992: 88). However, 
this view is not considered in biomedicine, which believes its products and creations 
to be 'out-there' as they are considered as objective things-in-themselves, removed 
from the contexts in which they emerged. 
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Taussig argues that medical practice produces mystifications to which we are all 
vulnerable in a socially constructed world that we see not as social, human or as 
historical, but as 'a world of a priori objects beholden only to their own force and 
laws, dutifully illuminated for us by professional experts such as doctors' (Taussig 
1992: 89). The implications of this for patients are the many (subconscious, 
unspoken) messages propounded by these dynamics which imply that patients should 
not trust their senses, nor their feelings of ambiguity that occur as the socially 
conditioned senses attempt to comprehend the various meanings placed upon 
otherwise mute things (ibid.). These things are portrayed as the facts of life rather than 
the socially constructed entities they really are. 
Interestingly, however, the whanau do not adhere to this, as they do trust their 
intuition and are, in many instances, guided by their senses. When interviewed, one 
health worker mentioned that she 'didn't feel right about' a certain doctor taking the 
project on. She also talked about needing to get spiritual guidance from a respected 
whanau member in order to go ahead with the project (field notes 7/10/03). Moreover, 
they challenge the a priori categories presented to them by questioning the way 
medical professionals communicate these categories to them and their patients, and by 
advocating a more forthright and simplistic way of expressing what, to most people, is 
medical jargon. In addition, the relationship dynamics within the partnership, and 
between those in the partnership and the members of the whanau are very important in 
ensuring the continual success of the partnership, and the wellbeing of the patients. 
In conjunction, Taussig (1992: 89) argues that the patient in the context of the modem 
clinic moves between alienated passivity and alienated self-assertion. However, this 
does not seem to be the case with the whanau as they have a plethora of support 
networks in place that cover everything from genetic counselling to pre- and post-
operative care. Moreover, Taussig argues that the rationalization embedded in 
biomedicine is an attempt to extract control from the patient, define the status of the 
person as a patient and as a 'thing', rather than treating the patient as 'mutually 
interacting partner in an exchange' (ibid.). 
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This highlights how, in biomedicine, the social relations that exist in this discourse are 
fetishised in order to show that disease is natural and objective, rather than 
constructed; and because patients think and feel, is not only physical (i.e. a thing-in-
itself) but also an interactive human relationship (Taussig 1992: 90). However, the 
conventional biomedical mode of fetishism is rendered problematic by the whanau 
health workers and the labour undertaken in the partnership with the scientists from 
the University of Otago. By asserting a large degree of control over the project, 
specifically the direction of the research, and having more power than the scientists to 
say what is acceptable and what is not, while advocating that all involved in the 
partnership are on equal footing, the whanau health workers have mitigated the degree 
and effect of fetishism apparent in modem medical science and biomedicine. 
In accordance, the emphasis placed on the patients' wellbeing by the whanau health 
workers as they act on their behalf helps move the patient into a mutually interacting 
partnership in exchange. This also highlights the complexities involved in medical 
intervention, and these points are considered further in the discussion below which 
draws upon Frank's (1995) post-colonial theory of illness. 
Illness Narratives 
Kleinman et al (1978 cited in Taussig 1992: 105) have distinguished between the 
notions of disease and illness, noting that while the former can be scientifically and 
medically measured, the latter is influenced by culture and 'is what that dysfunction 
means to the person suffering it'. Thus, from the practitioner's point of view, disease 
is the problem and is considered within the narrow biological confines of the 
biomedical body, meaning that 'disease is reconfigured only as an alteration in 
biological structure or functioning' (Kleinman 1988: 5-6). Although this distinction is 
useful for exploring the emotional, social aspects of suffering, it does reinforce the 
aforementioned dichotomy of Cartesian dualism as the personal, emotional aspect of 
suffering is considered distinctive from physical, material suffering, thereby thwarting 
an embodied approach, as previously noted by Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1998: 211). 
The notion of disease as more than physical is important to consider as it raises 
questions about the meaning of disease, or illness. While I considered disease as 
Tania Campbell 87 
Chapter Four - Medical Intervention 
textual and semiotic in the previous chapter, I now examine the notion of disease as 
illness through the concept of illness narratives which have been explored most 
notably by sociologist Arthur Frank (1995).67 Frank's analysis rests on the premise 
that 'The body whether still diseased or recovered, is simultaneously cause, topic, and 
instrument of whatever new stories are told' (Frank 1995: 2).68 
According to Frank, these stories, which he emphasises as embodied, have two 
important dimensions: they are both personal and social (ibid.). The personal side of 
telling these stories about illness is to allow the body a voice, in order for the 
transformed body to become familiar in these stories. However, as the language of the 
story tries to make the body familiar, Frank (1995: 2) argues that 'the body eludes 
language'. He notes that while the body is not mute, it is inarticulate, signalling that 
we must speak for the body; this can be frustrating, however, in that speech purports 
itself as being about the body, rather than of it. Thus, the mind and body are 
connected as the mind is diffused throughout the body (ibid.). The social dimension of 
telling these stories of illness is 'that they are told to someone' (ibid.: 3). 
Illness narratives are important to consider in that they highlight those elements of 
fetishism which I have previously discussed in which science can 'explain the "how" 
but not the "why" of disease' (Taussig 1992: 85). Frank's (1995: 18) assertion that 
'Telling stories of illness is the attempt, instigated by the body's disease, to give a 
voice to an experience that medicine cannot describe' is a particularly important 
service in view of biomedicine's focus on and objectification of the body. In addition, 
because considering narrative is a key means (like discourse analysis) of detecting the 
values of particular institutions, I will consider the different kinds of narrative that 
appeared in the popular culture accounts of the identification of the gene for 
hereditary stomach cancer further in this section. 
In terms of specific narrative styles, Frank argues that there are three particular styles, 
or phases: chaos, quest and restitution. I consider all three, but with particular 
67 In addition, Hunsaker Hawkins' (1999) work on 'Pathographies' is another example of the study of 
such writings. She defines the notion of pathography as: 'a form of autobiography or biography that 
describes personal experiences of illness, treatment, and sometimes death' (Hunsaker Hawkins 1999: 
1). 
68 This line of inquiry reiterates the work of the early anthropologist Marcel Mauss in his seminal work 
Sociology and Psychology: Essays (1979 [1950]) whereby he contended that 'The body is the first and 
most natural tool of man [sic]'. 
Tania Campbell 88 
Chapter Four Medical Intervention 
emphasis on the restitution narrative, primarily because it dominates, as asserted by 
Frank (1995: 77), the stories of most people, including most health workers. It is also 
a prominent narrative visible in media coverage of science, medicine, and health 
generally, and I consider this with special reference to my own discourse analysis 
below. Concerning the restitution narrative, Frank notes that contemporary culture 
regards health as the normal state that people are expected to have restored. He states 
that the restitution narrative is comprised of the basic storyline: 'Yesterday I was 
healthy, today I'm sick, but tomorrow I'll be healthy again' (Frank 1995: 77). This 
particular narrative thus reflects a 'natural' desire to become well, and maintain a state 
of 'normal' health (ibid.: 78). 
As previously noted, what is particularly interesting about the restitution narrative is 
that it is the preferred narrative of institutional medicine, and .this culture of illness is 
shaped from beyond the hospital (Frank 1995: 79). The institutional preference for the 
restitution narrative is apparent in many of the accounts I studied. For example, one 
article stated: 'A family cursed? That was the Maori belief for many years, that a 
maketu had been put on the whanau. But this "curse", they would be told in 1997, had 
a scientific reason. All these victims shared an inherited mutated gene' (Coddington 
2001: 77). Restitution is thus focused on cure, as the body requires 'fixing', which, in 
tum, requires a mechanistic perspective of the body whereby it is seen as a kind of 
machine. According to Frank (1995: 88), this view normalizes the illness and, I would 
add, hinders the potential for an embodied experience of illness as the mind and body 
are separated. The underlying point here is that biomedicine and medical science 
reject an embodied approach to illness by focusing on the body as an entity separate 
from the mind as previously discussed in relation to Cartesian dualism. Significantly, 
however, the whanau health workers adhere to the restitution narrative as they talked 
about wanting to see an end to the story (in other words, to find a cure). It is perhaps 
the hope of an eventual cure, along with the way they help to improve the outcome of 
patients that keeps these workers undertaking the labour they do. 
In conjunction, Frank (1995: 92) asserts that restitution stories are powerful because 
often they are true - many people do get well, returning to their previous state of 
'normal' health. He states that 'The cultural power of these stories is that their telling 
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reflects one of the best impulses in modernity: the heroism of applied science as self-
overcoming' (ibid.). This is briefly explored here on two levels: in relation to the 
culture of biomedicine generally, and more specifically, the role of the 'hero' - for 
example, scientists, doctors, and other experts. Concerning the latter example, Frank 
(1995: 93) states that: 
The respective heroism of physicians and patients are complementary but 
asymmetrical. Each heroism is required by the other, but physicians practice 
an active heroism, while patients accept a passive heroism. 
This highlights the power dynamics embedded in the process of the restitution 
narrative and parallels some of my own findings in relation to media representations 
of the identification of the gene for inherited stomach cancer and the issues that arose 
from my discourse analysis of these. However, particular portrayals of this case study 
disagree with Frank's portrayal of patients accepting a 'passive heroism'. For 
example, in the popular culture accounts of this case, several comments were made 
that asserted the active stance of those who were, and continue to be, involved in the 
project. They continue to have an impressive degree of control over the way medical 
scientific research is carried out in relation to them. For example, in the television 
documentary Gene Hunters (video recording 1998), one of the whanau research co-
ordinators states that: 'We didn't want to be a guinea pig-type programme, and we 
wanted to ... have some control over the process'. Moreover, the whanau health 
workers talked about the manner in which they and the scientists involved in the 
partnership referred to themselves as the 'A Team', highlighting the relatively 
egalitarian power relations and the sense of team work involved in the partnership. 
Concerning the chaos narrative, Frank (1995: 97) states that: 'Chaos is the opposite of 
restitution: its plot imagines life never getting better', and he observes that chaos 
flourishes when there is a sense that no one is in control (ibid.: 100). In the same vein, 
Gwyn (2002: 156) notes that 'chaotic stories reflect the chaotic trajectory of the 
illness, lacking causality or sense'. The chaos narrative can be related to the notion of 
the curse as experienced by some members of the whanau. It could be tempting to 
argue that their own narratives move from chaos to quest to restitution as the idea of 
the curse is 'disproved' by medical science, which restores a sense of organization, 
and allows the possibility for reflection and expression, both of which, according to 
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Frank, are unavailable to the sufferer in the chaos narrative. However, only some 
members of the whanau believed in the curse, and despite the identification of the 
gene for hereditary stomach cancer, some members continue to believe in this notion, 
which serves to explain the 'why' of the disease, just as medical science strives to 
explain the 'how', thereby satisfying their need for a socio-cultural and spiritual 
explanation. 
In accordance with this idea of a chaos narrative, Younger (1995) argues that chaos 
can be another way of describing suffering. This is what she terms the stage of 'mute' 
suffering, which is 'the experience of being struck dumb by the sheer force or 
unexpectedness of suffering and thus lacking a language that will express the 
experience' (Younger 1995: 56). Another comment made by a whanau member in a 
popular culture account illustrates this phase of the chaos narrative: 
Not only was the personal loss heavy to bear, so too was the fear that the 
family constantly carried. "We were continually thinking the worst," says 
Hira. "We would think- who is next? Will it be my brother, my sister, or me? 
Every pain you get, you think - that's it. And you become too frightened to go 
to the doctor" (O'Brien 2001: 2). 
The construction of a narrative, according to Younger, is tantamount to having an 
authentic voice, which signifies healing. The process of regaining voice, which is part 
of the healing process, can be observed in phases: mute suffering, expressive 
suffering, and finally, finding a voice that is both autonomous and authentic (Younger 
1995: 56). In relation to what Frank terms the quest narrative, Younger conceptualises 
the notion of expressive suffering, which often comes in the form of a story or 
narrative. This is important in that the narration plays a central role in transforming 
the suffering (ibid.: 57). Frank (1995: 115) states that: ' ... the quest is defined by the 
ill person's belief that something is to be gained through the experience'. This 
partially illustrates how the quest narrative can be thought of as a bridge between the 
chaos and restitution narratives, and how it can be conceptualised as a stepping stone 
to the restitution narrative, as the sufferer believes that the quest will be beneficial in 
some way. This is the case with the whanau (as presented in the popular culture 
accounts of the identification of the gene), who move from chaos (they do not talk 
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about the illness, they do not know what the cause is, and some members think it is a 
curse), to quest (they are proactive, take initiative, and move into the realm of 
biomedicine undertaking a journey with the hope they will find a scientific 
explanation of their illness), to restitution (with the help of scientists, the cause of 
illness and death is 'discovered', and there is hope for management and eventually a 
cure). While, as previously noted, the restitution narrative is the preferred narrative of 
biomedicine, the quest narrative is emphasised in the institution of the media's 
accounts of the whanau's situation. 
The example below of narrative from a newspaper article follows a similar pattern of 
the previous examples in that it begins with the chaos narrative, moves to the quest 
narrative, and finally, due to scientific and medical intervention, there is the 
appearance of the restitution narrative: 
Before the breakthrough many families were resigned to dying at an early age 
from stomach cancer, which took a terrible toll on the whanau ... "Many of 
them have lived with this terrible threat all their lives, convinced they are 
going to get it and will not live to normal old age," said Professor Reeve. 
"Now, thanks to this blood test, we can tell certain families that they will 
definitely not get stomach cancer and treat the ones at risk before they do." ... 
[whanau member] "We are future-looking people who do not dwell on the 
past. We faced the problem and didn't just sit down and wait for someone else 
to take the initiative" (New Zealand Herald 26 March 1998: A3). 
In the popular culture accounts of the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach 
cancer which I analysed in the previous chapter, one theme I considered was the ways 
in which the moral qualities of science and biomedicine are constructed. Related to 
this is one prominent narrative to emerge from much of that material, which was a 
restitution story of 'poor natives saved by white medicine'. This narrative was 
perceived and briefly mentioned by one of the scientists and one of the whanau health 
workers I interviewed. The scientist talked about its negative effects and the fact that 
it was a warped version of the reality of the partnership, stating that the media 
portrayed it as "'Bright Pakeha Scientists/Dumb Maori come Together to a Great 
Solution'", and how the Maori should be very grateful that the.se bright, brainy white 
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boys came along. And that's not really how it was' (field notes 2/9/04). Similarly, one 
whanau health worker noted that the media coverage was partial because 'they [the 
media] look at the scientists because they discovered the gene, or they look at the poor 
little Maoris on the hill because they started it all' (field notes 7/10/03). This is 
discussed at more length in the following chapter. 
The discussion below on colonial narratives serve as examples of what these people 
are saying, and I found many more examples of this kind of narrative in the media 
coverage of the identification of the gene. For example, one article stated that: 'The 
lives of thousands of people will be saved because of the co-operation of Hira's 
whanau and Parry Guilford's amazing discovery' (Cancer Gene n.d. online); and 
'Lives are being saved around the world, thanks to a team of New Zealand doctors 
who discovered a mutant gene causing stomach cancer in one Maori family' (New 
Zealand Herald 31 Dec. 1998: A13). 
Public Health and Surveillance 
Another interesting point of divergence between conventionally 'critical' social 
science accounts of medicine (especially in the public health arena) and the whanau is 
their emphasis on surveillance in medicine as a positive outcome of their experiences. 
Generally, social science has been critical of the notion of surveillance, and this adds 
to the conundrum in that this criticism, when considered in light of the example of the 
whanau, does not hold true. This notion of surveillance has been explored in relation 
to public health by Petersen and Lupton (1996) who base their arguments on the work 
of Foucault (1980 cited in Petersen and Lupton 1996: xii), thereby contending that in 
modern societies, power operates more through the 'creation of expert knowledges 
about human beings and societies, which serve to channel or constrain thinking and 
action' (ibid.), rather than through direct coercion and control. They note that, since 
the 1940s, emphasis has been placed upon the prevention of non-infectious diseases, 
such as cancer, and this has become the main focus of public health activities in the 
past decade (Petersen and Lupton 1996: 2). However, their main argument is that the 
new public health is the most recent manifestation of a regime of power and 
knowledge that is directed at the regulation and surveillance of individual bodies, and 
collectively, the social body (ibid.: 3). 
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Public health thus depends upon surveillance as a way of countering the fear and 
disorder brought about by disease as it seeks 'to establish and maintain order in the 
face of the disorder of ill bodies' (Petersen and Lupton 1996: 6). Genetic testing and 
surveillance, through such means as endoscopy, can be related to this. The reasons for 
such surveillance are promoted as being in the best interests of the individual or 
group: improving life expectancy and population well-being. Petersen and Lupton 
(1996: 3), however, are concerned that this 'idealistic and progressionist view of 
public health ... serves to obscure its profound moral, political, and social 
implications'. 
The moral and political implications are obscured by a modernist discourse which 
places special importance upon the role of rationality (especially science) in social 
progress (Petersen and Lupton 1996: 175). Furthermore, the logic of the new public 
health draws upon expert knowledges and technologies in order to increase the good 
of members of the public through improving their health status. The ideology of the 
new public health tends to make sense because of its emphasis on the notion of 
personal responsibility - specifically, on individuals participating in activities in order 
to improve their own health, and this is the main reason why this ideology remains 
largely unquestioned (ibid.: 175-176). However, the general impression I received 
after speaking to the whanau health workers and the scientists was that most people 
were happy with the surveillance programme, seeing it as a small price to pay to 
ensure that cancer is detected early, thereby increasing the chances of maintaining 
good health, or more extremely, living longer. Those who do not agree with it are not 
forced to participate as the individual has the right to choose. 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Narratives 
Frank (1995) also puts forward a post-colonial theory of illness, noting that many 
members of what he terms the 'remission society' feel they need to claim their status 
actively. He terms these people 'post-colonial', arguing that modernist medicine has 
claimed the bodies of patients as its territories during, and often beyond, treatment 
(Frank 1995: 10). Generally, post-colonialism in relation to biomedicine is the desire 
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to speak, rather than being spoken for - it is the demand to represent oneself, rather 
than being spoken for by an expert (ibid.: 13). 
In consulting two scientific studies of the whanau's disease, Frank's post-colonial 
theory of illness becomes especially relevant. The earlier study by Doctor Edward 
Jones (1964) outlines his thesis (based on evidence and intuition) that the whanau 
were suffering from hereditary stomach cancer, although, at that time, the technology 
was not available to prove it. Comments peppered throughout his study indicate the 
colonial nature of biomedicine (and to some extent, himself) at that time, highlighting 
the lack of cultural sensitivity apparent in both biomedicine, and himself: 
It is still difficult to understand why so many young folk have been affected. 
The Maoris explain it simply. The family is afflicted with makutu. This is 
because they sold a hill made tapu by the presence of the graves of their 
ancestors, for quarrying when Mount Maunganui harbour development began 
in the early 1950's (Jones 1964: 292-293). 
He goes on to write that: 
The Rotorua family of Bridgeman is similarly cursed for naming a meeting 
house after a woman. Obviously, the persons who laid these curses had a 
sound insight into genetic tendencies (ibid.: 293). 
The sarcastic tone of this comment signals a disregard of the social meaning of the 
illness as, as noted earlier in the discussion by Taussig, the doctor focuses solely on 
the disease at the cost of ignoring the ways in which the afflicted make sense of it and 
what it means to them. Although he considers the context in which the meaning of the 
illness emerged, he disregards it as nonsense. The following comment highlights 
another ideological facet of biomedicine. Jones (1964: 293) writes that: 
It is also interesting that all these families do in fact consider themselves 
related to the proband69 family. Unfortunately, even the memories of even 
their oldest members do not stretch far enough for one to be certain of the 
exact degree of relationship. Maori-wise, they are just "cousins". 
69 This term refers to 'the first patient to be investigated in a family study, to whom all relationships are 
referred' (Khan, A. 3 March, Pers. Comm. 2004). 
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This illustrates how familial relationships in biomedicine are considered to be based 
solely on hereditary. This has been explored by Finkler (2000: 3) who argues that, 
presently, we are experiencing genetic hegemony which is leading to the 
medicalization of kinship. This refers to the way in which family and kin relationships 
are being drawn into the domain of biomedicine through current notions that diseases 
are genetically transmitted from generation to generation. Moreover, Finkler notes 
that while Durkheim proposed that modern society is fixed in traditions, monuments 
and habits, she argues that instead of traditions, contemporary society is leaning 
towards an ideology of genetic inheritance to remember its ancestors. Within this 
ideology, people's heredity is reduced to nucleic acid and molecules, and notions of 
honour, social classifications, moral imperatives and the ability to mythologize the 
past are absent (Finkler 2000: 10). Following the logic of the new genetics then, an 
individuals' kin relations are prescribed on the basis of birth and not choice. 
According to Finkler (ibid.: 185), 'the medicalization of kinship thus subverts the 
ideology of choice regarding the people one selects as one's kin'. 
Jones's (1964: 295) concluding comments are particularly telling of the sense 
colonialism apparent not only in biomedicine, but also in himself. He states that: 
The influence must ultimately be considered a genetic one ... Any member who 
develops symptoms referable to the gastro-intestinal tract should be 
intensively investigated. Many difficulties arise here, not the least of which 
lies in persuading the apathetic Maori to co-operate. Previous studies seem to 
have met a similar lack of response on the part of the kindred. In that of 
Maiman and Zinninger two of those who later developed carcinoma refused 
early investigation and subsequently all surviving members have done 
likewise. 
This comment demonstrates several things. It highlights that this doctor thinks of this 
particular group as a homogeneous entity, insinuating that they were all uncooperative 
and adverse to 'help'. It also suggests that he did not have a close or meaningful 
relationship with any of the members as he has little respect for their beliefs or 
opinions. Third, he does not seem to have any substantial knowledge of their beliefs 
or the complexities of these in the first place. In addition, this comment also shows 
how the apparent unwillingness of the Maori to co-operate with the biomedical 
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professionals is taken to mean that they are 'apathetic', rather than resisting the 
colonizing forces of this practice. A different interpretation therefore suggests that 
those afflicted and their whanau were resisting entering a domain that has no 
consideration for their beliefs. In this way, they were resisting being fetishised by 
biomedicine. 
Jones (1964: 295) ends by stating: 
Then, too, the present survey seems to have done little more than imbue the 
family with a deep sense of makutu. In the event of other members becoming 
affected they may be more inclined towards their gods than their 
doctors ... Because so few of the surviving kindred have yet reached the cancer 
age they must remain at grave risk but the practicality of intensive follow up 
among Maoris is questioned. 
Again, this is another example of a patronising comment that establishes a sharp 
contrast between rational biomedicine and the irrational Maori. His generalizing 
comments imply that all of the whanau believed in the notion of the curse which, as 
previously discussed, is not the case. Furthermore, he portrays their questioning of the 
biomedical processes negatively, implying that they are putting themselves at grave 
risk by not following the 'doctor's orders'. Generally, his comments indicate a lack of 
any significant human relationship with the people. 
Although much has changed some thirty years later, there is still evidence of medical 
colonialism in the most recent, groundbreaking study of the whanau' s affliction which 
appeared in the prestigious international science journal, Nature. The paper outlines 
how the gene for hereditary stomach cancer was identified. Several features of the 
article resonate with issues raised by Frank in terms of textual colonialism. While the 
members of the whanau research team are noted as contributing authors, the whanau 
is not referred to in the body of the text as anything other than subjects and patients, 
codes and numbers: 'In one family, a frameshift mutation was identified in exon 15, 
and in a second family, a premature stop codon interrupted exon 13' (Guilford et al 
1998: 402). This resonates with Frank's (1994: 12) example whereby an unusual 
orthodontic occurrence in one man is published in a medical journal. Frank notes that 
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the man's name 1s not mentioned, and goes on to state that he is 'ignored as 
anyone ... other than a body'.70 
To place this in a wider context, Frank cites the work of post-colonial theorist Gayatri 
Spivak (1990 cited in Frank 1995: 12), stating that 'the master text of the medical 
journal article needs the suffering person, but the individuality of that suffering cannot 
be acknowledged'. This reflects the ideology of contemporary Western biomedical 
discourse which constructs people as objects rather than individuals. Frank argues that 
there is a degree of resistance to such reductive portrayals, (for example, the whanau 
research team contributing to the Nature publication). He argues that the post-colonial 
members of the remission society are refusing to be reduced to 'clinical material' in 
the construction of medical discourse by reclaiming their voice and demanding that 
medicine recognize its need for them (Frank 1995: 12). 
I was reminded of the notion that such members are resisting being reduced to 
'clinical material' generally as one whanau member took offence at my suggestion 
that they 'played an important role in the research'. She responded by saying that: 
'We are the research!', reminding me of the human dimension of scientific research, 
which is often disembodied and ignored as anything other than 'research'. 
Paradoxically, however, the whanau have taken up biomedicine relatively uncritically, 
and in terms of genetic testing, they are willingly being reduced to clinical material as 
their blood is sent away for testing. 
Yet, in small but significant ways, the Nature study is post-colonial in that those who 
comprise the whanau research team are named, alongside the scientists, as authors of 
the publication. This is compounded by the use of the pronouns 'we' and 'our' 
throughout the study, signalling that the work of the whanau research team was 
recognised as important in scientific discourse. Furthermore, where New Zealand is 
mentioned, Aotearoa, the Maori term for the country, is placed beside it in brackets 
70 This man had cancer of the mouth which required extensive reconstructive surgery to his jaw and 
face. This treatment was so extraordinary that his surgeon was able to publish the case in a medical 
journal. The article also included pictures illustrating the varying stages of the reconstructive process. 
When the man offered to show the article to Frank, he assumed it would be about the man's suffering 
throughout his ordeal. However, when he saw the article, he was surprised the man's name was not 
mentioned, even though there were pictures of him. This led Frank to conclude that rather than being 
the man's article, it was his surgeon's. 
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(Guilford et al 1998: 402), suggesting that a degree of cultural sensitivity was 
employed in writing the paper. However, it should be pointed out that while several 
whanau members are stated as co-authors, they are not represented as the original 
instigators of the research. 
Negotiating and Negating Fetishism 
In relation to the fetishism of disease, the manner of the whanau health workers is 
telling. Their holistic and straightforward approach lessens the degree of fetishism as 
it emphasises the social aspect of the medical encounter. Their different perspective 
on genetics highlights that the body can be conceptualised in various ways. It can thus 
be argued that their weariness and mistrust of some health professionals previously 
stems from the tendency in biomedicine to fetishise the patient through objectifying 
the disease in a very particular and disembodied way at the cost of obscuring the very 
important social relations and meanings of that disease. Their resistance to being 
fetishised is highlighted by their desire to have a large degree of input into the labour 
involved with managing both physical and socio-cultural aspects of the disease. 
The whanau health workers are not nai've in their approach - far from it. They are 
working within a socio-cultural framework that acknowledges the dual complexity of 
the body - that is, they acknowledge the physical aspect of the disease while paying 
attention to the embodied notion of the body which takes into account the experience 
of embodied suffering and the idea that bodies are also social and culturally inscribed. 
In terms of the material body, they see genetic testing, endoscopy and gastrectomy as 
opportunities for improving their health, and more radically, saving lives. However, 
unlike contemporary biomedical practice, they pay attention to not only the 'how' of 
disease, but also the 'why'. 
Thus, in the following chapter I consider the perspectives of the whanau health 
workers and the scientists involved in the identification of the gene for hereditary 
stomach cancer. This highlights the cultural labour of the gene as one has to learn 
(labour) in order to see and understand this construct. However, the physicality of the 
body is only one aspect of disease. It has to be reiterated that, indeed, people suffer 
and consequently, search for meaning- meaning that is often ignored by biomedicine 
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which fails to acknowledge the embodied aspect of suffering as well as the social 
significance of disease. 




' ... we all move in and out of the bustling city of knowledge production' (Martin 
1996: 102). 
As I move at this point in the thesis to consider the personal accounts of the labour 
undertaken in the partnership which identified the gene for hereditary stomach cancer, 
it is not to uncover any truths in relation to this. Rather, the point is to consider a 
range of opinions, taking into account the thoughts, feelings, and motives of those I 
interviewed. Throughout the previous chapters, I have discussed varying themes and 
discourses in relation to this particular case study. In undertaking interviews with the 
principal researchers (three scientists and two whanau health workers)71 involved in 
this case study, I asked them about what they thought of some of the most prominent 
discourses to emerge from my research. Therefore, in this chapter, I consider how 
these people move through the busy centre of knowledge production around medical 
genetic research in New Zealand. I do this by comparing and contrasting the 
participants' views on the orthodox notion of science, technoscience, the construction 
of the gene, embodied suffering, and the portrayal of science and biomedicine in the 
realm of popular culture. 
As previously mentioned in chapter two, Martin (1996: 101) has argued that the 
citadel of science is not a walled-off area separate from the rest of society. Rather, its 
walls are open as people constantly move in and out of it.72 This analogy is useful for 
71 The scientists are Tom, Peter and John, while the whanau health workers are Allison and Janet. 
72 As previously noted, Martin ( 1996: 102) states of the city of knowledge production that: 
The walls of the citadel are porous and leaky; inside is not pure knowledge, outside is 
not pure ignorance ... Scientific knowledge is being made by all of us; we all move in 
and out of the bustling city of knowledge production (Martin 1996: 102). 
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illustrating the complexities of the social reality of technoscience, as portrayed by 
those who live it. This view makes all sorts of beliefs about science equally useful to 
hold, and negates the notion that a 'pure' science exists that is separate from society 
(as reflected in my rejection the 'orthodox' view of science which was critiqued in 
chapter two). 
The Social Reality of (Techno)Science 
The first point to consider in discussing the views of science held by various 
participants in the stomach cancer gene research, concerns the different boundaries of 
science employed by the scientists and the whanau health workers. Through these 
personal accounts, I will also elucidate how they understand science and the culture of 
science. 
Generally speaking, it seems that the scientists adhere more to the orthodox notion of 
science, while the whanau health workers move more freely in the realm of 
technoscience, acting as translators between the scientists and non-scientists as they 
shift from one language to another, and explore all corners of Martin's 'citadel' of 
knowledge production. In doing so, they acknowledge the varied labour that occurs in 
these various worlds. 
As discussed in chapter two, the foundations of modern (orthodox) science sit upon 
premises of objectivity and rationality and the scientists adhere to this notion of a 
value-free, neutral and somewhat Eurocentric model of science. This was indicated by 
several factors in my interviews with them, including a limited view of who was 
involved in the project, in which the scientists had a more limited view compared to 
the whanau health workers, who acknowledged a wider range of the varied labour 
involved, and who were also more self-reflexive about their labour. The scientists, 
who distanced themselves from the webs of interactions that constitute the labour of 
science, prefer to see themselves as just 'doing' science. Throughout their interviews, 
however, the scientists were open about the importance of the whanau' s role to the 
partnership, and their role in initiating it. 
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The scientists' responses to a question about who was part of the team that helped 
them along signal, however, that their worlds are more 'split' than those of the 
whanau health workers. For instance, only one scientist mentioned the role of the 
whanau in initiating the research; two scientists mentioned that there were others in 
the lab who helped out, while all three named only those who were principally and 
directly involved in the 'science' side of things as 'fellow scientists'. The boundaries 
that demarcate the work undertaken by the scientists and the work undertaken by the 
whanau health workers are more clearly defined and boldly accentuated by the 
scientists. Therefore, they do not move around the 'city of knowledge production' as 
freely as the whanau health workers. 
The Scientists' Views 
Tom, for example, acknowledged only the principal scientists involved in the 
research. He does not mention the whanau workers and, while he does mention that 
there were others in the lab who were not directly associated with the project, it seems 
as though he assumes that they were also scientists. In other words, he does not 
consider those who cleaned the laboratory, worked in administration or who acted as 
support networks, such as friends and family. Thus, the worlds of the scientists are 
dramatically divided. Although they are moving within the city of knowledge 
production, they work behind closed doors. 
Tom: I've said there was Peter, there was another Post-doc researcher 
Fernanda da Silva Tatley; there was a Ph. D. student, Anita Dunbier, and there 
were other people who worked in the lab as well, who weren't directly 
concerned with the project. But otherwise, there was Tony Reeves as well, 
who was involved with the project as well. Um, that's about it. 
Tom came into the research later than Peter, who was involved from the beginning. 
However, he also failed to acknowledge the role of the whanau. 
Peter: At the time, it was just Tony, who wrote the original grant, and then 
that was for right of my salary, and the salary for the Junior Research Fellow, 
and that was a guy called Justin Hopkins, who was a guy with a BSc who 
came to work with us in the lab at the time. 
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This scientist however, had a slightly broader idea of who was involved, including the 
whanau and a technical assistant: 
John: The researchers from the family instigated the project, collected 
samples and recorded all the genealogical relationships. AER was the first 
point of contact for the family and by winning their trust enabled the lab 
research to begin. PG was the director of this project and main provider of 
technical expertise. PG, along with AER were successful in obtaining funding 
for the project, including my salary. J Haraway joined the team at the same 
time as me, and worked in parallel on an area which so far has turned out to be 
unimportant etiologically, although he provided much intellectually to 
discussions. Other members of the CGL [Cancer Genetics Laboratory], 
although not part of the stomach cancer team, provided technical assistance, 
notably Les McNoe, an 'old hand' of the lab. 
The Whanau Health Workers' Views 
In contrast, the whanau health workers have a broader view of who is involved, and a 
wider conception of what their own roles entail. Throughout the interview, and 
subsequent conversations, they mentioned the roles of individuals, including those 
who work as doctors and scientists, as well as a gastroenterologist, as all being 'part 
of the team'. 
Janet: I suppose you could call us anything now ... I mean, we do our natural 
ways. We're the genetic counsellors, we're the gastroenterologists. We know 
so much about it now; we're part and parcel of the whole thing with the 
people. We go in with them when they have their 'scopes, we go in with them 
just before they have their ops. Yeah, we're everything now. 
One of the whanau health workers also spoke of their role as advocates, and this, she 
asserted, involves a variety of roles, but most commonly involves negotiating on 
behalf of patients and their families, as well as dealing with government 
organizations, including Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ), the local District 
Health Board, and the Ministry of Health. The whanau health workers also made a 
point of recognizing the labour of others. They spoke fondly of the other principal 
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players involved in the research, offering a more holistic view of who was involved, 
highlighting some of the points of interaction that the scientists did not consider. 
Janet: He [Dr Shaw] should be a professor, but because of his work here, he 
hasn't got time for the university, because, you have to get that to do a 
professorship. 
Allison: And whatever he's done for us, he's hasn't gone wrong ... He gets less 
recognised than us, and we don't care about ourselves, and we want some 
recognition for him, and Professor Martin, nobody knows him. 
The Scientists and Science As Culture 
The thoughts of the scientists in relation to the notion of science as culture are 
interesting to consider in that they highlight the ways in which they define the 
boundaries of science and adhere to the orthodox view of science. The scientists either 
explicitly stated or implied that they consider 'science' to be separate from the notion 
of culture, and considered it to be distinct from Maori culture, thereby believing it to 
be a part of Pakeha culture, which they understand to be a neutral, rational, universal 
practice, free of any notions of 'culture'. As considered in chapter two, technoscience 
renders science as a practice and a culture. Comments made by the scientists are 
therefore implicated in this as they do not acknowledge this notion. 
However, before giving consideration to how it might be that science resides in 
Pakeha culture, or no culture at all, it is important to acknowledge that: 
Maori do not conform to a typical presentation either physically or 
psychologically. Even though there are discernible shared attributes, and a 
common DNA pattern, there is no single set of mental or emotional constructs 
which can be said to make up a typical Maori identity (Durie 2001: 4). 
Acknowledging this ensures that one does not essentialize Maori beliefs or reality, 
and following Durie's assertion, there is no longer 'a simple definition that will 
encompass the range of Maori experience' (2001: 5). Perhaps the same should be 
understood for the groupings of Pakeha and 'scientists' as well. 
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Tom, a scientist who identifies himself as ethnically Maori, states that he was brought 
up as a Pakeha, and considers the scientific world as distinct from Maori culture. 
While initially ambivalent about whether or not requests made by the whanau had 
changed the way he viewed the body or genetics, he believed that the scientific world 
was removed from Maori culture, thereby residing more in the domain of Pakeha 
culture: 
I'm of two minds there because I am Maori, but I was raised as a Pakeha, 
right? through the education system ... Because of that, I believe in both Maori 
beliefs, and also non-Maori beliefs - being in the scientific world, and genetics 
and so on and so forth ... Not really, not really, but it's made me, sort of, you 
could call it - like there is Maori superstition right? In some ways, I am sort of 
superstitious of that. 
T.C.: Superstitious of the superstition, or? 
Tom: Aware of the superstition. For example, when you go to urupa or a 
cemetery, you always wash your hands after that...Now, that's a Maori belief, 
and I always do that, so does that mean I believe in that or I do that because 
that's how I was raised? So I just learnt that from my parents when I was a 
wee young kid. Same thing for when you're at a funeral and there's an open 
casket and it's in a house or a marae or something like that. When you leave 
the room that the body's in, you wash your hands. Now, I do that because I 
was taught that, but with respects to that specific case, I believe in that 
superstition as well. But that does not affect the way that I do my work in the 
scientific lab - so a yes and a no. 
This highlights how he is in two worlds as he views Maori culture as distinct from the 
science he practices, signalling that science is perhaps 'culture-less', or a part of 
Pakeha culture. Adding to the complexity of this, this scientist believes in aspects of 
Maori culture that he terms 'superstitious', and specifically mentioned the curse. This 
makes for an interesting dynamic whereby culture and science cross-over, but then he 
goes on to claim that this does not affect the way he goes about his work in the 
laboratory. This shows how this particular scientist believes science to reside outside 
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of culture - his different perspective signals that he is working not only with the doors 
closed, but with the blinds pulled down as well. 
The Scientists' Accommodation of the Whanau's Views 
Related to the previous point are the following comments made by the scientists 
which highlight that although they acknowledge that science is a cultural practice, 
they do not articulate it. Particular elements of the whanau' s involvement in the 
partnership, which are acknowledged by the scientists, highlight the fluid and 
dynamic nature of science. For instance, the fact that the whanau wanted to have as 
much control as possible over the entire project highlights how science is a 
heterogeneous enterprise that can accommodate varying cultural elements. Tom, a 
scientist, asserts that the main difference between this case, and the same 
(hypothetical) case involving Pakeha is the whanau' s beliefs, and the degree of 
control they wanted: 
The main differences are their beliefs, and I think, I can't specifically say 
about the non-Maori family or anyone like that, but I think they wanted to 
have a lot more control of what was going on. And that's good - and that's 
just their personal preference, and maybe their cultural beliefs as well. Or 
maybe from the point of view that they've been shat on for so many years 
prior to, and post the Treaty of Waitangi - they wanted to keep things close to 
their own area, or grasp, so they have their own control, and I don't know how 
that could be taken over to non-Maori as well, I think it just depends on each 
individual case. 
Another interesting element of this statement is the scientist's mention of the Treaty 
of Waitangi, which resonates with the notion of technoscience by citing possible 
political reasons for the degree of control desired by the whanau. This highlights that 
science (as technoscience) has an undeniable political element, and that Tom is aware 
of the social, cultural and political influences in the realm of technoscience. However, 
this does not infiltrate the clearly defined boundaries he has created around what he 
considers 'science'. In other words, he does not see that the walls of the citadel of 
science are open to the city of knowledge production, and are constantly permeated by 
citizens of this city. 
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In addition, there was a sense of resistance on the whanau's part to conform to the 
traditions and conventions of science. This is noted by Peter, who stated that: 
I think another thing which was very, very striking was the desire for self-
determination amongst them. Perhaps that's not such a cultural thing, that's a 
pride issue, and an honour issue, but that's very strongly felt. And that was 
probably the biggest lesson to learn was that these people did not want to be 
told what to do - there's no room to say 'this is how it is'. The approach we 
took, it was all over so fast. They had a lot to contribute at that level, and how 
things were organized at the local level, and really that was how it had to be. 
And nine times out of ten, their approach was appropriate. 
The whanau health workers expressed this sense of resistance. For example, Allison is 
defiant about science having to accommodate them, and not the other way around: 
Don't come our way [if you're not going to change], 'cos we're not going to 
change. And we never change, for anyone. This is the way we are, and that's 
it. 
And the sense of control is echoed by Janet, who states that: 
So, everything that happens to us, happens to us with our say so ... we're in 
charge, we're in control of this whole thing. 
This degree of control over the project highlights that science is a malleable practice 
and culture. This is also exemplified by other factors, and while the scientists do not 
consciously acknowledge or understand science as a practice and culture, two other 
outcomes of the interviews indicate that it is. The significance of DNA and the 
whanau disregard for the medical community show how the boundaries of science are 
fluid as the whanau attempts to make these visible. In relation to the significance of 
DNA, one scientist has changed his views of this as he has come to realise its cultural 
significance and become aware that DNA is fetishised in Western society. He 
describes being struck by the Maori notion of DNA - he used to think it was 'a bit of 
a line introduced by Maori', therefore failing to realise how deeply held this belief 
was. He has since learnt of the 'value' of DNA, stating: 
I'm more acutely aware of, um, the value of DNA. Yeah, I don't send 
anyone's DNA to another researcher without careful thought that that DNA's 
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going to be looked after, and that it's only going to be used for what that 
researcher suggested in the first place. So, yeah, it increased my awareness of 
that value. 
Thus, the fact that its significance as it stands in Maori culture can be appreciated and 
accepted in science highlights that scientific knowledge is both a located and 
heterogeneous practice (Haraway 1997: 137). However, there is a contradiction as 
Peter (at the same time) understands molecular biology to be free from culture, free 
from any sort of socio-cultural contexts. 
Peter: ... well I think that's the thing about molecular biology - it strips away 
- you work at a level which doesn't really consider race or gender or 
personality- it goes below that stuff. 
This highlights the unusual complexity of his thinking. Like Tom, he moves through 
two separate worlds, but depending upon the subject matter, there is a connection 
between these worlds that he does not acknowledge; doing so would render elements 
of these two worlds problematic. 
Furthermore, in another sense, this scientist denies that science is a multicultural ( or 
cultural, for that matter) enterprise. However, that the Maori worldview can be 
accommodated by science highlights that science is a multicultural practice. Peter 
describes what struck him about Maori culture: 
I think the question of their ownership of the DNA, and how their DNA is the 
embodiment of their whakapapa. I used to kind of think it was a bit of line 
introduced by Maori, I didn't realise how deeply held that feeling was. So that 
struck me, the consistency of that. Maori, they have different occupations, and 
social standing within the Maori community, and they all had the same kind of 
line, so it's not just promoted more by outspoken Maori. So that ownership 
thing was very, very important. .. 
In addition, Peter explains that what he learnt from the whanau was a cultural rather 
than scientific education. This is because: 
My scientific methodology is very firm, very established, I wouldn't say, it's 
not inflexible, but there are certain principles which are a common theme 
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throughout, and that for example, is, you pay little attention to anecdotal 
information ... I don't think I learnt from them too much about the scientific 
side, but from the cultural side, an extraordinary amount. It's really opened my 
eyes up to their culture, and the strength of the culture. 
This highlights how this scientist has clearly marked boundaries of science, while at 
the same time, he recognises the broader context in which he practises - this is the 
boundary defining of science. 
Related to this is the fact that the whanau health workers believe that they taught the 
scientists and others involved about cultural values: 
Janet: ... [We had to] teach them all about cultural values and cultural 
sensitivity. 
They talked particularly about a genetic counsellor from South Africa and how they 
had to teach her 'a few lessons' about cultural sensitivity. They also noted that she 
was interested in taking the project on (before they got in contact with the University 
of Otago), but because of her lack of cultural sensitivity, they did not feel that she was 
the right person to do so. 
In addition, while it was necessary for the scientists to become (to some extent) 
familiar (if they were not so already) with the many cultural aspects of the whanau 
that differed from their own conventions, the whanau health workers did not need to 
become versed in the complexities of 'scientific' labour, such as learning to operate a 
micro-array machine. Thus, in the same way that the scientists can skirt around 
dealing with WINZ, the whanau health workers do not have to be at the laboratory. 
The labour undertaken by the two groups is divided and therefore involves different 
roles that influence how they come to see and define themselves around and through 
the city of knowledge production. 
For instance, Peter noted that there was a distinct disregard and lack of respect by the 
whanau for the (bio )medical community. He emphasised that with the whanau, there 
was not the same degree of respect for the medica~ community as there is with many 
Pakeha. He also stated that they wanted more control and involvement with the 
project, signalling that the whanau does not accept the conventional Pakeha way of 
doing science and medicine. This highlights the fluid boundaries of technoscience 
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which can accommodate a variety of cultural practices. Peter also noted that this case 
was also different from a case involving Pakeha primarily because of their desire to 
do things their own way, on their own terms . 
. . . we had to have another look at all their systems of genetic counselling. 
Because Pakeha would say "you go down to the hospital and get counselling 
there, and then go back in two weeks time". There would be no question, you 
would do that. It would be cap in hand to the traditions that it's done. So that 
was all gone. There wasn't the same respect for the medical community that 
you see with Pakeha. There was this desire for independence. There was a 
tendency to be less compliant with medical professionals. 
T.C.: So they wouldn't just take your word for everything? 
Peter: No, they wouldn't, that's right, yeah. And this need to be very closely 
related with all the aspects of the project. Pakeha tend to be more hands-off 
and say 'well, you go do it, doc, come back when it's done'. 
T.C.: They put more trust in you. 
Peter: Yeah. That trust had to be developed because it wasn't there. It's 
probably the same thing, you know, Pakeha probably already had the trust 
there when they grow up trusting the medical profession. The Maori people 
didn't really have that trust from day one, so that had to be built up, and now 
things do happen a bit easier because they do trust me, they know I'm not 
going to go off and do anything strange. 
A point to make in relation to these comments is that in the same way that it is 
considered a Pakeha 'tradition' that many Pakeha would go to the hospital and receive 
counselling and not question the work and knowledge of the doctor, the fact that many 
whanau members were not trusting of the biomedical community can be considered a 
tradition in itself, perhaps stemming from the years of colonization that instilled this 
distrust (for instance, the medical article on the whanau which appeared in the 1960s 
as discussed in the previous chapter). Moreover, when I talked informally to the 
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elderly mother of one of the whanau health workers I interviewed, she told me that 
she had never been to the doctor, and when she or one of her eleven children became 
sick, she would cure many ailments with grass (field notes 6/10/3). 
The Whanau Health Workers Criticise Biomedicine 
Unsurprisingly then, the whanau health workers were critical of biomedical practice, 
especially in terms of the hierarchies and the way in which doctors communicate with 
patients. The way in which they have gone about working thus resonates with the 
practice and culture of technoscience. Allison states that she has witnessed the 
impersonal and nonsensical way doctors communicate with their patients: 
I've seen it, because I was a nurse. I've seen them talking to Pakeha old 
people. This and that, rattling on. And I say 'C'mon c'mon'. When I was 
working in Nelson, there was this Taiwanese, he came in off the ships because 
there's a port there. And he had a pneumothorax and the doctors would go 'we 
want to put a needle in you and we want to draw it all out' and he had no idea, 
couldn't get hold of the interpreter. So I said, 'let's draw it'. He's not even 
listening to you'. So he said 'can you?', and I did - 'this is what we're going 
to do' .... It's across the board. It's common sense. He had no idea, this poor 
guy, what the doctor was talking about. And I said 'move aside', I told the 
doctor to move aside, I'll explain it to him, and I drew the whole thing. And he 
was quite happy. 
This highlights that Allison is something of a translator, translating between cultures 
and the divides of expert/layperson, scientist/non-scientist. Her need to translate 
between different worlds signals the specific doctor's inability to work outside the 
confines of biomedicine and to consider the person as more than a physical, material 
entity. 
The whanau health workers also mentioned their dislike of hierarchies in the medical 
community, as Janet stated: 
I suppose one of the things that has come out of what we do [is] that you don't 
have to have a doctor's degree or a physics degree or whatever, it's just to be 
on equal footing with both people. 
She went on to state that they are a team of equal players in the project: 
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Yeah, that's how we become with our [people] - we're called the 'A Team', 
they're called the 'A Team'. Yeah, these are all the principals involved in our 
work. 
In addition, Allison stated that the scientists did not educate the whanau members 
about the condition. Rather, the whanau health workers did it 'in a simple form': 
There's no education about it, we just told them where they had a gene. 
This point is also considered in relation to the notion of suffering, biomedicine, and 
science in popular culture further on in this discussion. 
The Construction of the Gene 
A central area of inquiry throughout this thesis has been the domain of technoscience, 
of which biotechnology is an important component, and I now want to consider the 
aspect of biotechnology in relation to my research, especially in terms of the 
construction of the gene. This industry is a major player in business pursuits and 
therefore signals a site of genetic fetishism in the sense of being 'a non-critical 
relationship to genetic technologies' (Haraway 2000: 91). 
As the scientists operate in the realm of biotechnology, the whanau do not want to be 
involved. Two of the scientists I interviewed have gone on to continue gastric cancer 
research (and other cancer research) at Pacific Edge Biotechnology in Dunedin. The 
purpose of this in terms of cancer is coming up with unmet medical needs, such as 
new drugs, earlier detection, and more effective management (Guilford 2004: 2). The 
aims of the company are 'to apply a diverse set of skills working in concert to develop 
improved diagnostic and disease management tools for cancer and other diseases with 
a genetic component' (Pacific Edge Biotechnology 2002: 8). The company is also 
entangled with the University of Otago, and is often described as the commercial arm 
of the Cancer Genetics Laboratory at this University.73 
73 From a national perspective, the Government has estimated that current export earnings for the 
biotechnology sector in New Zealand are approximately $250 million per annum. Currently, New 
Zealand is experiencing rapid growth of this industry as nearly half of the forty two biotechnology 
companies in New Zealand were created within the last three years. Biotechnology has therefore 
become a significant industry in this country (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 2003: para. 4). 
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One Scientist's Views on DNA 
The following comments illustrate how DNA is fetishised (disembodied and 
commodified) within this realm. Peter seems to understand the dynamic of genetic 
fetishism, but does not articulate it. This indicates that he is aware of the potentially 
negative consequences of the whanau's DNA being entangled in commercial 
enterprise. Peter explains why the whanau have been excluded from Pacific Edge 
Biotechnology: 
They've been specifically excluded from that. All the intellectual property 
from the Cancer Genetics Lab came over here with an exception, a clear 
exception of all that stuff ... so that has been excluded, and I, or we, 
approached a lot of new areas, so we patented over the test and with the family 
and all that kind of stuff, and I just didn't want to bring the new area of 
commercial development to that project. There wasn't any need for it anyway, 
so no, it's been clearly excluded. I was also concerned that if the company was 
ever sold, and it got into overseas hands, there might be a control issue there as 
well. So, no it's been very, very, clearly kept out of the company. 
Peter is also aware of the tension in biotechnology between commercial enterprise for 
profit and for helping people. He criticises the way some people are suspicious of the 
motives of those working in this area: 
And this is where I think I get frustrated in the company where some people 
will look at us, you know, the commercial side, and go 'oh yeah, just making 
some money'. But it's not that way at all, we're trying to finish off research, 
we're trying to actually improve outcomes, it's the only way that we're going 
to, as a company, ever do well, is if we actually improve outcomes. It's to 
improve the outcome of the patient. 
As previously noted, the whanau team helped to negotiate a shared patent for the 
genetic test (Rankine and McCreanor in press: 10). And although they did not talk to 
me about this, Rankine (1999: 37) notes that 'The patent decision was a difficult one 
for the whanau'. In this article, one whanau member states that: 
"The project is to help people, not to make money ... The whanau wanted the 
two things kept separate, so non-involved members have formed a trust to 
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manage it. If any money does come out of it, it could go towards training 
whanau members to do counselling" (Rankine 1999: 37). 
This highlights how the whanau are weary of being involved in the realm of 
biotechnology and are sensible about their decisions in relation to patents so as to 
minimise the fetishisation and potential exploitation of their DNA. 
Another interesting point to emerge from the scientists' explanations of how they 
understand their work is that their vision is trained to look for certain things and 'see' 
in a particular way, thereby signalling that the ways in which the gene is represented 
are constructed as one has to labour to see it. This is important to consider in relation 
to how the gene as a construct is viewed differently by the scientists and the whanau 
health workers. The following quote illustrates how scientists fetishise the gene, as it 
comes to be understood as a thing-in-itself, an object which is free from socio-cultural 
contexts, connections and relationships. 
The Scientists and the Gene 
In the following interview extract, Tom is describing how they find genes which are 
active in tumour cells. 
Tom: So, once you've done all those, you've hybridised everything, all those 
30,000 spots with the majority of them will be either lighting up red, green, or 
yellow. Red means it's over-exposed in tumour [tissue sample], and green 
means its being more expressed in normal [tissue sample]. From there we can 
quantify that, quantify the red, the green and the yellow. And from there we 
can determine what genes are being expressed in tumour [tissue sample], 
identify what the protein is, or the product of the RNA, and then, you could 
carry on and do further studies. 
The subsequent example also illustrates how the gene has become separate from the 
labour involved to understand it. Here Peter describes to me how they come to 
understand the change in the sequence which becomes the mutation, and what it looks 
like: 
Peter: Well, the gene itself is about 2,800 nucleotides long, so it's a long run 
of As, Cs, Gs and Ts - this is the name we give the chemicals. And within the 
2,800 nucleotides would be one change. So a G is changed to a T- that's all it 
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is, one change. So, there's three billion nucleotides based in the whole 
genome, and one change, a G to a T, has caused the whole problem ... So, it's a 
single base change in one gene, called the E-cadherin gene. And, it looks like 
the presence of an extra blob. Reading the DNA sequence, reading the two 
copies of the gene, so your mother's and your father's copies and they're 
basically the same, in most cases they're the same, and where they differ you 
just see a base split out a little bit, instead of one spot, there are two spots. So, 
to look at, you just see the separate rungs gel like a ladder, and then you get 
the mutation and there's a double band ... So, it's a very clear thing to 
determine, when you see it, it's moved out a bit. I'll show you, you can see it 
with your own eyes, I haven't described it very well, I'll show you what it 
looks like. 
T.C.: So, you're absolutely certain about it? 
Peter: Absolutely certain, yes. 
These examples resonate with Haraway's assertion that the scientist (as fetishist) 
comes to see 'the gene itself in all the gels, blots, and printouts in the lab and 
"forgets" the natural-technical processes that produce the gene and genome as 
consensus objects in the real world' (1997: 146). They also illustrate how scientific 
objects in general are considered by fetishists (or, more appropriately, scientists) as 
being 'simply and purely technical and representational, rooted in processes of 
potentially bias-free discovery and nontropic, even if conventional, naming' (Haraway 
1997: 136-137). 
The following event, whereby Peter showed me a small blob on a piece of paper, 
illustrates how scientists are trained to see in particular ways. While I could not make 
sense of it, to him it was a very important piece of genetic information - the variation 
I 
in the DNA sequence. This illustrates that science is learnt and shows how knowledge 
shapes ways of understanding and seeing. The subsequent examples thus resonate 
with Haraway' s assertion that the scientist does not acknowledge the natural and 
technical processes that construct the gene as an object (1997: 146). 
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Peter: These are tests of individual people. This is the DNA sequence, and 
you read in this direction here. There's a normal sequence through here. See, 
this person has an extra band here, see this person has it as well. These people 
are all normal. These two people have that extra block, so this lane is the 'G' 
lane, and it's changed to a 'T', so you still have one normal copy from one 
parent, and you also have a fault, or a mutation from another parent. So, that's 
all you look for, so a very clear test. There's no doubt that they have a 
mutation. 
T.C.: It could be quite easy to miss. 
Peter: Yeah, but we know where to look, we know to look at this little patch 
here, so we know exactly which place to stare at, and we don't do everything 
twice, so we don't make mistakes. 
Again, the whanau health workers have a contrasting view. They do not conceptualise 
the condition as genetic, but as hereditary. This perception is more holistic in that it 
considers the gene in relation to the body as opposed to the gene as an isolated entity 
represented by spots, as previously discussed. 
Allison: This is how I see it. I see it as hereditary, not genetic, whatever the 
word is. It's hereditary. If you think of anything that's hereditary, you've 
inherited things, just like me. So, that's how it is. I don't see it as a genetic 
problem, I see it as a hereditary problem. 
The Notion of Embodied Suffering 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Taussig (1992) argued that emotional and social 
suffering is disguised in biomedicine and that science can 'explain the "how" but not 
the "why" of disease' (1992: 85), and although identifying the 'how' of disease can be 
profoundly positive, biomedicine fails to explain the social significance of disease and 
acknowledge the embodied aspect of suffering. Kleinman (1995: 31), for example, 
notes how the experience of suffering is given little consideration in biomedicine: 





II c ' ,~ 
' 
Chapter Five Personal Accounts 
... biomedicine presses the practitioner to construct disease, disordered 
biological processes, as the object of study and treatment. There is hardly any 
place in this narrowly focused therapeutic vision for the patient's experience 
of suffering. 
Similarly, as previously mentioned, Cassell notes that persons, rather than bodies, 
suffer (1991: vii). In chapter four I considered the notion of suffering and the 
importance of considering this in terms of embodiment. While the scientists made the 
point that because of the nature of the project they had become emotionally involved, 
the whanau health workers were reluctant to talk about this aspect of the illness. And 
why should they? After all, this is a very private and personal area and they should not 
have to expose this part of the lived, embodied experience to a relative stranger. 
However, the embodied experience of suffering is more profound for these people as 
they have to deal with the very real, day-to-day aspects of suffering more than the 
scientists. This is not to underestimate the vested interests of the scientists in 
alleviating suffering. A sense of emotional involvement and altruism comes through 
in comments made by the scientists, especially Peter, who wholeheartedly believes 
that genetic testing for this predisposition is a positive step, one that has contributed to 
saving lives and relieving the social suffering of the whanau: 
Well, I think there's no doubt, you know. The alternative is to just go back to 
the way this family was where you'd wake up with a tummy pain, and you'd 
think 'oh god, is it me now - I've got it now'. And that destroyed that 
community, that fear, and people didn't, you know, I mean stable relationships 
were under pressure, career options were under pressure, because 'I'm going 
to be dead when I'm thirty - if I live to thirty I'll die at forty'. Any kind of 
pain that you or I, presumably mutation-negative, have, we just put down to a 
big night or whatever, and you get on with it. If you have that family history, 
you'll be thinking 'ohhh no, this is it', and that's a terrible thing to have over 
you. 
He also judges his own work in relation to how much he can relieve the suffering of 
the whanau, indicating that he considers the wider implications of medical 
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intervention as he understands that what goes on in the citadel of science affects the 
citizens of the city of knowledge production: 
I judge myself on how well these people do - I'll be just so happy if these 
people do well, and how well these people do. And if you get someone whose 
cancer is picked up early, I'll go 'yahoo'. That's what I'm doing. 
Significantly, the whanau health workers affirmed that the scientists were aware of the 
suffering (physical and emotional) involved. This awareness is one likely reason for 
the continual success of the partnership. 
The Whanau Health Workers and the Naming of the Disease 
The following conversation highlights how the identification and naming of the 
physical condition has played a key role in alleviating physical and emotional 
suffering, not only for the afflicted, but those who are also intimately involved, such 
as the whanau health workers. As previously mentioned, these workers also made a 
point of emphasising that they always knew it was hereditary: 
Allison: Well, we knew it was hereditary, or we wouldn't have got those 
geneticists in. 
Janet: There was a misconception about the whole thing, for years people 
believed. And they [were] believing it to the point where "I'm going to get it, 
I'm going to get it, I'm going to die". 
Allison: So, our thing was to prove that it was hereditary. We knew it was. 
Janet: Prove to our family. 
Allison: 'Cos we did some research prior to Tony and them, and the research 
was that there were certain families having it. So, we knew it was hereditary. 
All we had to do was try and prove it to the people. Because they thought they 
had a curse on them, well anyone would. Pakehas think that, they even told 
me. 
T.C.: And after the discovery? 
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Allison: They were glad. Elated. 
Janet: The fact that 'this is what's happening now - we feared for this thing, 
and now we can do something about it.' 
The Scientists and Embodiment 
Another interesting consideration in relation to the notion of suffering is the 
representation of the whanau as both symbols and people. Significantly, all three 
scientists felt working with the whanau had been an enriching experience in that there 
was human face-to-face contact, rather than them just knowing individuals as blood 
samples, or symbols on a piece of paper. This signals that the scientists became aware 
of the wider implications of what they were doing, and considered the human, 
embodied element of this: 
Tom: Just finding out the way that they think, and actually just having a one-
on-one situation with them as opposed to just being in the lab and just dealing 
with blood or DNA or something like that; and just knowing that there's 
someone on the other end of that. And that's been quite important, I think, and 
it's been a great sort-of motivator as well. 
This sentiment was also expressed by John, 'Yho spoke of moving out of the citadel 
and interacting with his research subjects socially: 
Initially, the relationship was a professional, clinical one. (I knew the members 
only as symbols on paper and the contents of test-tubes). After meeting several 
members of the family on multiple occasions and staying twice on the Marae, 
I considered them to be friends and we were made to feel members of the 
extended family. 
The Whanau Health Workers and Trust 
However, the whanau health workers stated that they found it difficult to trust the 
scientists at the beginning of the partnership. That trust could gradually be built over a 
period of time indicates that the scientists were working according to the whanau' s 
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specifications. This trust, and the fact that they covered themselves religiously,74 
indicated that they were doing 'the right thing' in terms of actively alleviating 
suffering. 
Allison: Well, I must say, that in the beginning, it was hard to trust, you know. 
Because there was a bit of hoo-haa in New Zealand at the time, in the early 
'90s about genetic testing on sheep and all that. So it was hard to trust at first. 
It was when the gene came that I think the final trust was there, and even then. 
Janet: We used to have three or four phone calls a day to Peter, checking, 
making sure, ringing, making sure. 
Allison: "Are we doing the right thing? ... Were we doing the right thing for our 
people?" Because it was like putting our whole family into a risk situation. We 
did. And we were taking their blood - are we doing the right thing? Mind you, 
we had prayed, and we had covered ourselves because we're religious, and we 
did do that so that we're not doing the wrong thing. 
Janet: Yeah, our very being here is covered by a spiritual thing. 
Allison: Yeah, it is. 
The Realm of Popular Culture: Media, Metaphors and the 
'Public' 
In chapter three I considered media accounts of the identification of the gene of 
hereditary stomach cancer, drawing on my own discourse analysis as well as that of 
Rankine and McCreanor (in press) on the same topic. As previously mentioned, they 
termed the newspaper articles they analysed 'Colonial Coverage' as most of the 
stories 'cast the Maori family as a problem that Pakeha scientists had to fix' (in press: 
21). 
74 The whanau are followers of the Ratana faith, and one member stated that because of this 'delving 
into the background of our ancestors is not something we would normally do. It's a bit like opening a 
grave' (O'Brien 2001: 6). With the help of the marae minister, they sought a spiritual blessing and 
wrote and signed a kawenata (covenant) between the whanau and God which noted that the research 
was to be used only for the purposes of the illness (ibid.). 
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When I asked all of those I interviewed what they thought of the media coverage of 
the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer, the scientists, more than 
the whanau health workers, thought it was misleading. This was mostly due to the 
emphasis on the notion of the curse and the lack of acknowledgment given to the 
whanau' s role in initiating the research and the subsequent whanau health workers' 
involvement in the partnership. 
The Scientists and the Media Coverage 
Generally, however, the scientists also thought that the accounts were sufficient. 
Tom: I think it's quite misleading in some respects, because, as far as I'm 
aware, how it came about was that the family approached us - we'd nothing to 
do with the family prior to that, it was their 'get-up and go' that basically got 
the project started .. .I sort of agree with it, but not really because the family 
approached us, and we had the skills that were there already - they're using 
us, which is what it should be, as opposed to we're using them to progress our 
standard of scientific grounds. So, I think it is somewhat misleading, I think. 
They get more of the human interest sort of thing as opposed to what's really 
going on. 
Tom also thought, however, that most of the media accounts of the work he took part 
in were good enough. He thought that the articles which emphasised the relationship 
between the family co-ordinators and principal investigators were especially good. 
However, he was aware that the majority of accounts were not from the whanau's 
point of view. He hints at the stigma of the curse, and notes that the freedom of 
individual choice was not emphasised: 
Tom: I thought most of it, this is just going back a few years though as well, I 
thought most of it was quite good, but I think there were some instances of 
what I would call a witch-hunt. Most of the accounts were not actually from 
the family's point of view, but even within the family there were people who 
were against it as well, and that's fair enough. But, I believe, that they have a 
choice, and it's up to them whether or not they want to take that choice. And I 
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don't think that was conveyed in most of the media reports or nine times out of 
ten there wasn't information about it. 
Like Tom, Peter felt that the media coverage was generally sufficient. However, he 
notes that the notion of the curse was emphasised to the point of being detrimental to 
the whanau. Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, he was aware of the narrative 
portrayal that was also detrimental to the whanau: 
Peter: I didn't like the stuff about the curse - that was really overdone. And it 
made it the 'Bright Pakeha Scientists/Dumb Maori come Together to a Great 
Solution', and how the Maori should be very grateful that these bright, brainy 
white boys came along. And that's not really how it was. 
Regarding the curse, he notes that some members of the whanau still believe in it, and 
that it makes a good story: 
Peter: And the curse, I mean some people still do believe in that curse. I was 
struck by one, I was there about a year ago for hui, and one of the elders was 
speaking on the lawn outside of the marae ... And he turned back and pointed 
to the hill and said how it was starting to heal over now, and that's why things 
are going better. So, there's still that belief by some people. But when 
Maybelle and Hira and Rangi came to see me, they knew it wasn't caused by 
selling the hill, so lovely story, but over-amped I think. 
He also thought that their research was represented realistically, except that they did 
not give the involved whanau members enough credit for the labour undertaken by 
them. 
Peter: I think that was one area where they didn't give the Maori involved 
enough credit for their awareness of what was going on. 
In terms of the marking of ethnicity, Tom was not initially sure why the whanau were 
always marked as Maori while the scientists were never marked, even though he is 
Maori himself, and identifies his iwi as Ngati Ruanui (a South Taranaki tribe). He 
decides that it is because the project leaders are non-Maori. He stated that: 
I don't know, I'm not too sure about that one. I think because the project 
leaders are non-Maori, and I consider myself not a project leader. So 
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obviously, I believe that if they were Maori, then I believe that people would 
actually mention that. Because they're not, they won't mention it. 
In contrast, Peter believes that the whanau are marked as Maori (in relation to the 
unmarked scientists) because it makes 'good press': 
Peter: ... I think it's a part of, perhaps the desire to make a good news story 
where the Maori with their simplistic beliefs meet modem science, as in 
Winston Peters' line - it makes a nice story. You know, the crossing of the 
cultural divide and working together for a common cause kind of story. So, 
that makes good press. 
However, personal experience leads him to claim that there is some truth in this 
representation: 
And, there is a degree of truth, you know, I've come from a very different 
world and have come to find myself quite immersed in a Maori environment, 
so there has been crossing over. And I think that's perhaps hyped up, because 
of that, and it makes a good story - it's only when the venture of the whole 
project is always reduced to that, the cultural aspects. 
The Whanau Health Workers and the Media Coverage 
In contrast, the whanau health workers were not overly concerned with the way in 
which they and their work had been represented in the media. Janet notes that they 
had a large degree of control over the content in terms of monitoring and overseeing 
the reports before they were filed. Allison stated that: 'It had to be for our 
specification', and they were not concerned with being marked as Maori, even though 
the ethnicity of the scientists was not noted. Allison has seen the article written by 
Rankine and McCreanor (in press) and although initially disgusted with the media 
coverage, 
.. .it didn't worry me too much. Because it's how, if Peter and them think 
they're better than us, then there's a problem there, but they don't, and so it 
doesn't worry me. 
Moreover, Janet mentioned that 'We are equal partners with all our people.' 
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When I stated that I had never come across the name of one doctor intimately 
involved in the project before, Janet made a comment that signalled she is aware of 
the media bias that ensued after the identification of the gene, and that she resists the 
degrading portrayal: 
Yeah, because they look at the scientists because they discovered the gene, or 
they look at the poor little Maoris on the hill because they started it all. We're 
not poor. 
In addition, another point of interest is that the whanau health workers mentioned that 
they are tired of dealing with the media. Allison said 'it's a pain' having to deal with 
them, but a necessary evil in that they need to keep up publicity in order to ensure 
funding is continuous. However, they spoke of a reporter and photographer from the 
New Zealand Herald who were coming down the next day, and sounded excited about 
the planned 'photo shoot', and joked about wearing gumboots to it. 
The Scientists and the 'Battle' Against Cancer 
Having given consideration to what the key researchers thought about the popular 
culture accounts of the identification of the gene for hereditary stomach cancer, I 
asked them what they thought about the metaphors of cancer and the body that exist in 
scientific and medical discourse as well as popular culture. As previously noted in 
chapter three, Montgomery (1991: 347) asserts that in Western culture, war is the 
reigning image-system for all diseases, and indeed, my own analysis illustrated that 
metaphors of the body and cancer were overwhelmingly masculine, militaristic and 
mechanistic. The following discussion considers what both the scientists and whanau 
health workers think about the way language in these discourses is used. 
Two of the scientists thought that language with mechanistic and militaristic 
connotations which is characteristic of scientific and biomedical discourse, as well as 
popular culture accounts of science and medicine, were appropriate. One scientist 
(Peter), however, began to see how words are fetishised in science, considering the 
wider implications of word use. He does however, explain cancer in terms of a 
biological process, adhering to the notion of microbiology as neutral and disembodied 
as it does not consider the wider socio-cultural and emotional implications of the 
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disease, although, as previously discussed, he does have some idea of the suffering 
involved. 
Peter: I get really frustrated with that when people talk about, (that's probably 
a very good point), you know 'So and so lost their battle against cancer'. That 
just drives me crazy - it's not a battle against cancer, it's not a nice way, a 
good way to describe the disease - again, it's implying that, yeah you're 
absolutely right, that cancer is a foreign invader and you've got to invade it 
back, and it's not, it's part of your own body, a normal, a very normal process 
of your own body gone wrong. Cancer is abnormal cell proliferation, and 
abnormal cell migration, and that is a very normal part of us. When we 
develop as an embryo, cell proliferation, and cell migration is what happens 
when your cells regenerate ... If you're wounded and get a cut, it heals by cells 
proliferating and moving. So normal processes, and every single cell in your 
body has the capacity to do that, and it loses it's control - so it becomes too 
strong, wrong direction, wrong time, then you've got cancer. But it's not 
something that foreign, you know, it's not a foreign invader. 
The Whanau Health Workers on Communicating Science 
The whanau health workers, however, had a more extreme response. While they 
agreed that science and medicine is full of jargon, they believe these discourses 
generally are not an appropriate way of explaining information, and they talk of 
teaching another way to communicate science: 
Janet: Yeah, well we agree that that's how they describe it, but when they talk 
to us, or any of our people, they have to put it in lay people's terms. They have 
to be down to earth, telling them exactly, none of that medical rubbish. If 
you've got cancer, then that's what you've got. It's not 'carcinoma something 
something'. 
Allison: Straight up the guts. You know how I told you about David Shaw? 
Well, he said to me, with that sixteen year old, and there were about 30 of 
them sitting in the room and he goes 'what should I say?' and I said 'tell the 
truth'. 'Be honest, tell them the truth'. And now he knows it works for anyone. 
You don't have to be a Maori. 
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Such language helps to cross the expert/lay divide as discussed by Taussig (1992) in 
chapter four. The statements of the whanau health workers here help to illuminate the 
ways in which words are fetishised in the aforementioned discourses. Their direct 
approach takes into account the embodied experience of illness by not falling into the 
trap of lessening the emotional impact by placing emphasis on the physicality of the 
disease (as in the term 'carcinoma'). Such terms, it can be argued, distance the 
medical professional from the embodied notion of suffering, as they believe that they 
work solely on a physical level, alleviating physical suffering. 
Allison spoke of why the partnership had been so successful, emphasising that it was 
egalitarian and understanding through speaking the same language: 
Allison: And we have been able to make relationships work. That's why they 
call it a 'Blue-print relationship', because it is. You can have relationships, but 
not on an even par. And this is an even par relationship, and unless you see it, 
you'll never know. When the Cancer Control saw it, they knew. And they 
couldn't even describe it to anyone. It was ten minutes before the show, and I 
said to her, Vanessa, you facilitate this, I'm hungover. And she could, 'cos 
we've all got the same language. 
The Lay/Expert Divide? 
One interesting meeting point between the intersection of scientific views of genetic 
testing and the realm of popular culture is the public understanding of science. The 
scientists and whanau health workers I interviewed had differing perspectives on this 
topic, which I will now consider. They differ from my own analysis as discussed in 
chapter two where I revealed the constructions of popular culture and the public 
understanding of science as complex, heterogeneous and fluid categories. One striking 
revelation of this was Nowotny et al's (2001: 2) point that that science and society are 
inseparable as they rely on the same foundation. Similarly, as previously noted, Irwin 
and Wynne (1996: 9) warn against perceiving and portraying the public as 'a 
homogeneous mass which needs to be rendered more receptive to the insights of 
science'. This is because of the fact that 'masses' do not exist naturally, but are 
constructed to appear as such in particular ways (ibid.). These points resonate with 
Haraway's (1997: 67) argument that understanding science as a culture and a practice 
Tania Campbell 127 
> 
Chapter Five Personal Accounts 
makes room for non-scientists to influence the forms of scientific knowledge and who 
this knowledge will be relevant to. They are also important to consider in relation to 
the thoughts of those I interviewed on the public understanding of science. 
All of the scientists interviewed thought that the public (or, more appropriately, non-
scientists) generally did not have a good grasp of what the scientists do. Tom 
expresses that he has difficulty in explaining what he does to lay people, stating that it 
is more difficult to communicate to people 'outside' of what he does than it is to his 
colleagues. Tom, in explaining the genetic sequence to me, stated that: 
So, I think if you don't really understand that, you don't really understand 
what those red and green lines actually mean. I think that's the hardest part to 
convey 'cos you try and actually represent things as simply as possible, but 
people don't understand or maybe don't know what they represent, and it 
makes you work twice as hard. But for us, because we know what they 
actually mean, what they indicate, what they represent, well, it's easier to 
understand that sort of thing. 
Thus, this scientist finds it difficult to communicate with some of the other citizens of 
the city of knowledge production, however, that is not to say that these citizens have a 
lesser understanding of the complexities of technoscience than these scientists. 
Rather, it signals that this scientist finds it easier to communicate with those who 
reside within the laboratories inside the citadel. 
In contrast, the whanau health workers believe that scientists generally and doctors 
especially, need to learn a new way of communicating scientific and medical 
knowledge to non-scientists. They advocate teaching another way to communicate, 
and emphasise the importance of equality between medical professional and patient, 
which requires the professional to communicate with the patient in a way that the 
patient will understand. This requires 'unlearning' what they have learnt to some 
extent, and also, as advocated below, 'chucking the Book away', allowing a degree of 
'plain speaking' to take place. 
The whanau health workers believe that the patient feels more comfortable in this 
personal setting, and this type of communication ensures a degree of honesty, as the 
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professional cannot hide behind medical terminology that no one but that expert 
understands. They also believe that this sense of equality makes for a more humane 
medical encounter (for both doctor and patient), and believe the foundations of 
effective communication are built upon honesty and common sense. Therefore, they 
assert that their work has changed New Zealand society in the sense that it has shown 
a way to bridge the gap between expert and lay knowledge: 
Janet: ... ! suppose one of the things that's come out of what we do [is] that 
you don't have to have a doctor's degree or a physics degree or whatever, it's 
just to be on equal footing with both people. 
Allison: We have a natural ability. You know, even though I was a nurse, I put 
all of that aside, because that's by the Book, you use your common sense. It's 
all by the book in nursing. Chuck it aside. 
Janet: It's all about common sense. And honesty, you know. People don't 
understand medical terminology and stuff like that. So you can tell them in lay 
people's terms and they understand. When you talk about a 'carcinoma of 
something something', they're not going to bloody understand any of that 
crap. 
Allison goes on to criticize the way in which doctors generally communicate with 
their patients, but praising the fact that one doctor in particular acknowledges his 
mistakes. 
David, I love David because he always admits his mistakes, and he admits it to 
the people and that's what I love about him. He's learnt to be honest. Doctors 
- they are so roundabout it's not funny. And they make them believe they're 
going to be alright when they are not. But he knows they're going to be 
alright. He always tells the truth, well you know, from that time on. When I 
say the truth, I mean it's straight up. 
Considering the thoughts and opinions of the scientists and the whanau health workers 
on the aforementioned themes illustrate the complexities involved in the social reality 
of technoscience as it is played out in the dynamic city of knowledge production. 
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Investigating the opinions of these key science workers in the stomach cancer gene 
research project has provided some empirical support for understanding the complex 
social reality of science as technoscience while at the same time demonstrating the 
importance of understanding cultural contexts and the constructions embedded in 
various discourses. I will now move on to the final chapter of this thesis which 
discusses the general conclusions I have drawn from my fieldwork and research for 
this thesis. 










'Nobody wants to leave until there's an end in the story' (Allison, field notes 
7/10/03). 
The purpose of the following discussion is to briefly summarise key findings which 
have emerged from this project and consider them in light of the broader picture of the 
partnership which identified the gene for hereditary stomach cancer as considered 
throughout this thesis. It has become apparent that, in various ways, the intersection 
between scientific views of genetic testing and the realm of popular culture is a messy 
one. The complex knots embedded in the intersection of these realms have been 
illuminated by the employment of anthropology and, to a lesser extent, cultural 
studies, which has also been useful for untangling some of these complexities. How 
genetics is represented in biomedical and scientific discourse as well as popular 
culture speaks volumes of how we construct these worlds, and subsequently, what we 
value in these contexts. This project has shown the importance of considering both 
textual, semiotic portrayals of genetic testing, and the lived reality of living with 
hereditary stomach cancer in New Zealand society. 
Donna Haraway's (1997: 142) notion of gene fetishism has been used throughout this 
thesis as an organizing thread to highlight the ways in which relations and practices 
get mistaken for things-in-themselves as they are taken for granted as both natural and 
objective. In this case, the thing-in-itself is the gene, and focusing on this as a neutral 
object reinforces the separation of the natural from the cultural. This is also the case in 
practices that are characteristic of medical science and biomedicine whereby many 
practitioners of these institutions focus on the physical 'how' of disease, at the cost of 
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revealed the constructed nature of the gene and frames it less as an object and more as 
a web of action made up of human and nonhuman actors (Haraway 1997: 142). 
The use of the notion of technoscience has been useful in highlighting the 
complexities of science as 'cultural practice and practical culture' (Haraway 1997: 
66), signalling that rather than transcending culture, science is entangled within it. 
One interesting thread to emerge from this is the premise that science is multicultural. 
This argument, as considered in chapter two, was put forward by Harding (2001: 
189), who argued that multicultural perspectives are necessary tools in re-thinking 
science. Her key point is that modem science does, in fact, have non-Western origins. 
Modem science, then, can be considered multicultural in the sense that is has 
incorporated components of the knowledge traditions of a myriad of non-European 
cultures (ibid.: 192). This project has shown that, indeed, science is multicultural. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that aspects of Maori culture have been incorporated into 
mainstream scientific practice. For example, as noted in the previous chapter, one 
scientist is now very careful with tissue samples in order to respect the notion of 
whakapapa. Thus, that aspects of the Maori worldview can be accommodated by 
science highlights that science is not only a fluid and dynamic practice, but one that 
may (if prodded) become more multicultural in its practice as well as in its theoretical 
borrowings. This is exemplified by the manner in which the whanau, and the whanau 
health workers especially, have retained a large degree of control over the project and 
the way in which the processes stemming from the original project have been 
conducted. 
As discussed throughout this thesis, popular culture is a crucial site for accessing 
representations of scientific views of genetic testing. It is no more or less privileged as 
a setting of understanding science, as illustrated by the public understanding of 
science which highlights that, as noted by Latour (1987), Haraway (1997), Nowotny 
et al (2001) and myself, science and society are inseparable as they rely on the same 
foundation. This has implications for the public understanding of science as the 
'public', who, as part of society, engage with 'science' actively and critically. 
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The undertaking of discourse analysis as part of the empirical research carried out for 
this thesis revealed the portrayals in popular culture of the identification of the gene 
for hereditary stomach cancer to be both culturally constructed and politicised. The 
forums to discuss this event generally did not appropriately or realistically represent 
what the actual situation was. The discourses operating within these media accounts 
presented indigenous people as victims instead of the initiators of the project and 
directors of the research. My findings also reveal that it is common to use masculine 
and militaristic metaphors in technoscientific and biomedical discourse, as well as in 
popular culture to discuss the relationship between the body, genetics and disease and 
this was indeed the case for New Zealand accounts of the stomach cancer gene 
research. This highlights how such accounts are not objective and neutral. Rather, 
they are culturally constructed to represent material in a certain way. This was 
certainly the case when I examined some of the most prevalent metaphors of the gene 
to exist in contemporary popular culture, which revealed that the broader cultural 
meanings of these metaphors offer a limited and partial understanding of the complex 
socio-cultural relations embedded in technoscience. 
Contrary to the common western portrayal of the gene as an entity is the holistic 
notion of whakapapa, which takes to task the reductive portrayal of the gene in 
popular culture. This Maori perspective highlights that the body can be conceptualised 
in various ways. Maori discourses of genetics as observed in this particular study 
break open the fetishism apparent in science and genetics by offering an 
understanding of the gene and DNA that is more than a physical entity, one that is 
connected to the spiritual and socio-cultural contexts of their worldview, and one that 
western scientists should take heed of. 
In considering the importance of the material body, I examined the complexities of 
medical intervention in relation to this specific case study and considered how the 
whanau health workers negotiate the fetishism apparent in biomedicine. A key way in 
which they do this is by emphasising the importance of communication that makes 
sense to lay people, thereby negating the jargon, which hides the social relations in 
which the practice of biomedicine is embedded. The holistic and straightforward 
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approach of the whanau health workers lessens the degree of fetishism as it prioritises 
the social aspect of the medical encounter. 
Another interesting thread to emerge from this study has been the fact that non-
scientists can be so influential in directing scientific research, especially by 
emphasising the importance of the human component of this research. The whanau 
driven aspect of the project has also been beneficial in that generally, those on the 
receiving end of the project are very satisfied, certainly more so than if the whanau 
had had little say or control in the project. However, it could have been negative: for 
instance, the whanau could have refused to undergo surveillance because of its 
invasive and uncomfortable nature, not to mention the schism between the practices of 
biomedicine and their cultural beliefs. 
Thus, the whanau have manipulated biomedicine for what they want, which debunks 
some writing that has emerged from the social sciences that critiques biomedical 
practices such as surveillance. Taking into account the fact that the whanau are 
generally happy with the outcomes of the partnership and the surveillance 
programme, it is evident that the social science commentaries decrying surveillance 
and the uneven power relations characteristic of indigenous peoples' experiences of 
biomedicine and biotechnology need to be questioned. For example, the bleak 
argument of the new public health, as asserted by Petersen and Lupton (1996) does 
not apply to this case. As previously mentioned in chapter four, they argue that the 
new public health is a recent addition to the regimes of power and knowledge which 
are geared towards the control and surveillance of both individual bodies, and the 
social body (1996: 3). However, as the whanau example shows, this is not the case as 
they have a large degree of agency within this, and they have had, and continue to 
have, a positive experience of surveillance as they see that the beneficial aspects of its 
technologies outweigh its negative aspects. 
The whanau health workers are working within a socio-cultural framework that 
acknowledges that the body is physical, emotional, and spiritual, taking into account 
the embodied self which considers suffering that is more than physical. Interventions 
to improve the physical body, such as genetic testing, endoscopy and gastrectomy are 
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opportunities for improving their health, and more radically, saving lives. However, 
unlike contemporary biomedical practice, they pay attention to not only the 'how' of 
disease, but also the 'why'. In addition, the personal accounts of the whanau health 
workers indicate a strong interest to avoid such concealment in the practice of science 
and medicine. 
Talking to those primarily involved in the partnership has revealed different 
perspectives and experiences of the partnership as the stories they relayed varied 
significantly. These stories also revealed how the categories that we normally put 
people within are unstable and fluid; for example, a Maori scientist who leaves Maori 
culture at the door of the laboratory, and a Pakeha scientist who is mindful of the 
Maori belief in whakapapa. 
The holistic and straightforward approach taken by the whanau health workers and 
their resistance to being fetishised is also reinforced by their desire to have a large 
degree of input into the labour involved with managing both physical and socio-
cultural aspects of the disease. These whanau health workers therefore have an 
embodied understanding of both suffering and the implications of this as they live, 
more than the scientists, with the day-to-day reality of this affliction (a point which 
the scientists involved in the research project have readily acknowledged). 
In terms of science and medicine and authorising intervention, we do not find grateful 
people at the Kimihauora Health Centre - rather, they are dynamic with their own 
understandings and ways of negotiating medical science. This highlights that there is 
scope within science to change, to recognise cultural worth, and highlight the fact that 
we have to labour to accept each other. The scientists had to take the whanau health 
workers on their own terms, but these health workers also allowed that within the 
project, mistakes would be made, and they allowed for things to go wrong, an 
approach that is uncannily similar to the philosophical and sociocultural 
understandings of science as an ongoing falsifiable and culturally relative process. 
The notion that scientists are neutral and that they have privileged knowledge is 
questioned by the personal accounts of the projects which are recorded in this thesis. 





Chapter Six Conclusion 
There is also complexity in their world as, while they continued undertaking the same 
scientific work they had done in the past, their worldviews have become deeply 
enriched, many of them having learnt a great deal about Maori culture, and one 
scientist in particular incorporating aspects of this knowledge into his scientific 
practice. Thus, this has influenced how they go about their work in the laboratory, 
although, they did not acknowledge this, signalling the complexities of living in two 
'split' worlds. Moreover, the whanau health workers have become cultural translators, 
acting as a buffer between potentially deeply divergent understandings of cultural 
activities. However, there is room for improvement as the procedures used to detect 
and treat stomach cancer, such as genetic testing, endoscopy and gastrectomy, are all, 
to varying extents, uncomfortable and invasive procedures. 
In terms of the broader picture, what can be said about the partnership is that it 
continues to be a success. However, it is not a modernist success story - rather, it is 
complex and tangled and is therefore more a postmodern story than a fairytale. Since 
the partnership's inception, there have been both negative and positive consequences, 
and to use a scientific term, it has been not dissimilar to the process of 'trial and 
error'. This process has been necessary, however, to allow for improved relations and 
more effective delivery of procedures. The knowledge that has emerged from it has 
given help and hope to many, not just those within the whanau, but other sufferers of 
hereditary stomach cancer as well. More specifically, it has produced essential 
financial aid and the development of appropriate facilities to help both the whanau 
and other families in New Zealand who carry the disease. 
Overall, the experience seems to have been positive and it is evident that this case 
study is a landmark of skilful indigenous appropriation of technoscience. The 
'standard' social science commentary about issues raised in the partnership - such as 
surveillance, unequal power relations and bioprospecting - do not hold true here for 
this particular project as the whanau have an unusual degree of control over how the 
surveillance procedures are carried out, and how relations within the partnership and 
between the whanau and other biomedical professionals are carried out. They have 
contracts and protocols in place to ensure that any sort of bioprospecting or 
exploitation of their DNA does not take place. Because of this, the scientists seem to 
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be more aware of the (cross-cultural) 'value' of DNA, and consequently, such 
bioprospecting would appear abhorrent to them. 
The labour undertaken in the partnership continues to be an ongoing process. While 
the majority of the whanau now have confirmation of the cause of the disease, in a 
sense, none of their problems have vanished. Arguably, it could be said that there has 
not been a medical breakthrough as there is not yet a cure. However, the scientists 
have learnt something in the process, and beyond the enrichment of Maori culture, 
one scientist in particular is wearier of science, especially in relation to the notions of 
DNA and the commoditization of knowledge. This is thus a hopeful story with 
complex pathways, but through these pathways many of those involved in the 
stomach cancer gene project have come out with better solutions. 
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